CrPC; S.82 [BNSS; S.528]-Criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. (Para 31)

CrPC; S.482 – [BNSS; S. 528] –In the matters arising out of commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute, the High Court should exercise its powers under Section 482 CrPC for giving an end to the criminal proceedings – The possibility of conviction in such cases is remote and bleak and as such, the continuation of the criminal proceedings would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice. (Para 15)

Summary: Khalsa University (Repeal) Act, 2017 struck down as being unconstitutional.

Constitution of India; Article 14,32,226– The test of manifest arbitrariness would apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14-Mifest arbitrariness must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle- When something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such a legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. (Para 62) [Referred to Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1 : 2017 INSC 785 ]

Legislation – Though a legislation affecting a single entity or a single undertaking or a single person would be permissible in law, it must be on the basis of reasonable classification having nexus with the object to be achieved. There should be a reasonable differentia on the basis of which a person, entity or undertaking is sought to be singled out from the rest of the group. Further, if a legislation affecting a single person, entity or undertaking is being enacted, there should be special circumstances requiring such an enactment. Such special circumstances should be gathered from the material taken into consideration by the competent legislature and shall include the Parliamentary/Legislative Debates. (Para 48)

Summary: Writ petition challenging caste-based discrimination in the prisons in the country and offending provisions in State prison manuals- SC held: Provisions discriminate against marginalized castes and act to the advantage of certain castes. By assigning cleaning and sweeping work to the marginalized castes, while allowing the high castes to do cooking, the Manuals directly discriminate. This is an instance of direct discrimination under Article 15(1)- Rules that discriminate among individual prisoners on the basis of their caste specifically or indirectly by referring to proxies of caste identity are violative of Article 14 on account of invalid classification and subversion of substantive equality – The impugned provisions are declared unconstitutional for being violative of Articles 14, 15, 17, 21, and 23 of the Constitution. All States and Union Territories are directed to revise their Prison Manuals/Rules in accordance with this judgment within a period of three months; Union government is directed to make necessary changes, as highlighted in this judgment, to address caste-based discrimination in the Model Prison Manual 2016 and the Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act 2023 within a period of three months; References to “habitual offenders” in the prison manuals/Model Prison Manual shall be in accordance with the definition provided in the habitