2024 INSC June-July

Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 299,300- Provocation itself is not enough to reduce the crime from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In order to convert a case of murder to a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, provocation must me such that would temporarily deprive the power of self-control of a “reasonable person”. What has also to be seen is the time gap between this alleged provocation and the act of homicide; the kind of weapon used; the number of blows, etc. These are again all questions of facts. There is no standard or test as to what reasonableness should be in these circumstances as this would again be a question of fact to be determined by a Court. (Para 25)

Criminal Trial -Long Adjournments –This may affect the fairness of the trial and may even endanger, in a given case, the safety of the witness. As far as possible, the defence should be asked to cross examine the witness the same day or the following day. Only in very exceptional cases, and for reasons to be recorded, the cross examination should be deferred and a short adjournment can be given after taking precautions and care, for the witness, if it is required – A request for deferral must be premised on sufficient reasons, justifying the deferral of cross examination of the witness- The mandate of Section 231 of Cr.PC and the law laid down on the subject referred above must be followed in its letter and spirit. (Para 11-13)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 105- The burden of proof that the accused’s case falls within the general exception is upon the accused himself- This burden of proof though is not as onerous as the burden of proof beyond all reasonable doubts which is on the prosecution, nevertheless some degree of reasonable satisfaction has to be established by the defence, when this plea is taken. (Para 21)

Bail – The condition of dropping a PIN on Google Maps cannot be imposed – Imposing any bail condition which enables the Police/Investigation Agency to track every movement of the accused released on bail by using any technology or otherwise would undoubtedly violate the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21.

Summary – Appeal Against High Court of Kerala judgment that allowed the appeal preferred by the defendant modified the decree passed by the Trial Court whereby, in a suit for specific performance, the Trial Court had directed the defendant no. 1 to refund a sum of Rs. 18,00,000/- (Rs. Eighteen Lakhs only) to the plaintiff- High Court allowed the plaintiff to recover only a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rs. Three Lakhs only) with 12% interest per annum from the date of suit till realisation from the defendant no. 1 – Dismissing appeal, SC observed: There is no reason why payment of such substantial amount of Rs. 15,00,000/- (Fifteen Lakhs only) would be missing in the suit notice. The only possible reason for this could be that the advocate who prepared the notice was not apprised of this fact. If such was the case, plaintiff’s statement in Court, without any further corroboration, is not believable and the High Court has rightly found that the case of the plaintiff as to the subsequent payment of Rs. 15,00,000/- (Fifteen Lakhs only) is not established by positive evidence.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 313 [ Section 351 BNSS] – Though questioning under clause (a) of sub-Section (1) of Section 313, Cr.PC, is discretionary, the questioning under clause (b) thereof is mandatory. Needless to say, a fatal non-compliance in the matter of questioning under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) thereof, in case resulted in material prejudice to any convict in a criminal case the trial concerned, qua that convict should stand vitiated. (Para 1) – Non-questioning or inadequate questioning on incriminating circumstances to an accused by itself would not vitiate the trial qua the accused concerned and to hold the trial qua him is vitiated it is to be established further that it resulted in material prejudice to the accused. True that the onus to establish the prejudice or miscarriage on account of non-questioning or inadequate questioning on any incriminating circumstance(s), during the examination under Section 313, Cr.PC, is on the convict concerned. (Para 21)

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 19(1)(a)- The freedom under Article 19(1)(a), that is the creative freedom of the filmmaker cannot include the freedom to lampoon, stereotype, misrepresent or disparage those already marginalised – if the overall message of the work infringes the rights of persons with disabilities, it is not protected speech, obviating the need for any balancing. However, in appropriate cases, if stereotypical/disparaging portrayal is justified by the overall message of the film, the filmmaker’s right to retain such portrayal will have to be balanced against the fundamental and statutory rights of those portrayed- Guidelines: Representation of persons with disabilities must regard the objective social context of their representation and not marginalise persons with disability: (i) Words cultivate institutional discrimination. Terms such as “cripple” and “spastic” have come to acquire devalued meanings in societal perceptions about persons with disabilities. They contribute to the negative self-image and perpetuate discriminatory attitudes and practices in society; (ii) Language that individualises the impairment and overlooks the disabling social barriers (e.g. terms such as “afflicted”, “suffering”, and “victim”) should be avoided or adequately flagged as contrary to the social model; (iii)Creators must check for accurate representation of a medical condition as much as possible. The misleading portrayal of what a condition such as night blindness entails may perpetuate misinformation about the condition, and entrench stereotypes about persons with such impairments, aggravating the disability v)Persons with disabilities are under-represented. Average people are unaware of the barriers persons with disabilities face. Visual media must reflect their lived experiences. Their portrayal must capture the multitudes of their lived realities, and should not be a uni-dimensional, ableist characterisation; (v) Visual media should strive to depict the diverse realities of persons with disabilities, showcasing not only their challenges but also their successes, talents, and contributions to society. This balanced representation can help dispel stereotypes and promote a more inclusive understanding of disability. Such portrayals should reflect the multifaceted lives of persons with disabilities, emphasizing their roles as active community members who contribute meaningfully across various spheres of life. By highlighting their achievements and everyday experiences, media can shift the narrative from one of limitation to one of potential and agency; (vi)They should neither be lampooned based on myths (such as, ‘blind people bump into objects in their path’) nor presented as ‘super cripples’ on the other extreme. This stereotype implies that persons with disabilities have extraordinary heroic abilities that merit their dignified treatment. For instance, the notion that visually impaired persons have enhanced spatial senses may not apply to everyone uniformly. It also implies that those who do not have such enhanced superpowers to compensate for the visual impairment are somehow less than ideal; (vii) Decision-making bodies must bear in mind the values of participation. The ‘nothing about us, without us’ principle is based on the promotion of participation of persons with disabilities and equalisation of opportunities. It must be put to practice in constituting statutory committees and inviting expert opinions for assessing the overall message of films and their impact on dignity of individuals under the Cinematograph Act and Rules; (viii) The CPRD also requires consultation with and involvement of persons with disabilities in the implementation of measures to encourage portrayal that is consistent with it. Collaboration with disability advocacy groups can provide invaluable insights and guidance on respectful and accurate portrayals, ensuring that content aligns with the lived experiences of persons with disabilities; and (ix)Training and sensitization programs should be implemented for individuals involved in creating visual media content, including writers, directors, producers, and actors. These programs should emphasize the impact of their portrayals on public perceptions and the lived experiences of persons with disabilities. Topics should include the principles of the social model of disability, the importance of respectful language, and the need for accurate and empathetic representation. Regular workshops and collaboration with disability advocacy groups can foster a deeper understanding and commitment to responsible portrayal. (Para 74)

Cinematograph Act, 1952- Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 2024 – Slow interference with the determination of an expert body under the Cinematograph Act, particularly to allow the exhibition of a film. It is for the Board to draw the line between permissible and impermissible portrayal of social ills through visual media, and ensure that the Guidelines are meant to be read as broad standards for the same. (72.1) – The Board must decide whether a disparaging portrayal stood redeemed by the overall message or not. No doubt this entails a complex balancing of interests as we noted at the outset. It would be ideal if the statutory bodies included subject matter experts. The 2024 Rules are a welcome acknowledgment of this principle and consultations with subject matter experts on disability would certainly better inform the perspective of the Board. The policy underlying the Act and the Rules already accounts for expert consultation. This Court cannot interfere merely because it could be better or that a better alternative is available, when the legality of such policy is not in question.121 The Court cannot read additional requirements into unambiguous provisions.It is beyond the remit of constitutional courts to specify the qualifications or expertise that the constituents of these bodies must possess or to direct that such a requirement be legislatively included into the statute.(Para 72.5)

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2016; Section 7(d)– Section 7(d) is directed towards the appropriate government. While we have underlined that the principle of reasonable accommodation includes positive obligations of private parties to support persons with disabilities and facilitate their full participation, we cannot agree that Section 7(d) includes such an obligation against private person. Even otherwise, such a direction would amount to compelled speech. (Para 72.2)

Humour– ‘disabling humour’ that demeans and disparages persons with disability from ‘disability humour’ which challenges conventional wisdom about disability. While disability humour attempts to better understand and explain disability, disabling humour denigrates it.The two cannot be equated in their impact on dignity and on stereotypes about persons with disabilities. (Para 66)

Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Prabodhak Service Rules, 2008 – Is Rule 13(v) of the Rules, insofar as it provides age relaxation to the persons serving under educational projects discriminatory and contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India? The provisions generally including sub clause (v) are not arbitrary or discriminatory. Insofar as the clause (v) is concerned, the historical background leading to the enactment of the Rules itself provides a justification for granting relaxation to the persons serving under the educational project, if they fulfil the condition that they were within the age limit when they were initially engaged. (Para 22)

Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908; Section 11- Res Judicata-The principle of res judicata is applicable not only between the plaintiff and the defendants but also between the co-defendants. In applying the principle of res judicata between the co-defendants, primarily three conditions are necessary to be fulfilled, namely, (i) there must be a conflict of interest between the co-defendants; (ii) there is necessity to decide the said conflict in order to give relief to plaintiff; and (iii) there is final decision adjudicating the said conflict. Once all these conditions are satisfied, the principle of res judicata can be applied inter se the codefendants. (Para 23)

Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908; Section 11- Res Judicata- The general policy behind the principle of res judicata as enshrined under Section 11 CPC is to avoid parties to litigate on the same issue which has already been adjudicated upon and settled. This is in consonance with the public policy so as to bring to an end the conflict of interest on the same issue between the same parties. One of the basic essential ingredients for applying the principle of res judicata, as stated earlier also, is that the matter which is directly and substantially in issue in the previous litigation ought not to be permitted to be raised and adjudicated upon in the subsequent suit. (Para 23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 149 [Section 190 BNS] -When the charge is under Section 149, the presence of the accused as part of the unlawful assembly itself is sufficient for conviction- Their presence with the other co-accused amounted to an unlawful assembly which is sufficient for conviction, even if they may have not actively participated in the commission of the crime. (Para 29)

Summary: Constitution of Search­ cum­Selection Committee for Universities in West Bengal – Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Former Chief Justice of India appointed as Chairperson of the Search ­cum Selection Committees for all the Universities- Eminent educationists, scientists, jurists, subject experts and administrators etc. short­listed for the purpose of empanelment on Search­cum­ Selection Committee(s) .

Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 125 [Section 144 BNSS]- Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 – Section 125 of the CrPC applies to all married women including Muslim married women – Section 125 of the CrPC applies to all non-Muslim divorced women- If Muslim women are married and divorced under Muslim law then Section 125 of the CrPC as well as the provisions of the 1986 Act are applicable. Option lies with the Muslim divorced women to seek remedy under either of the two laws or both laws. This is because the 1986 Act is not in derogation of Section 125 of the CrPC but in addition to the said provision. If Section 125 of the CrPC is also resorted to by a divorced Muslim woman, as per the definition under the 1986 Act, then any order passed under the provisions of 1986 Act shall be taken into consideration under Section 127(3)(b) of the CrPC. -The 1986 Act could be resorted to by a divorced Muslim woman, as defined under the said Act, by filing an application thereunder which could be disposed of in accordance with the said enactment.

Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 125 [Section 144 BNSS]- Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019; Section 5 -In case of an illegal divorce as per the provisions of the 2019 Act then, i) relief under Section 5 of the said Act could be availed for seeking subsistence allowance or, at the option of such a Muslim woman, remedy under Section 125 of the CrPC could also be availed ii) If during the pendency of a petition filed under Section 125 of the CrPC, a Muslim woman is ‘divorced’ then she can take recourse under Section 125 of the CrPC or file a petition under the 2019 Act. iii) The provisions of the 2019 Act provide remedy in addition to and not in derogation of Section 125 of the CrPC.

Summary: Supreme court declares a person as an Indian citizen and not a foreigner. It sets aside Foreigner’s Tribunal order that rejected his citizenship claim.

Foreigners Act, 1946; Section 9 – Does Section 9 of the Act empower the Executive to pick a person at random, knock at his/her/their door, tell him/her/they/them ‘We suspect you of being a foreigner.’, and then rest easy basis Section 9? It is for the authorities concerned to have in their knowledge or possession, some material basis or information to suspect that a person is a foreigner and not an Indian- Ipso facto just an allegation/accusation cannot lead to shifting of the burden to the accused, unless he/she is confronted with the allegation as also the material backing such allegation. Of course, at such stage, the evidentiary value of the material would not be required to be gone into, as the same would be done by the Tribunal in the reference. However, mere allegation, that too, being as vague as to mechanically reproduce simply the words which mirror the text of provisions in the Act cannot be permitted under law. Even for the person to discharge the burden statutorily imposed on him by virtue of Section 9 of the Act, the person has to be intimated of the information and material available against him, such that he/she can contest and defend the proceedings against him. (Para 34-35)

Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 494 [Section 82(1) BNS]- High Court after restoring conviction for the offence under Section 494 I.P.C., sentenced accused to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- each with default sentence to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months- Allowing appeal, SC observed: An offence under Section 494 I.P.C., is a serious offence, the circumstances obtaining in this case would constrain us to hold that the imposition of ‘imprisonment till the rising of the court’ is not a proper sentence falling in tune with the rule of proportionality in providing punishment as mentioned hereinbefore- Imposition of sentence of ‘imprisonment till the rising of the court’ upon conviction for an offence under Section 494 I.P.C., on them was unconscionably lenient or a flea-bite sentence – The sentence awarded to accused Nos.1 and 2 for the conviction under Section 494 I.P.C., modified to six months each, making the nature of the sentence as simple imprisonment for the said period -Fine imposed reduced from Rs. 20,000/- each to Rs. 2,000/- each, as originally awarded by the trial Court.

Criminal Trial – Sentencing – Following the rule of proportionality in imposing punishment would promote and bring order and orderliness in society – It is the solemn duty of the Court to strike a proper balance awarding sentence proportionate to the gravity of the offence committed by the accused concerned upon his conviction for serious offence(s).

Doctrine of Merger – if Special Leave was not granted and the petition was dismissed by a reasoned or unreasoned order, the order against which such Special Leave Petition is filed would not merge with the order of dismissal. However, once leave has been granted in a Special Leave Petition, regardless of whether such appeal is subsequently dismissed with or without reasons, the doctrine of merger comes into play resulting in merger of the order under challenge with that of the appellate forum, and only the latter would hold the field. Consequently, it is the decision of the superior court which remains effective, enforceable, and binding in the eyes of the law, whether the appeal is dismissed by a speaking order or not. (Para 43)

Judgment – State has no authority whatsoever to annul a Court decision through its administrative fiat. Even legislative power cannot be resorted to, to overrule a binding judicial dictum, except that the legislature can remove the basis on which such judgment is founded upon. (Para 45)

Limitation – no undue leverage can be extended to the State or its entities in condonation of delay and that no special privilege can be extended to the State or its instrumentalities. (Para 49)

Service Law – prescription of pay scale for a post entails Policy decision based upon the recommendations of an expert body like Pay Commission. All that the State is obligated to ensure is that the pay structure of a promotional or higher post is not lower than the feeder cadre. Similarly, pay parity cannot be claimed as an indefeasible enforceable right save and except where the Competent Authority has taken a conscious decision to equate two posts notwithstanding their different nomenclature or distinct qualifications. Incidental grant of same pay scale to two or more posts, without any express equation amongst such posts, cannot be termed as an anomaly in a pay scale of a nature which can be said to have infringed the right to equality under Article 16 of our Constitution- The creation, merger, de-merger or amalgamation of cadres within a service to bring efficacy or in the administrative exigencies, is the State’s prerogative. The Court in exercise of its power of judicial review would sparingly interfere in such a policy decision, unless it is found to have brazenly offended Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (Para 53-54)

Summary: Sai Prasad Group of Companies – constitution of a High-Powered Sale Committee to auction the immovable assets of the companies, to the extent they are required to satisfy the investors’ claims and liquidate all other statutory liabilities of the Companies.

Industrial Policy, 2003- The Market fees and Rural Development fees are distinct and, there being no exemption from Rural Development fees mentioned in the 2003 Policy, it only encompasses exemption from Market fees in its ambit. The two fees under the two different statutory frameworks cannot be equated as one by the Respondent and they cannot assume that exemption from “Market fees” would subsume in itself “Rural Development fees” also.

Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order XXIII Rule 3- For a valid compromise in a suit there has to be a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties which would then require it to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. In the absence of any document in writing, the question of the parties signing it does not arise. Even the question of proving such document to the satisfaction of the Court to be lawful, also did not arise- Mere statements of the parties before court about such said compromise, cannot satisfy the requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC. (Para 20-23)

Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 52- Transfer of suit property pendente lite is not void ab initio, as it remains subservient to the pending litigation. The purchaser of any such property takes the bargain subject to the rights of the plaintiff in pending suit. (Para 18)

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 341- The list specified under the Notification under Clause-1 can be amended, altered only by law made by Parliament and, second, it prohibits that but for a law made by Parliament a notification issued under sub-Clause-1 cannot be varied by any subsequent notification. That is to say that neither the Central Government, nor the President can make any amendments or changes in the notification issued under Clause-1 specifying the castes in relation to the States or Union territory, as the case may be- It does not deal with merely castes, races or tribes but also parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes, therefore, if any change is to be made with respect to inclusion or exclusion not only of any caste, race or tribe but also of a part of or group within any of the caste, race or tribe the same has to be done by law made by the Parliament. (Para 12-13)

Summary: Bihar State Government had passed a resolution based upon consideration of recommendations by the State Backward Commission which had recommended that in the list of Extremely Backward Classes published under the Bihar Reservation of Vacancies in Posts and Services (for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes) Act, 1991, the caste “Tanti-Tantwa” recorded at Serial No.33 be deleted and the said “Tanti-Tantwa” be merged in the Scheduled Castes list with the caste ‘Pan/Sawasi’ mentioned at Serial No.20 so that they could get benefit of the Scheduled Castes- Supreme Court held: State Government had no competence/ authority/power to tinker with the lists of Scheduled Castes published under Article 341 of the Constitution – The State may be justified in deleting “Tanti-Tantwa” from the Extremely Backward Classes list on the recommendation of the State Backward Commission, but beyond that to merge “Tanti-Tantwa” with ‘Pan, Sawasi, Panr’ under Entry 20 of the list of Scheduled Castes was nothing short of mala fide exercise for whatever good, bad or indifferent reasons, the State may have thought at that moment. Whether synonymous or not, any inclusion or exclusion of any caste, race or tribe or part of or group within the castes, races or tribes has to be, by law made by the Parliament, and not by any other mode or manner.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 321 [ Section 360 BNSS]– Merely because an accused person is elected to the Legislative Assembly cannot be a testament to their image among the general public. Matters of a gruesome crime akin to the double murder in the present case do not warrant withdrawal of prosecution merely on the ground of good public image of an accused named in the charge sheet after thorough investigation. Contrary to the Trial Court’s view, such withdrawal cannot be said to be allowed in public interest. This reasoning cannot be accepted especially in cases of involvement of influential people. [In this case, Trial Court allowed the application for withdrawal of prosecution for one of the accused persons] (Para 12)

Permanent Alimony– the award of maintenance or permanent alimony should not be penal but should be for the purposes of ensuring a decent living standard for the wife. (Para 32)

Summary: Supreme Court dissolves a marriage and directs: Keeping in view the totality of the circumstances, the social and financial status of the parties, their current employments as well as future prospects, standards of living, and their obligations, liabilities, and other expenses, a onetime settlement amount of Rs. 2 Crores would be a balanced and fair amount. This amount would also cover all pending and future claims. Thus, we fix the said amount as permanent alimony to be paid by the respondent to the appellant within a period of four months.

Bihar City Manager Cadre (Appointment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2014 -A conjoint reading of the Rules, 2014 in particular rules 5 and 11, with the advertisement and giving it a pragmatic and harmonious construction, what emerges is that 32% in the written examination would make a candidate eligible and qualified to be placed in the consideration zone. [In this case, candidate received 22.5 marks out of 70, 32.14 per cent, above the minimum qualifying marks of 32 per cent as per the advertisement, the Court held that the Commission was not right by denying her a place on the merit list.]

Central Excise Act, 1944; Section 4A(1) – in view of sub-section (1) of Section 4A, the question is whether there is any requirement in the said Rules to declare the retail sale price of the commodity on the package. What is relevant is whether the package is of such nature that attracts any of the provisions of the said Rules, which mandatorily require the mention of retail price on the package. In case of a package that does not attract provisions of the said Rules regarding mentioning the retail price, even if the retail price is mentioned on the package, that itself will not attract sub-section (1) of Section 4A of the Excise Act. (Para 15)

Summary: The respondent no.1 is 100 per cent visually impaired. He appeared in the Civil Services Examination, 2008 (CSE2008). Respondent no.1 gave four preferences for services in the following order: Indian Administrative Services (IAS), Indian Revenue Services-Income Tax (IRS (IT)), Indian Railway Personnel Service (IRPS) and Indian Revenue Service (Customs and Excise) (IRS (C&E)). After having undergone the written test and interview, he was denied an appointment- SC held: The cases of respondent no.1 and the other 10 candidates belonging to the VI category who are Civil Appeal No.3303 of 2015 Page 11 of 12 above him in the merit list of CSE-2008 shall be considered for appointment against the backlog vacancies of PWD candidates either in IRS (IT) or in other service/branch;

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11(6)- Scope and standard of judicial scrutiny that an application under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996 can be subjected to when a plea of “accord and satisfaction” is taken by the defendant-The scope of enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement, and nothing else (Para 114) -The dispute pertaining to the “accord and satisfaction” of claims is not one which attacks or questions the existence of the arbitration agreement in any way (Para 115)- The question of “accord and satisfaction”, being a mixed question of law and fact, comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, if not otherwise agreed upon between the parties (Para 116)- If the referral court , goes beyond the scope of enquiry as provided under the section and examines the issue of “accord and satisfaction”, then it would amount to usurpation of the power which the parties had intended to be exercisable by the arbitral tribunal alone and not by the national courts. Such a scenario would impeach arbitral autonomy and would not fit well with the scheme of the Act, 1996. (Para 122) – if the referral courts go into the details of issues pertaining to “accord and satisfaction” and the like, then it would become rather difficult to achieve the objective of expediency and simplification of pleadings. (Para 124) – Tests like the “eye of the needle” and “ex-facie meritless”, although try to minimise the extent of judicial interference, yet they require the referral court to examine contested facts and appreciate prima facie evidence (however limited the scope of enquiry may be) and thus are not in conformity with the principles of modern arbitration which place arbitral autonomy and judicial non-interference on the highest pedestal. (Para 118)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11(6)- While determining the issue of limitation in exercise of the powers under Section 11(6) of the Act, 1996, the referral court should limit its enquiry to examining whether Section 11(6) application has been filed within the period of limitation of three years or not. The date of commencement of limitation period for this purpose shall have to be construed as per the decision in M/s Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. M/s Aptech Ltd. reported in 2024 INSC 155 – the referral courts, at the stage of deciding an application for appointment of arbitrator, must not conduct an intricate evidentiary enquiry into the question whether the claims raised by the applicant are time barred and should leave that question for determination by the arbitrator. Such an approach gives true meaning to the legislative intention underlying Section 11(6-A) of the Act. (Para 133)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 7- The arbitration agreement, being separate and independent from the underlying substantive contract in which it is contained, continues to remain in existence even after the original contract stands discharged by “accord and satisfaction”- Once the full and final settlement of the original contract itself becomes a matter of dispute and disagreement between the parties, then such a dispute can be categorised as one arising “in relation to” or “in connection with” or “upon” the original contract which can be referred to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration clause contained in the original contract, notwithstanding the plea that there was a full and final settlement between the parties. (Para 59)

Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 16– Relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief. As such, the Courts while exercising power to grant specific performance of contract, need to be extra careful and cautious in dealing with the pleadings and the evidence in particular led by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have to stand on their own legs to establish that they have made out case for grant of relief of specific performance of contract. The Act, 1963 provides certain checks and balances which must be fulfilled and established by the plaintiffs before they can become entitled for such a relief. The pleadings in a suit for specific performance have to be very direct, specific and accurate. A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected. Section 16(C) of the 1963 Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract. The said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory. (Para 22(i))

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1882; Section 138 & 147- Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 makes all offences under NI Act compoundable offences – Settlement agreement can be treated to be compounding of the offence – All the same, Section 320 (5) of CrPC provides that if compounding has to be done after conviction, then it can only be done with the leave of the Court where appeal against such conviction is pending- In cases where the accused relies upon some document for compounding the offence at the appellate stage, courts shall try to check the veracity of such document, which can be done in multiple ways – Dishonour of cheques is a regulatory offence which was made an offence only in view of public interest so that the reliability of these instruments can be ensured – A large number of cases involving dishonour of cheques are pending before courts which is a serious concern for our judicial system. Keeping in mind that the ‘compensatory aspect’ of remedy shall have priority over the ‘punitive aspect’, courts should encourage compounding of offences under the NI Act if parties are willing to do so. (Para 4-7)

Bail– An accused is entitled to a speedy trial- An accused or an undertrial has a fundamental right to speedy trial which is traceable to Article 21 of the Constitution of India. If the alleged offence is a serious one, it is all the more necessary for the prosecution to ensure that the trial is concluded expeditiously. When a trial gets prolonged, it is not open to the prosecution to oppose bail of the accused-undertrial on the ground that the charges are very serious. Bail cannot be denied only on the ground that the charges are very serious though there is no end in sight for the trial to conclude- Article 21 of the Constitution of India is overarching and sacrosanct. A constitutional court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused-undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the way. Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an intrinsic part. In the given facts of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline to grant bail. But it would be very wrong to say that under a particular statute, bail cannot be granted. It would run counter to the very grain of our constitutional jurisprudence. (Para 22-32)

NDPS Act, 1986; Section 37- While considering the application for bail made by an accused involved in an offence under NDPS Act a liberal approach ignoring the mandate under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. Recording a finding mandated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which is sine qua non for granting bail to an accused under the NDPS Act cannot be avoided while passing orders on such applications – When the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, are not satisfied, the sole reason that the accused is a HIV patient cannot be a reason to enlarge her on bail. (Para 8-10)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11 – The initiation of arbitration and criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 are separate and independent proceedings that arise from two separate causes of action. Therefore, the institution of the proceedings under Section 138 does not imply a ‘continuing cause of action’ for the purpose of initiating arbitration. (Para 9)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11 –Whether a claim is barred by limitation lies ordinarily within the domain of the arbitral tribunal. However, a court exercising jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act may reject ex facie non-arbitrable or dead claims, to protect the other party from being drawn into a protracted arbitration process, that is bound to eventually fail. The court must ‘cut the deadwood’ by refraining from appointing an arbitrator when claims are ex facie time-barred and dead, or there is no subsisting dispute.This examination does not involve a full review of contested facts but only a primary review, where uncontested facts speak for themselves.Such limited scrutiny is necessary as it is the duty of the court to protect the parties from being compelled to arbitrate when the claim is demonstrably barred by limitation. If courts do not intervene within this limited compass and mechanically refer every dispute to arbitration, it may undermine the effectiveness of the arbitration process itself. (Para 5)

Principle of Promissory Estoppel Or Legitimate Expectation – A prior executive decision does not bar the State legislature from enacting a law or framing any policy contrary to or in conflict with the previous executive decision in furtherance of larger public interest. Nor can it be canvassed that the law laid down by the legislature would be hit by principle of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation because earlier the executive had expressed its view differently- Promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation can be dealt with on the same status of the executive decision when the prior as well as the subsequent decisions are both taken by the same or similarly placed authorities. Where the executive takes a decision based upon which a party acts and, later on, the executive withdraws that decision to the detriment of the party acting upon the earlier decision, it can be said to be estopped from withdrawing its promise or depriving the party from its legitimate expectation of what had been promised- If the previous executive decision is withdrawn, modified or amended in any manner in exercise of legislative power in larger public interest, then the earlier promise upon which the party acts, cannot be enforced as a right and neither can the authorities be estopped from withdrawing its promise, as such an expectation does not give any enforceable right to the party. (Para 25-27)

Doctrine of bona fide purchaser –The doctrine of bona fide purchaser for value applies in situations where the seller appears to have some semblance of legitimate ownership rights. However, this principle does not protect a subsequent purchaser if the vendor had already transferred those rights through a prior sale deed. In a case where the vendor deceitfully executes a second sale deed years after the initial transfer, without disclosing the earlier transaction and without any ongoing litigation regarding the property, the subsequent purchaser cannot claim the benefits of a bona fide purchaser. Essentially, if the vendor’s rights were already severed by the first sale, any later sale deed made without transparency and in bad faith is invalid. The subsequent purchaser, even if unaware of the prior sale, cannot be considered bona fide because the vendor no longer had the legal right to sell the property. Thus, the protection afforded by the bona fide purchaser doctrine is nullified by the vendor’s deceitful conduct and the pre-existing transfer of rights. This ensures that the original purchaser’s rights are upheld and prevents unjust enrichment through fraudulent transactions. (Para 35)

Transfer Of Property Act, 1882; Section 54 – Registration Act, 1908 – If the purchaser has no means to pay stamp duty or exorbitant demand of stamp duty is made by the registering authority which the purchaser is unable to pay at that time but he remains satisfied with the fact that the vendor has fairly and duly executed the sale deed presented it for registration and put him in possession of the purchased property which he is peacefully enjoying, he is always at liberty to pay the deficiency of stamp duty at any point of time. The document presented for registration will remain with the Registering Authority till such time, the deficiency is removed. However, this pendency of registration on account of deficiency cannot enure any benefit to the vendor, who has already eliminated all his rights by executing the sale deed after receiving the sale consideration. He cannot become the owner of the transferred land merely because the document of sale is pending for registration. It is the purchaser who cannot produce such document which is pending registration with respect to the immovable property in evidence before the Court of law as the same would be inadmissible in view of statutory provision contained in the TP Act as also the Act, 1908. (Para 33.13)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908- Even if the defendant/opposite party failed to file a written statement and, in that matter, even if forfeiture of the right to file written statement has occasioned it would not disentitle that party from participating in the further proceedings, without filing a written statement and in such circumstances, the said party would also be having the right to cross-examine the witness(es), if any, of the plaintiff/complainant. (Para 15)

Consumer Protection Act,2019 – Practice and Procedure – In the absence of any specific provisions dealing with non-filing of written statements/forfeiture of the right to file a written statement, it can only be held that it should bar the opposite party in a proceeding before the Consumer Redressal Forums to bring in pleadings, indirectly to introduce its/his case and evidence to support such case. In the situations mentioned above, the right of the opposite party is confined to participate in the proceedings without filing a written statement and to cross-examine witness(es), if any, examined by the complainant(s). (Para 18)

Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 307 [Section 109 BNSS]-The victim need not suffer any kind of bodily injury. The offence to commit murder punishable under Section 307, IPC is constituted by the concurrence of mens rea followed by actus reus, to commit an attempt to murder though its accomplishment or sufferance of any kind of bodily injury to the victim is not a ‘sine qua non’ – if a man commits an act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that if death had been caused, the offence would have amounted to murder or the act itself is of such a nature as would have caused death in the usual course of an event, but something beyond his control prevented that result, his act would constitute the offence punishable as an attempt to murder under Section 307, IPC. (Para 6) – In case the victim suffered hurt in terms of the second part of Section 307, IPC, the convict can be sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. In the event the court did not consider that imprisonment for life is not to be imposed the other option, going by the provision, is only to impose such punishment as is mentioned in the first part of Section 307, IPC.

Legal Maxim – ‘Culpae poena per esto’ – Let the punishment be proportionate to the offence; let the punishment fit the crime.

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Section 20 – In a case where a civil contempt is alleged by a party by referring to a “continuing wrong/breach/offence” and such allegation prima facie satisfies the court, the action for contempt is not liable to be nipped in the bud merely on the ground of it being presented beyond the period of one year as in section 20 of the Act. Applicability of the principle underlying Order VII Rule 6, CPC for granting exemption would only be just and proper having regard to the object and purpose for which the jurisdiction to punish for contempt is exercised by the courts if, of course, the court is satisfied that benefit of such an exemption ought to be extended in a given case. At the same time, it must be remembered that the court cannot grant exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship – e. For a “continuing wrong/breach/offence” to be accepted as a ground for seeking exemption in an action for contempt, the party petitioning the court not only has to comprehend what the phrase actually means but would also be required to show, from his pleadings, the ground resting whereon he seeks exemption from limitation. Should the party fail to satisfy the court, the petition is liable to outright rejection. Also, the court has to be vigilant. Stale claims of contempt, camouflaged as a “continuing wrong/breach/offence” ought not to be entertained, having regard to the legislative intent for introducing section 20 in the Act which has been noticed above. Contempt being a personal action directed against a particular person alleged to be in contempt, much of the efficacy of the proceedings would be lost by passage of time. Even if a contempt is committed and within the stipulated period of one year from such commission no action is brought before the court on the specious ground that the contempt has been continuing, no party should be encouraged to wait indefinitely to choose his own time to approach the court. If the bogey of “continuing wrong/breach/offence” is mechanically accepted whenever it is advanced as a ground for claiming exemption, an applicant may knock the doors of the Court any time suiting his convenience. If an action for contempt is brought belatedly, say any time after the initial period of limitation and years after the date of first breach, it is the prestige of the court that would seem to become a casualty during the period the breach continues. Once the dignity of the court is lowered in the eyes of the public by non-compliance of its order, it would be farcical to suddenly initiate proceedings after long lapse of time. Not only would the delay militate against the legislative intent of inserting section 20 in the Act (a provision not found in the predecessor statutes of the Act) rendering the section a dead letter, the damage caused to the majesty of the court could be rendered irreparable. It is, therefore, the essence of justice that in a case of proved civil contempt, the contemnor is suitably dealt with, including imposition of punishment, and direction as well is issued to bridge the breach. (Para 55-57)

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 129,215– Contempt of Courts Act, 1971– The power of the Supreme Court and a high court to punish for breach of its orders is expressly recognised by Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution, respectively. It is an inherent power, distinguishable from a power derived from a statute. (Para 29)- Despite such a power being conferred by the Constitution, what would constitute contempt – civil and criminal – and also, what would be the procedure for initiating action and how to punish for contempt is provided by the Act. (Para 33).

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971– In the vast majority of cases seeking invocation of the provisions of the Act for an alleged civil contempt, institution of proceedings is through a petition or an application containing information made available by a party alleging that the facts disclosed by him do constitute contempt of court and, thus, provide the court the premise for initiating proceedings to commit for contempt. The role of such a party, who brings a petition for contempt and activates the court’s machinery, is merely that of an informer. Despite such a party figuring in the memo of parties as a petitioner, the matter relating to entertainment of his petition and the punishment to be imposed, in case of a proved contempt, relate to the exclusive jurisdiction and authority of the high courts to punish for contempt and is substantially a matter between the court and the alleged contemnor. Whether or not to take the assistance of the petitioning informer is a question which invariably must be left entirely to the discretion of the court seized of the proceedings. (Para 45)

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971– Insofar as an interim order is concerned, despite an element of contempt being involved, if a defence appearing to be valid in law and having substance is raised before the high court by a party in default which shakes the very foundation of the order alleged to have been violated and upon the high court reaching a satisfaction of such a defence being valid to the extent that the subject order ought not to have been passed, it would always be open to the said court, depending on the nature of order and the breach alleged, to first secure compliance of the order by allowing the contemnor to purge the contempt without prejudice to his rights and contentions and, after such compliance, to revisit the order as per law and the circumstances present before it and then pass appropriate orders. There could be exceptional situations where the consequences of complying with an interim order, apparently erroneous or without jurisdiction and which has attained finality, could bring about irretrievable consequences. In such a case, where the high court is satisfied that securing compliance of its order would cause more injustice than justice, notwithstanding the finality attached to such order, the high court’s authority ought to be conceded to pass such order as the justice of the case before it demand. (Para 47)

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971– State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Supreme Court & High Court Judges (2024) 3 SCC 1-Standard Operating Procedure for being followed by the high courts while summoning public officials, alleged to be in contempt, to be physically present in court- Deeply concerned with the lack of self-restraint shown in the exercise of contempt power in certain cases, the Bench directed framing of rules by all the high courts in terms of the SoP, as devised- This Court noted in such decision that mandating the physical presence of a contemnor, specifically in the case of public officials, comes at a cost to the public interest and efficiency of public administration, and thus ought not to be resorted to at the drop of a hat -Concomitantly, there lies a bounden duty on the contemnor to comply with the court’s order without any delay, in a case where legal recourse has not been taken to set aside/review/vacate the order which is alleged to have been breached. A public official against whom an allegation of contempt is levelled, upon being noticed either by issuance of a rule for contempt or by court notice, must work out his remedy in accordance with law if he wishes not to comply with the court’s direction. He must not wait for compliance to be secured only upon all the phased steps to be taken by the high courts in terms of paragraph 44 of State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), forming part of the SoP, are complete. A public official who is arrayed as a contemnor is as much bound by an unchallenged order of a high court as a private party is, and cannot consider himself not bound by the law by virtue of the office he holds. Being under a duty to comply with a final and binding order of a high court, the contemnor ought not to drag his feet in doing the same until the coercive measure of summoning the contemnor to be physically present is resorted to by the high court. (Para 38-39)

Code Of Civil Procedure,1908; Section 114 and Order XLVII – Review – The exercise of review jurisdiction is not an inherent power given to the court; the power to review has to be specifically conferred by law – The provisions contained in section 114 and Order XLVII of the CPC relating to review of an order or decree are mandatory in nature and any petition for review not satisfying the rigours therein cannot be entertained ex debito justitiae, by a court of law. (Para 12) – The general impression is that more the number of grounds, less the likelihood of existence of a case for review. To succeed in a motion for review, viewed through the prism of ‘error apparent on the face of the record’, it does neither require long-drawn arguments nor an elaborate process of reasoning as these may be required, in a given case, when exercising the power of merit review. An error apparent on the face of the record has to be self-evident. Where, conceivably, two opinions can be formed in a given set of facts and circumstances and one opinion of the two has been formed, there is no error apparent on the face of the record. (Para 25) An applicant seeking review on the basis of discovery of new evidence has to demonstrate: first, that there has been discovery of new evidence, of which he had no prior knowledge or that it could not be produced at the time the decree was passed or the order made despite due diligence; and secondly, that the new evidence is material to the order/decree being reviewed in the sense that if the evidence were produced in court when the decree was passed or the order made, the decision of the court would have been otherwise. Ultimately, it is for the court to decide whether a review sought for by an applicant, if granted, would prevent abuse of the process of law and/or miscarriage of justice. (Para 16)

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 226- The principles flowing from the CPC may safely be taken as a guide to decide writ proceedings but to the extent the same can be made applicable. (Para 13)

Legal Maxim – Secundum allegata et probate – The court will arrive at its decision on the basis of the claims and proof led by the parties. (Para 71)

Pleadings – When a point is not traceable in the pleas set out either in a plaint or a written statement, findings rendered on such point by the court would be unsustainable as that would amount to an altogether new case being made out for the party. (Para 71)

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 32, 226 – Judicial Review of the decision taken by the bodies concerned in the matter of Genetically Modified Organisms is permissible- Directions issued: The respondent-Union of India is directed to evolve a National Policy with regard to GM crops in the realm of research, cultivation, trade and commerce in the country. The said National Policy shall be formulated in consultation with all stakeholders, such as, experts in the field of agriculture, biotechnology, State Governments, representatives of the farmers, etc. The National Policy to be formulated shall be given due publicity. ii. For the aforesaid purpose, the MoEF&CC shall conduct a national consultation, preferably within the next four months, with the aim of formulating the National Policy on GM crops. The State Governments shall be involved in evolving the National Policy on GM crops. iii. Respondent – Union of India must ensure that all credentials and past records of any expert who participates in the decision-making process should be scrupulously verified and conflict of interest, if any, should be declared and suitably mitigated by ensuring representation to wide range of interests. Rules in this regard may be formulated having a statutory force. iv. In the matter of importing of GM food and more particularly GM edible oil, the respondent shall comply with the requirements of Section 23 of FSSA, 2006, which deals with packaging and labelling of foods.

Legal Maxim – Expressio unius est exclusio alterius- When a manner is specified for doing a certain thing, then all other modes for carrying out such act are expressly excluded -When a statute contemplates a specific procedure to be adhered to in order to arrive at a desired end, such procedure cannot be substituted by an alternative procedure which is not contemplated under the statute. Further, if an action is to be carried out by way of issuance of a particular statutory instrument on the basis of certain requirements, such action cannot be validly carried out by way of issuance of an instrument when the same is not contemplated under the statute [ Referred to Taylor vs. Taylor, (1875) LR 1 Ch D 426 (“Taylor”) and Nazir Ahmad vs. King-Emperor, 1936 SCC OnLine PC 41 : (1935-36) 63 IA 372 (“Nazir Ahmad”) – Parbhani Transport Cooperative Society Ltd. vs. Regional Transport Authority Aurangabad, (1960) 3 SCR 177 : AIR 1960 SC 801, Dipak Babaria vs. State of Gujarat, (2014) 3 SCC 502 , Kameng Dolo vs. Atum Welly, (2017) 7 SCC 512, Tahsildar, Taluk Office, Thanjore vs. G. Thambidurai, (2017) 12 SCC 642, Union of India vs. Charanjit S. Gill, (2000) 5 SCC 742. (Para 42.19-42.20 of Justice BV Nagarathna opinion)

Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 439 – [Section 483 BNSS] – In an application made under Section 439(2) of the CrPC or Section 483(3) of the BNSS or other proceedings filed seeking cancellation of bail, the power to grant an interim stay of operation of order to bail can be exercised only in exceptional cases when a very strong prima facie case of the existence of the grounds for cancellation of bail is made out. While granting a stay of an order of grant of bail, the Court must record brief reasons for coming to a conclusion that the case was an exceptional one and a strong prima facie case is made out – As a normal rule, the ex­parte stay of the bail order should not be granted. The said power can be exercised only in rare and very exceptional cases where the situation demands the passing of such drastic order. Where such a drastic ex­parte order of stay is passed, it is the duty of the Court to immediately hear the accused on the prayer for continuation of the interim relief. When the Court exercises the power of granting ex­parte ad interim stay of an order granting bail, the Court is duty bound to record reasons why it came to the conclusion that it was a very rare and exceptional case where a drastic order of ex­parte interim stay was warranted. (Para 20)

Customs Act, 1962; Section 124,125,28,28AB- The owner of goods has a liability to pay customs duty, even after confiscated goods are redeemed after payment of fine under Section 125 of the Act. Furthermore, when confiscation proceedings are initiated under Section 124 of the Act, the obligation to pay duty and other charges under Section 125 will arise only when the owner of goods exercises the option to pay fine for redemption of goods and the Department accepts it. Liability to pay customs duty in such confiscation proceedings under Section 125(2) is distinct from the assessment and determination of duty, which can rise only under Section 28. The duty liability arising under Section 125(2) must be assessed under Section 28 – Once Section 28 applies for determination of duty, interest on delayed payment of duty under Section 28AB follows. (Para 1)

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,2016– A holding company and its subsidiary are always distinct legal entities. The holding company would own shares of the subsidiary company. That does not make the holding company the owner of the subsidiary’s assets.- Therefore, the assets of the subsidiaries cannot be included in the resolution plan of the holding company. (Para 21,28)

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,2016; Section 7– The financial creditor can always file separate applications under Section 7 of the IBC against the corporate debtor and the corporate guarantor. The applications can be filed simultaneously as well. (Para 19,28)

Indian Contract Act, 1872; Section 126-137- The liability of the surety and the principal debtor is co-extensive. The creditor has remedies available to recover the amount payable by the principal borrower by proceeding against both or any of them. The creditor can proceed against the guarantor first without exhausting its remedies against the principal borrower- if any variance is made without surety’s consent in the terms of the contract between the principal debtor and the creditor, it amounts to discharge of the surety as to the transactions subsequent to the variance. Under the provisions of Section 133, surety can be discharged only when there is a variance made in the terms of the contract between the principal debtor and the creditor. Section 134 contemplates a situation where the principal debtor is released by a contract between the creditor and the principal debtor. In such a case, the surety is discharged. If by any act or omission on the part of the creditor, the legal consequence of which is the discharge of the principal debtor, the surety stands discharged. Section 135 is based on the same principle on which Section 133 is based. If there is a contract between the creditor and the principal debtor by which the creditor makes a composition or promise with the principal debtor, or gives time to the principal debtor or agrees not to sue the principal debtor, it amounts to discharge of the surety provided the surety has not assented to such a contract. If the creditor contracts with a third party to give time to the principal debtor, and when the principal debtor is not a party to such a contract, the surety is not discharged. Section 137 lays down a settled principle that it is not necessary for the creditor to first sue the principal debtor or adopt a remedy against him. If the creditor omits to do that, unless there is a contract to the contrary, it will not amount to discharge of the surety. This means that without proceeding to recover the debt against the principal debtor, the creditor can proceed against the surety unless there is a contract to the contrary. Even if the creditor discharges one surety, it will not amount to the discharge of the other surety- If the creditor recovers a part of the amount guaranteed by the surety from the surety and agrees not to proceed against the surety for the balance amount, that will not extinguish the remaining debt payable by the principal borrower. In such a case, the creditor can proceed against the principal borrower to recover the balance amount. Similarly, if there is a compromise or settlement between the creditor and the surety to which the principal borrower is not a consenting party, the liability of the borrower qua the creditor will remain unaffected. The provisions regarding the discharge of the surety discussed above show that involuntary acts of the principal borrower or creditor do not result in the discharge of surety. (Para 14-15)

Service Law – Promotion is effective from the date it is granted and not from the date when a vacancy occurs on the subject post or when the post itself is created. No doubt, a right to be considered for promotion has been treated by courts not just as a statutory right but as a fundamental right, at the same time, there is no fundamental right to promotion itself – Once employed, the employees are entitled for being considered for promotion to the next higher post subject to their satisfying the eligibility criteria, as per the applicable rules. Failure to consider an employee for promotion even after satisfying the eligibility criteria would violate her fundamental right. However, a clear distinction has been drawn between the stage of considering an employee for being promoted to taking the next step of recognizing the said right as a vested right for promotion. That is where the line has to be drawn. Stated differently, a right to be considered for promotion being a facet of the right to equal opportunity in employment and appointment, would have to be treated as a fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India but such a right cannot translate into a vested right of the employee for being necessarily promoted to the promotional post, unless the rules expressly provide for such a situation- romotion to a post should only be granted from the date of the promotion and not from the date on which a vacancy may have arisen- No employee can lay a claim for being promoted to the next higher post merely on completing the minimum qualifying service. (Para 18-27)

Summary : Appeal against HC Judgmentsetting aside the order of termination of services of the respondent – Allowing appeal, SC held: respondent had complete knowledge of the registration of the FIR and pendency of the criminal cases. Despite that, he had wilfully withheld material information from the appellants while filling up the Verification Roll. He had further misconducted himself when the appellants issued him a show-cause notice calling upon him to explain his position and falsely denied the allegations levelled against him in his reply to the notice to show cause that ultimately led to initiation of disciplinary proceedings against him.

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 143A, 141- The drawer under Section 143A refers specifically to the issuer of the cheque, not the authorized signatories – Liability under Section 141 arises from the conduct or omission of the individual involved, not merely their position within the company – The distinction between legal entities and individuals acting as authorized signatories is crucial. Authorized signatories act on behalf of the company but do not assume the company’s legal identity. This principle, fundamental to corporate law, ensures that while authorized signatories can bind the company through their actions, they do not merge their legal status with that of the company. (Para 28-35)

Summary: Appeal arose from a partition suit- Appeals allowed.

Summary: Writ petition seeking a direction for convening a re-test on the ground that (i) there was a leakage of the question paper; and (ii) there are systemic deficiencies in the modalities envisaged for the conduct of the examination- SC Held: Ordering the cancellation of the entire NEET (UG) 2024 examination is not justified-There are no abnormalities in the results for 2024 when compared with the results for the past two years – The leak of the paper does not appear to be widespread or systemic. It appears to be restricted to isolated incidents in some cities, which have been identified by the police or are in the process of being identified by the CBI- The manner in which NTA has organised the exam this year gives rise to serious concerns. The Court is cognizant of the fact that national-level exams with participation from tens of lakhs of students require immense resources, coordination, and planning. But that is precisely the reason for the existence of a body such as NTA. It is no excuse to say that the exam is conducted in myriad centres or that a large number of aspirants appear for the exam.

Examinations – The cancellation of an examination, either for the purposes of gaining admission into professional and other courses or for the purpose of recruitment to a government post, is justified only in cases where the sanctity of the exam is found to be compromised at a systemic level. Courts may direct the cancellation of an examination or approve such cancellation by the competent authority only if it is not possible to separate the tainted candidates from the untainted ones- The purpose of testing whether the integrity of the exam has been compromised at a systemic level is to ensure that the cancellation of the exam which has already taken place and the conduct of a fresh examination is a proportionate response.14 This is also why courts are required to assess the extent of the use of unfair means and separately, consider whether it is possible to separate tainted and untainted candidates. A holistic view must be taken – In arriving at a conclusion as to whether an examination suffers from widespread issues, courts must ensure that allegations of malpractice are substantiated and that the material on record, including investigative reports, point to that conclusion. There must be at least some evidence to allow the Court to reach that conclusion. This standard need not be unduly strict. To elaborate, it is not necessary for the material on record to point to one and only conclusion which is that malpractice has taken place at a systemic level. However, there must be a real possibility of systemic malaise as borne out by the material before the Court. (Para 64-67)

Constitution Of India, 1950; Seventh Schedule -Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – Royalty is not a tax. Royalty is a contractual consideration paid by the mining lessee to the lessor for enjoyment of mineral rights. The liability to pay royalty arises out of the contractual conditions of the mining lease. The payments made to the Government cannot be deemed to be a tax merely because the statute provides for their recovery as arrears; b. Entry 50 of List II does not constitute an exception to the position of law laid down in M P V Sundararamier (supra). The legislative power to tax mineral rights vests with the State legislatures. Parliament does not have legislative competence to tax mineral rights under Entry 54 of List I, it being a general entry. Since the power to tax mineral rights is enumerated in Entry 50 of List II, Parliament cannot use its residuary powers with respect to that subject-matter; c. Entry 50 of List II envisages that Parliament can impose “any limitations” on the legislative field created by that entry under a law relating to mineral development. The MMDR Act as it stands has not imposed any limitations as envisaged in Entry 50 of List II; d. The scope of the expression “any liimitations” under Entry 50 of List II is wide enough to include the imposition of restrictions, conditions, principles, as well as a prohibition; e. The State legislatures have legislative competence under Article 246 read with Entry 49 of List II to tax lands which comprise of mines and quarries. Mineralbearing land falls within the description of “lands” under Entry 49 of List II; f. The yield of mineral bearing land, in terms of the quantity of mineral produced or the royalty, can be used as a measure to tax the land under Entry 49 of List II. . Entries 49 and 50 of List II deal with distinct subject matters and operate in different fields. Mineral value or mineral produce can be used as a measure to impose a tax on lands under Entry 49 of List II; h. The “limitations” imposed by Parliament in a law relating to mineral development with respect to Entry 50 of List II do not operate on Entry 49 of List II because there is no specific stipulation under the Constitution to that effect.

Constitution Of India, 1950; Article 226 – Pension – Pension is a right and not a bounty. It is a constitutional right for which an employee is entitled on his superannuation. However, pension can be claimed only when it is permissible under the relevant rules or a scheme. If an employee is covered under the Provident Fund Scheme and is not holding a pensionable post, he cannot claim pension, nor the writ court can issue mandamus directing the employer to provide pension to an employee who is not covered under the rules. (Para 35) [The employees of Roadways who were not holding any pensionable post prior to their deputation or absorption in the Corporation, are not entitled to pension, as their service conditions in the erstwhile Roadways did not provide that they are entitled to pension. Thus, they have not been put to any inferior service conditions on their joining the services in the Corporation]

Summary: Appeal by the National Highways Authority of India against HC direction that NHAI, will not levy and collect any fee from the users at Runni Toll Plaza on Muzaffarpur-Sonbarsa section of National Highway-77 with effect from 07.07.2015. It was further directed that the appellant, NHAI, shall not levy any fee in exercise of its power under Rule 3(1) of the National Highways Fee (Determination of Rates and Collection) Rules, 20082 till completion of the project- SC Allowed appeal and set aside HC directions.

Summary: Appeal against NCDRC Order – Partly allowing appeal, SC held: Direction made by the learned Commission for refund of the entire amount deposited by the complainants-appellants is upheld. However, the direction with regard to interest is modified to the extent that it shall be paid at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of respective deposit till the date of refund

Advocates Act, 1960; Section 24– The State Bar Councils (SBC) cannot charge “enrolment fees” beyond the express legal stipulation under Section 24(1)(f) as it currently stands; Section 24(1)(f) specifically lays down the fiscal pre-conditions subject to which an advocate can be enrolled on State rolls. The SBCs and the BCI cannot demand payment of fees other than the stipulated enrolment fee and stamp duty, if any, as a pre-condition to enrolment; The decision of the SBCs to charge fees and charges at the time of enrolment in excess of the legal stipulation under Section 24(1)(f) violates Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution- This decision will have prospective effect. The SBCs are not required to refund the excess enrolment fees collected before the date of this judgment. (Para 109)

Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 362- The second prayer in the writ petition could have been hit by Section 362 of the Cr.PC, as the prayer was to quash the order on the application for discharge (This prayer was sought in writ petition that was dismissed earlier). But the first prayer was for quashing the complaint itself. Therefore, dismissing the first prayer in the writ petition on the ground of the bar of Section 362 of the Cr.PC was erroneous. (Para 15)

Criminal Trial – The threshold for disbelieving a witness is not mere discrepancy or inconsistency but material discrepancy and inconsistency, which renders the account narrated by the witnesses so highly improbable that the same may safely be discarded altogether from consideration. (Para 15)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 134 -No particular number of witnesses is required, in any case, to prove a fact. Therefore, it is not the law that a conviction cannot be recorded unless there is oral testimony of at least two witnesses matching with each other. It is the quality of evidence and not the quantity that matters. If the evidence of a solitary witness appeals to the court to be wholly reliable, the same can form the foundation for recording a conviction. (Para 17)

Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 300– Death caused by a single stab wound can also be considered murder if the requirements of section 300, IPC are fulfilled. (Para 25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 299,300-Culpable homicide and murder are closely related concepts. It is often said that culpable homicide is the genus and murder is one of species in that genus. All murders are culpable homicide but not all culpable homicides are murder. (Para 21)

Criminal Trial – Test Information Parade – TIP is only a part of Police investigation. The identification in TIP of an accused is not a substantive piece of evidence. The substantive piece of evidence, or what can be called evidence is only dock identification that is identification made by witness in Court during trial- In cases where accused is a stranger to a witness and there has been no TIP, the trial court should be very cautious while accepting the dock identification by such a witness- The relevance of a TIP, depends on the fact of a case. In a given case, TIP may not be necessary. The non conduct of a TIP may not prejudice the case of the prosecution or affect the identification of the accused. It would all depend upon the facts of the case. It is possible that the evidence of prosecution witness who has identified the accused in a court is of a sterling nature, and therefore TIP may not be necessary. It is the task of the investigation team to see the relevance of a TIP in a given case. Not conducting TIP in a given case may prove fatal for the prosecution – (Para 12-13)

Criminal Trial –The normal rule of human conduct is that a person would confess the commission of a serious crime to a person in whom he has implicit faith. The accused had worked in prosecution witness’s shop only for five months in 2004. The accused was otherwise not known to him. Therefore, it is unnatural that the accused would call the deceased on the phone and confess. (Para 7)

Summary: Murder accused acquitted – concurrent conviction set aside.

Hindu Marriage Act, 1956; Section 13- The desertion of the appellant at least from 2008 till the date of filing the divorce petition in 2013 continued without any reasonable cause. Therefore, a decree for divorce on the ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) ought to have been passed. Thus, in our view, the High Court ought to have confirmed the decree of divorce on the ground of desertion. This is a case of a complete breakdown of marriage for last 16 years and more. (Para 14)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 34– The period of 30 days mentioned in the proviso that follows sub­section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is not the “period of limitation” and, therefore, not the “prescribed period” for the purposes of making the application for setting aside the arbitral award. (Para 9-10)

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 37- The Appellate Court can exercise the power of remand only when exceptional circumstances make an order of remand unavoidable. There may be exceptional cases where remand in an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act may be warranted. Some of the exceptional cases can be stated by way of illustration: a. Summary disposal of a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is made without consideration of merits; b. Without service of notice to the respondent in a petition under Section 34, interference is made with the award; and c. Decision in proceedings under Section 34 is rendered when one or more contesting parties are dead, and their legal representatives have not been brought on record. (Para 18)

Practice and Procedure -The proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 are being treated as if the same are appeals under Section 96 of the CPC. When members of the bar take up so many grounds in petitions under Section 34, which are not covered by Section 34, there is a tendency to urge all those grounds which are not available in law and waste the Court’s time. The time of our Courts is precious, considering the huge pendency. This is happening in a large number of cases. All this makes the arbitral procedure inefficient and unfair. It is high time that the members of the Bar show restraint by incorporating only legally permissible grounds in petitions under Section 34 and the appeals under Section 37. Everyone associated with the arbitral proceedings must remember that brevity will make the arbitral proceedings and the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 more effective. All that we say is that all the stakeholders need to introspect. Otherwise, the very object of adopting the UNCITRAL model will be frustrated. Arbitration must become a tool for expeditious, effective, and cost­ effective dispute resolution. (Para 23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 375 -The physical relationship between the prosecutrix and the appellant cannot be said to be against her will and without her consent. On the basis of the available materials, no case of rape or of criminal intimidation is made out – Criminal proceedings quashed.

Criminal Trial – In a case where the identity of the accused is not known and TIP has not been conducted, the court has to see if there was any description of the accused either in the FIR or in any of the statement of witness recorded during the investigation- The identification of an accused in court is acceptable without a prior TIP and absence of TIP may not be fatal for the prosecution. It would depend on facts of each case. (Para 16)

Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 319 – Prevention Of Corruption Act, 1988 ; Section 19- Courts cannot take cognizance against any public servant for offences committed under Sections 7,11,13 & 15 of the P.C. Act, even on an application under section 319 of the CrPC, without first following the requirements of Section 19 of the P.C Act. Here, the correct procedure should have been for the prosecution to obtain sanction under Section 19 of the P.C Act from the appropriate Government, before formally moving an application before the Court under Section 319 of CrPC. In fact, the Trial Court too should have insisted on the prior sanction, which it did not. In absence of the sanction the entire procedure remains flawed. (Para 11)

Income Tax Act, 1961; Section 206C – Even though the statute may be silent regarding notice and hearing, the court would read into such provision the inherent requirement of notice and hearing before a prejudicial order is passed. We, therefore, hold that before an order is passed under Section 206C of the Income Tax Act, it is incumbent upon the assessing officer to put the person concerned to notice and afford him an adequate and reasonable opportunity of hearing, including a personal hearing. (Para 19)

Income Tax Act, 1961; Section 206C – Explanation(a)(iii) visualizes two conditions for a person to be excluded from the meaning of “buyer” as per the definition in Explanation(a). The first condition is that the goods are not obtained by him by way of auction. The second condition is that the sale price of such goods to be sold by the buyer is fixed under a state enactment. These two conditions are joined by the word ‘and’. The word ‘and’ is conjunctive to mean that both the conditions must be fulfilled; it is not either of the two. Therefore, to be excluded from the ambit of the definition of “buyer” as per Explanation(a)(iii), both the conditions must be satisfied- Section 206C of the Income Tax Act is not applicable in respect of Mysore Sales and that the liquor vendors(contractors) who bought the vending rights from the appellant on auction cannot be termed as “buyers” within the meaning of Explanation(a) to Section 206C of the Income Tax Act.

Summary : Partition suit -Appeals partly allowed.

Constitution Of India, 1950; Article 14, 226– Although disputes arising purely out of contracts are not amenable to writ jurisdiction yet keeping in mind the obligation of the State to act fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously, it is now well settled that when contractual power is being used for public purpose, it is certainly amenable to judicial review. (Para 59) – To ascertain whether an act is arbitrary or not, the court must carefully attend to the facts and the circumstances of the case. It should find out whether the impugned decision is based on any principle. If not, it may unerringly point to arbitrariness. If the act betrays caprice or the mere exhibition of the whim of the authority it would sufficiently bear the insignia of arbitrariness. In this regard supporting an order with a rationale which in the circumstances is found to be reasonable will go a long way to repel a challenge to State action. No doubt the reasons need not in every case be part of the order as such. If there is absence of good faith and the action is actuated with an oblique motive, it could be characterised as being arbitrary. A total non-application of mind without due regard to the rights of the parties and public interest may be a clear indicator of arbitrary action. One another way, to assess whether an action complained of could be termed as arbitrary is by way of scrutinizing the reasons that have been assigned to such an action. It involves overseeing whether the reasons which have been cited if at all genuinely formed part of the decision-making process or whether they are merely a ruse. All decisions that are taken must earnestly be in lieu of the reasons and considerations that have been assigned to it. The Court must be mindful of the fact that it is not supposed to delve into every minute details of the reasoning assigned, it need not to go into a detailed exercise of assessing the pros and cons of the reasons itself, but should only see whether the reasons were earnest, genuine and had a rationale with the ultimate decision. What is under scrutiny in judicial review of an action is the decision-making process and whether there is any element of arbitrariness or mala fide. – Thus, the question to be answered in such situations is whether the decision was based on valid considerations. This is undertaken to ensure that the reasons assigned were the true motivations behind the action and it involves checking for the presence of any ulterior motives or irrelevant considerations that might have influenced the decision. The approach of the court must be to respect the expertise and discretion of administrative authorities while still protecting against arbitrary and capricious actions. (Para 69-71) Once a decision is made, all opinions and deliberations pertaining to the said decision in the internal file-notings become a part of the process by which the decision is arrived at, and can be looked into for the purposes of judicial review. In other words, any internal discussions or notings that have been approved and formalized into a decision by an authority can be examined to ascertain the reasons and purposes behind such decisions for the overall judicial review of such decision-making process and whether it conforms to the principles enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. (Para 87) Public authorities cautioned to be circumspect in disturbing or wriggling out of its contractual obligations through means beyond the terms of the contract in exercise of their executive powers. We do not say for a moment that the State has no power to alter or cancel a contract that it has entered into. However, if the State deems it necessary to alter or cancel a contract on the ground of public interest or change in policy then such considerations must be bona-fide and should be earnestly reflected in the decision-making process and also in the final decision itself. We say so because otherwise, it would have a very chilling effect as participating and winning a tender would tend to be viewed as a situation worse than losing one at the threshold. (Para 129)

Criminal Trial –An extra-judicial confession is used against its maker but as a matter of caution, advisable for the court to look for a corroboration with the other evidence on record – The normal rule of human conduct is that if a person wants to confess to the crime committed by him, he will do so before the person in whom he has implicit faith. (Para 9-10)

Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 311- Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 165– The trial Court is under an obligation not to act as a mere spectator and should proactively participate in the trial proceedings, so as to ensure that neither any extraneous material is permitted to be brought on record nor any relevant fact is left out. It is the duty of the trial Court to ensure that all such evidence which is essential for the just decision of the case is brought on record irrespective of the fact that the party concerned omits to do so. (Para 48)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 65B- When the prosecution admittedly, did not prove the call detail records in accordance with the mandate of Section 65B of the Evidence Act and hence, the call detail records cannot be read in evidence. (Para 51)

Summary: Murder accused acquittal upheld – the probability of the victim having caught accidental fire while preparing tea is higher rather than the theory set up by prosecution witnesses that it is a case of intentional immolation.

Indian Evidence Act, 1872– Mere marking of exhibit upon the letter without the expert deposing about the opinion given therein would not dispense with the proof of contents of the document as per the mandate of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. (Para 36)

Criminal Trial -Where the medical evidence goes so far that it completely rules out all possibility of the ocular evidence being true, the ocular evidence may be disbelieved. (Para 45)

Specific Releif Act, 1963; Section 19- In view of clause (b) of Section 19, the defendants who are claiming under the sale deeds executed after the execution of the suit agreement can be subjected to a decree of specific performance as the suit agreement can be enforced specifically against such defendants unless they are bona-fide purchasers without the notice of the original contract. When, in a given case, the defendants, who are subsequent purchasers, fail to prove that they entered into the sale deed in good faith and without notice of the suit agreement, in view of Section 19(b), a decree for specific performance can be passed against such defendants. Therefore, in such a case where Section 19(b) is applicable, under the decree of specific performance, the subsequent purchasers can be directed to execute the sale deed along with the original vendor. There is no necessity to pray for the cancellation of the subsequent sale deeds. (Para 16)

Contract Law –In interpretation of a deed, the question is not what the parties to the deed may have intended to do by entering into that deed, but what is the meaning of the words used in the deed. The Court can understand the true intent of the deed only by the words used in the deed. It does not matter what the parties, in their most state of mind, thought what the terms meant. They may have meant different things, but still the terms or the language used in the deed should bind them. It is for the court to interpret such terms or language used in the deed – in construing a document, the fundamental rule is to ascertain the intention from the words of the deed; the surrounding circumstances are to be considered but that is only for the purposes of finding out the meaning of the words which have been actually employed in the deed. (Para 13-14)

Code Of Civil Procedure, 1908; Section 151- Whether upon admission of an instrument in evidence and its marking as an exhibit by a court (despite the instrument being chargeable to duty but is insufficiently stamped), such a process can be recalled by the court in exercise of inherent powers saved by section 151 CPC? Trial Court did have the authority to revisit and recall the process of admission and marking of the instrument, not in the sense of exercising a power of review under section 114 read with Order XLVII, CPC but in exercise of its inherent power saved by section 151 thereof – (Para 10) – The legislature has reposed responsibility on the courts and trusted them to ensure that requisite stamp duty, along with penalty, is duly paid if an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument is placed before it for admission in support of the case of a party. It is incumbent upon the courts to uphold the sanctity of the legal framework governing stamp duty, as the same are crucial for the authenticity and enforceability of instruments. Allowing an instrument with insufficient stamp duty to pass unchallenged, merely due to technicalities, would undermine the legislative intent and the fiscal interests of the state. The courts ought to ensure that compliance with all substantive and procedural requirements of a statute akin to the 1957 Act are adhered to by the interested parties. This duty of the court is paramount, and any deviation would set a detrimental precedent, eroding the integrity of the legal system. Thus, the court must vigilantly prevent any circumvention of these legal obligations, ensuring due compliance and strict adherence for upholding the rule of law. (Para 21)

Indian Contract Act, 1872; Section 207-208 –In the absence of a particular mode suggested for revocation of the authority of an agent, the manner adopted by the principal to revoke the authority of the agent must be one which clearly and unequivocally communicates to the parties i.e., to be affected by such revocation, that the agent’s authority has been withdrawn. In the framework of Sections 207 and 208 of the Act, the revocation/renunciation of authority may be made by express words or may be implied from the words and conduct of the principal, viz., which is inconsistent with the continuance of the agency. This is one facet of renunciation or revocation of authority of an agent; the other facet is governed by Section 208 of the Act. Section 208 provides for the effective time and date of termination of the agent’s authority and third parties. From a plain reading, Section 208 infers and gives effect to revocation upon the twin conditions being satisfied, (i) communication to the agent and (ii) knowledge to a third party i.e., one who deals with or is likely to deal with the agent. Then, the revocation of authority becomes known to the agent and the said third parties. In other words, an idea in the mind of the principal to revoke cannot be construed as implied revocation or renunciation of agency. There ought to be an act or conduct of the principal which implies that the agency is revoked or withdrawn. If the revocation is expressed, such as by publication in newspapers, public notice or advertisement, communication to the agent etc., the parties who deal with the agent have a reasonable opportunity to know the revocation of agency by the principal. Two stages of revocation are, firstly, one dealing with the agent, and secondly, one which applies to the third parties. For attracting the consequence of revocation to either of the situations, the revocation of the agent’s authority is made by the principal in a manner that clearly implies that the principal has withdrawn the authority to act on his or her behalf by the agent. (Para 21)

Summary : Murder conviction upheld

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1)(d)- Whether the purchase of a vehicle/good by a Company for the use/personal use of its directors would amount to purchase for “commercial purpose” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (now re-enacted as Consumer Protection Act, 2019)? to determine whether the goods purchased by a person (which would include a legal entity like a company) were for a commercial purpose or not, within the definition of a “consumer” as contemplated in Section 12 2(1)(d) of the said Act, would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. However ordinarily “commercial purpose” is understood to include manufacturing/industrial activity or business-to-business transactions between commercial entities. The purchase of the goods should have a close and direct nexus with a profit generating activity. It has to be seen whether the dominant intention or dominant purpose for the transaction was to facilitate some kind of profit generation for the purchaser and/or their beneficiary. If it is found that the dominant purpose behind purchasing the goods was for the personal use and consumption of the purchaser and/or their beneficiary, or was otherwise not linked to any commercial activity, the question of whether such a purchase was for the purpose of “generating livelihood by means of self-employment” need not be looked into. Again, the said determination cannot be restricted in a straitjacket formula and it has to be decided on case-to-case basis. (Para 16)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1)(r)- A trade practice which for the purpose of promoting the sale of any goods by adopting deceptive practice like falsely representing that the goods are of a particular standard, 33 quality, style or model, would amount to “unfair trade practice” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(r) of the said Act. (Para 39)

Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972; Section 21 – Section 21 of the Land Reforms Act bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts only in specific circumstances: (a) suits for specific performance of a contract for transfer of land, and (b) questioning the validity of any proceeding or order taken or made under the Act – The Civil Court alone has the jurisdiction to decide and declare whether the land belonged to the religious shrine or to Tikka Devinder Singh in his personal capacity

Summary: In a suit filed for partition and separate possession claiming that the appellant/plaintiff was the son of respondent no. 1/defendant no. 1, born from his marriage with Padminibai, very heavy burden was on the appellant/plaintiff to prove this fact, when the factum of marriage was denied by the respondent no. 1/defendant no. 1, as he was married to Sheshbai (respondent no. 4/defendant no. 4). From the evidence led by the appellant/plaintiff, he had failed to discharge that burden. – Dismissal of Partition Suit upheld

All India Tourist Vehicles (Permit) Rules, 2023 – legality of different State Governments levying and collecting Authorization Fee/Border Tax in violation of All India Tourist Vehicles (Permit) Rules, 2023- Whether levy and realization of taxes by the respective states is covered by the Act and Rules framed by the respective States under Entries 56 & 57 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution or not.- The State enactments, rules and regulations being not under challenge, it cannot be said that the demand of Border Tax/Authorization Fee at the borders by the respective State Governments is bad under law.

Constitution Of India,1950; Article 226- Code Of Civil Procedure,1908 ; Section 141 and Order XXI Rule 90- The provisions of the CPC do not apply to writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India except some of the principles enshrined therein like res judicata, delay and laches, addition of parties, matters which have not been specifically dealt with by the writ rules framed by the respective High Court – The High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution has jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders. Such power can neither be controlled nor affected by the provisions of Order XXI Rule 90 of the CPC. It would not be correct to say that the terms of Order XXI Rule 90 should be mandatorily complied with while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution stand on a different footing when compared to the proceedings in suits or appeals arising therefrom. (Para 48-49)

Constitution Of India,1950; Article 226- Issuance of a writ or quashing/setting aside of an order if revives another pernicious or wrong or illegal order then in that eventuality the writ court should not interfere in the matter and should refuse to exercise its discretionary power conferred upon it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ court should not quash the order if it revives a wrong or illegal order. (Para 74)

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 226,12- Imparting education involves public duty and therefore public law element could also be said to be involved. If there is a breach of a covenant of a private contract, the same does not touch any public law element. The school cannot be said to be discharging any public duty in connection with the employment of the respondents. (Para 42)

Doctrine of legitimate expectation: a. First, legitimate expectation must be based on a right as opposed to a mere hope, wish or anticipation; b. Secondly, legitimate expectation must arise either from an express or implied promise; or a consistent past practice or custom followed by an authority in its dealings; c. Thirdly, expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be treated as a legitimate expectation; d. Fourthly, legitimate expectation operates in relation to both substantive and procedural matters; e. Fifthly, legitimate expectation operates in the realm of public law, that is, a plea of legitimate action can be taken only when a public authority breaches a promise or deviates from a consistent past practice, without any reasonable basis. f. Sixthly, a plea of legitimate expectation based on past practice can only be taken by someone who has dealings, or negotiations with a public authority. It cannot be invoked by a total stranger to the authority merely on the ground that the authority has a duty to act fairly generally -legitimate expectation, jurisprudentially, was a device created in order to maintain a check on arbitrariness in state action. It does not extend to and cannot govern the operation of contracts between private parties, wherein the doctrine of promissory estoppel holds the field. (Para 48-49)

Supreme Court Rules,2013; Order XXVI Rule 6– A plaint is liable to be rejected where it does not disclose a cause of action or where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law.- Order XXVI Rule 6 (a) and (b) are analogous to the provisions in clauses (a) and (d) of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC -For considering objections under Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) of the CPC, what needs to be looked into is only the averments made in the plaint- If the averments made in the plaint are germane then the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at this stage- The averments made in the plaint have to be read as a whole and not in isolation. (Para 22-27)

Constitution of India,1950; Article 32, 131,136– Article 131 of the Constitution is a special provision which deals with the original jurisdiction of this Court in case of a dispute between the Federal Government and the State Governments. It provides for a special jurisdiction to this Court to decide any question on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. Any dispute either between the Government of India and one or more States; or between the Government of India and any State or States on one side and one or more other States on the other; or between two or more States which involve a question on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends are covered by this provision. A special provision has been made for deciding the question on which the existence or extent of a legal right between the special parties mentioned therein has been provided. Therefore, the words “subject to the provisions of this Constitution” will have to be considered in that context. The jurisdiction under Article 131 of the Constitution would only be subject to any other provision in the Constitution which provides for entertaining a dispute between the parties mentioned therein- Article 32 of the Constitution provides for remedy for enforcement of rights conferred by Part-III of the Constitution whereas Article 136 provides for remedy by way of special leave to appeal before this Court. These are the general remedies available to “any party”. Merely because, in any of the proceedings initiated under Article 32 or Article 136 or even Article 226 of the Constitution, one of the parties is common, the pendency of such proceedings would not come in the way of a specific party mentioned in Article 131 of the Constitution to take recourse to the remedy available therein -A remedy under Article 131 of the Constitution is a special remedy available only to the parties mentioned therein and for the purposes mentioned therein. (Para 75-77)

Summary: In the present suit, the plaintiff is raising the legal issue as to whether after withdrawal of the consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, the CBI via the defendant – Union of India can continue to register and investigate cases in its area in violation of the provisions of Section 6 of the DSPE Act. The same has been sought to be attacked by the defendant – Union of India by raising various contentions challenging the maintainability of the suit. In our considered opinion, the contentions raised by the defendant, do not merit acceptance and for the reasons given hereinbefore, are rejected. The preliminary objection is, therefore, rejected.

Prevention Of Corruption Act, 1988; Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) , 13(2)-In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance, by either direct or circumstantial evidence. (Para 28)

Indian Penal Code,1860; Section 300 -If there was no intention on the part of the accused to cause bodily injury to the deceased and other injured witnesses, there was no reason for him to go back to his house and bring the weapon. He brought the billhook from his home, obviously to make an assault. It is not the defence of the accused that the deceased was the aggressor. The deceased had come to the spot only to resolve the fight among the family members of the accused. Hence, it cannot be said that there was a sudden and grave provocation due to any act on the part of the deceased. The accused himself started the dispute by questioning the PW-4 on non-payment of the electricity bill. Therefore, the appellant’s case will not fall under Exception 1 or Exception 4 of Section 300 of the IPC. (Para 7)

Land Acquisition – The purpose for which the land is acquired must be taken into consideration while determining development charges- market value is determined based on the price of a willing buyer- a willing seller at arm’s length – When there is a choice between an exemplar where the transaction is between unrelated parties dealing at arm’s length and between an exemplar where the transaction is between related parties of a higher value, both of which are broadly around the same period, prudence would dictate and common sense would command that we accept the value of set out in the transaction between unrelated parties. (Para 62-67)

Specific Relief Act,1963; Section 16- To obtain a decree for specific performance, the plaintiff must aver and prove that he has performed his part of the contract and has always been ready and willing to perform the terms of the contract which are to be performed by him. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act mandates ‘readiness and willingness’ of the plaintiff to be averred and proved and it is a condition precedent to obtain the relief of specific performance-There is a distinction between the terms ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’.‘Readiness’ is the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the sale consideration. ‘Willingness’ is the conduct of the party. -The continuous readiness and willingness is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. (Para 13-14)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 5A- A “person interested” under Section 5A(1), can seek annulment of the acquisition process if no opportunity to file objections, is accorded. However, such person cannot seek hearing as a statutory right unless has lodged the objections. (Para 22)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 4- Notification issued under Section 4 of the 1894 Act creates an impediment on the transfer of title in a property.16 The subsequent purchasers do not acquire an unencumbered title over the property and they deliberately run the risk of securing a defective title. The axiom that ‘a public right cannot be altered by the agreement of private persons’, will thus clog their right to raise objection against the acquisition. (Para 26)

Legal maxim – ‘Omnia Consensus Tollit Errorem’- Every assent removes error. (Para 22)

Legal maxim – ‘omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta’ -The act can be presumed to have been rightly and regularly done. The Court would presume that the official act was done rightly and effectively and the burden to prove contrary lies on the party who disputes the sanctity of such act. (Para 40)

Land Acquisition Act,1894- Sale exemplars reflecting the prices paid by a willing buyer to a willing seller would be the most relevant piece of evidence for determination of such value.3 25. However, for utilizing these sale deeds as the foundation for determining compensation, it is imperative that these sale instances satisfy certain criteria of comparability. In this regard, it is necessary that the sale deeds adhere to the following factors: i. the sale must be a genuine transaction; ii. the sale deed must have been executed at the time proximate to the date of the notification issued under Section 4 of the 1894 Act; iii. the land covered by the sale must be in the vicinity of the acquired land; and iv. the nature of such land, including its size, must be similar to the acquired land.,(Para 24-25)

Land Acquisition Act,1894 – Guesstimation– Guesstimation is a heuristic device that enables the court, in the absence of direct evidence and relevant sale exemplars, to make a reasonable and informed guess or estimation of the market value of the land under acquisition, and concomitantly the compensation payable by the appropriate Government. In that sense, guesstimation hinges on the Court’s ability to exercise informed judgement and expertise in assessing the market value of land, especially when the evidence does not tender a straightforward answer. 32. This principle accentuates the fundamental understanding that determining compensation for land is not a matter of exact science but involves a significant element of estimation. Indeed, this holds true for valuation of land in general, which is affected by a multitude of factors such as its location, surrounding market conditions, feasible uses etc. Accordingly, while evidence and calculations can aid in estimating the land value, they ultimately serve as tools for approximation rather than precision. Instead, land valuation—and consequently the affixation of compensation -While the Court can use the principle of guesstimation in reasonably estimating the value of land in the absence of direct evidence, the exercise ought not to be purely hypothetical. Instead, the Court must embrace a holistic view and consider all relevant factors and existing evidence, even if not directly comparable, to arrive at a fair determination of compensation. (Para 34)

Transfer of Property Act,1881; Section 52– The doctrine of lis pendens as provided under Section 52 of the Act does not render all transfers pendente lite to be void ab-initio, it merely renders rights arising from such transfers as subservient to the rights of the parties to the pending litigation and subject to any direction that the Court may pass thereunder – Therefore, the mere fact that the Registered Sale Deed was executed during the pendency of the Underlying Suit does not automatically render it null and void. (Para 16-17)

PMLA ; Section 19– The following questions of law referred for consideration by a larger Bench: (a) Whether the “need and necessity to arrest” is a separate ground to challenge the order of arrest passed in terms of Section 19(1) of the PML Act? (b) Whether the “need and necessity to arrest” refers to the satisfaction of formal parameters to arrest and take a person into custody, or it relates to other personal grounds and reasons regarding necessity to arrest a person in the facts and circumstances of the said case? (c) If questions (a) and (b) are answered in the affirmative, what are the parameters and facts that are to be taken into consideration by the court while examining the question of “need and necessity to arrest”?

RTI Act,2006- The CIC must be allowed to operate independently and exercise its powers of superintendence, direction, and management without external constraints. The principle of non-interference is crucial for maintaining the integrity and efficacy of the CIC. Allowing the Commission to function autonomously ensures that it can fulfil its role in promoting transparency and accountability, which are the cornerstones of the RTI Act. The ability to form benches and allocate work among Information Commissioners is essential for the CIC to manage its workload effectively and uphold the citizens’ right to information- The Chief Information Commissioner’s powers to frame Regulations pertaining to constitution of Benches of the Commission are upheld as such powers are within the ambit of Section 12(4) of the RTI Act

Civil Suit -Suit for possession and suit for claiming damages for use and occupation of the property are two different causes of action. There being different consideration for adjudication in our opinion, second suit filed by the respondent claiming damages for use and occupation of the premises was maintainable- The case in hand stands on a better footing, inasmuch as, the plaintiff-respondent had specifically reserved its rights in the first suit regarding claim against warehousing charges, damages for illegal use and occupation etc. and further had applied for leave before the Trial Court for filing a separate suit, which leave had been granted. There was neither any relinquishment at any stage, nor omission to claim relief. Both the causes of action being separate, the second suit was clearly maintainable. (Para 16-17)

Transfer Of Property Act, 1882; Section 41 – A plain reading of the above provision clearly requires the consent, be it express or implied, of the persons interested in the immovable property -Further the proviso to section 41 of the TP Act requires that the transferees to take reasonable care in ascertaining that the transferor had power to make the transfer and that they had acted in good faith. This again would require specific pleading and evidence by the transferees. (Para 12-13)

Summary: marriage has failed completely and there is no possibility of parties living together and thus the continuation of further legal relationship is unjustified- decree of divorce on account of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. As both the parties are professionally qualified medical doctors and have sufficient and equal earnings, permanent alimony not awarded.

Revenue Records– Merely because the name of the plaintiff continued in the revenue records (Jama Bandis), it would not confer any title upon him. Revenue records (Jama Bandis) are only entries for the purpose of realising tax by the Municipal Corporations or land revenue by Gram Sabhas. (Para 27)

Limitation – When the suit is barred by any law, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to circumvent that provision by means of clever drafting so as to avoid mention of those circumstances, by which the suit is barred by law of limitation. (Para 17)

Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 107,306 – There must be either an instigation, or an engagement or intentional aid to ‘doing of a thing’. When we apply these three criteria to Section 306, it means that the accused must have encouraged the person to commit suicide or engaged in conspiracy with others to encourage the person to commit suicide or acted (or failed to act) intentionally to aid the person to commit suicide. (Para 8)

Constitution Of India, 1950; Article 226- While undertaking the exercise of judicial review of matters relating to tenders, the court has to strike a fair balance between the interests of the Government, which is always expected to advance the financial interests of the State, and private entities -Not every small mistake must be perceived through the lens of a magnifying glass and blown up unreasonably. (Para 14)

Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1995 – A ‘dealer’, as defined in the DPCO, would be a wholesaler or retailer who undertakes the purchase or sale of the drug while a ‘distributor’, as defined thereunder, would include a distributor of the drugs or a stockist appointed by a manufacturer. Though the definition of ‘wholesaler’ under Paragraph 2(y) of the DPCO blurs the distinction between a ‘dealer’ and a ‘distributor’, by including a dealer as well as a stockist appointed by a manufacturer, the fact remains that a ‘distributor’ under Paragraph 2(c) of the DPCO has links with the manufacturer directly while a ‘dealer’ does not, as he obtains his supply of drugs from the said ‘distributor’. It is obvious that the definitions of ‘distributor’ and ‘dealer’ under the DPCO are not mutually exclusive and it is very much possible in this scheme that a ‘distributor’ may play a dual role by becoming a ‘wholesaler’ or ‘retailer’ also and thereby satisfy the definition of ‘dealer’ under Paragraph 2(d) of DPCO.

Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 227- At the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, defence case or material, if produced at all by the accused, cannot be looked at all. Once “the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith” are before the Court they alone can be looked into for considering the application for discharge and thereafter if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused concerned then he shall be discharged after recording reasons therefor. In that regard, it is only appropriate to consider the authorities dealing with the question as to what exactly is the scope of consideration and what should be the manner of consideration while exercising such power-in a case where an application is filed for discharge under Section 227, Cr.PC, it is an irrecusable duty and obligation of the Court to apply its mind and answer to it regarding the existence of or otherwise, of ground for proceeding against the accused, by confining such consideration based only on the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. To wit, such conclusion on existence or otherwise of ground to proceed against the accused concerned should not be and could not be based on mere suppositions or suspicions or conjectures, especially not founded upon material available before the Court – Normally, the Court is to record his reasons only for discharging an accused at the stage of Section 227, Cr.PC. However, when an application for discharge is filed under Section 227, Cr.PC, the Court concerned is bound to disclose the reason(s), though, not in detail, for finding sufficient ground for rejecting the application or in other words, for finding prima facie case, as it will enable the superior Court to examine the challenge against the order of rejection(Para 22)

Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 120A,120B -Conspiracy is hatched in privacy and not in secrecy, and such it would rarely be possible to establish conspiracy by direct evidence. A few bits here and a few bits there, on which the prosecution may rely, are not sufficient to connect an accused with the commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy- To constitute even an accusation of criminal conspiracy, first and foremost, there must at least be an accusation of meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act, which is not illegal in itself, by illegal means. (Para 26-27)

Summary: security amount deposited by the Respondents rightly deserves to be forfeited by the Appellants.

Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 161- Indian Evidence Act,1872; Section 32- A statement made by a person who is dead, as to the cause of his death or to the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, to a Police Officer and which has been recorded under Section 161 CrPC, shall be relevant and admissible, notwithstanding the express bar against use of such statement in evidence contained therein. In such eventuality, the statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC assumes the character of a dying declaration. Since extraordinary credence has been given to such dying declaration, the court ought to be extremely careful and cautious in placing reliance thereupon. (Para 65) -the mere nonobtainment of a medical fitness certificate will not deter this Court from considering a properly recorded statement under Section 161 CrPC to be a dying declaration. (Para 69)

Code Of Criminal Procedure,1973; Section 154-The object of the FIR is three-fold: firstly, to inform the jurisdictional Magistrate and the Police Administration of the offence that has been reported to the Police Station; secondly, to acquaint the Judicial Officer before whom the case is ultimately tried as to what are the actual facts stated immediately after the occurrence and on what materials the investigation commenced; thirdly and most importantly, to safeguard the accused against subsequent variations, exaggerations or additions. (Para 39) -e stipulations outlined in Section 154 CrPC concerning the reading over of the information after it is written down, the signing of the said information by the informant, and the entry of its substance in the prescribed manner are not obligatory. These requirements are procedural in nature, and the omission of any of them does not impact the legal consequences resulting from the information provided under the section. (Para 43)

Criminal Trial -It would be too unfair and unreasonable to expect a witness, unless parroted, to recall every minute detail of the occurrence and 31 present it with a totally accumulative narrative. (Para 58)

Criminal Trial – The non explanation of human blood on the weapon of crime constitutes a circumstance against the accused. It is incumbent upon the accused to provide an explanation regarding the presence of human blood on the weapon. (Para 61)

Summary: Appeal against HC order directing the bank to consider appellants- claim for appointment on compassionate ground- Dismissing appeal, SC held: In the facts of the case in hand, the deceased employee was not placed under suspension on account of contemplation of the disciplinary proceedings and the charge sheet was also not issued. It is merely said that the charge sheet was under preparation, however, in absence of any relevant material disclosed, it might not be presumed to be a case of prima facie award of major penalty on account of contemplation of disciplinary proceedings.

Summary: Marriage between parties dissolved.

Constitution of India,1950; Article 32,226– Performance audit of statute:-Constitutional courts are fully justified in giving such directions as they are in a unique position of perceiving the working of a statute while exercising judicial review, during which they could identify the fault-lines in the implementation of a statute. This extraordinary capacity to assess the working of a statute is available to the judicial institution because of its unique position where, i) disputes, based on the statutory provisions unfold before it, ii) claims of rights or allegations of dereliction of duties are raised with varied, and sometimes, contradictory interpretations of the same text of the statute, iii) submissions of lawyers opens up a debate and as officers of the Court experienced lawyers would lay bare the fault-lines in the statutory scheme, iv) many a times court silently witnesses the play of statutory power relegating the deserving to the backseat, and the undeserving taking away all the benefits. (Para 37)

Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 –Two facets of Section 13 (2) of the Act are that; a) the SRA has the power to redevelop the project if it is satisfied that the development is not proceeding within the time specified, and b) that power of SRA is coupled with a duty to ensure that the project is completed within time. We hold that the SRA is accountable for the performance of this duty. Accountability need not be superimposed by the text of a statute, it exists wherever power is granted to accomplish statutory purpose- The primary responsibility to implement Section 13 of the Act and allied provisions and to monitor compliances of schemes and agreements vests with the CEO. If the actions of CEO are based on the directions of the SRA, then the SRA must equally bear the responsibility. The CEO and/or the SRA must explain the delay in implementation, failing which, the consequences as determined by the court will follow. (Para 14)

Indian Evidence Act,1872; Section 106- When the prosecution has not discharged the burden on it to prove that the accused was last seen together with the deceased wife- Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked to shift the burden on the accused. (Para 7)

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – One of the main objects of the 2010 Act is to uphold and protect the right of the citizens to healthy environment which is a part of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The objects and reasons of the 2010 Act indicate that the object of setting up the Tribunal was to protect the said fundamental right. In this case, it was the duty of the Tribunal to address the issues raised by the appellant on merits. The duty of the Tribunal was to decide the issues especially when the contention of the appellant was that the construction of the proposed bridge will cause harm to the environment. (Para 6)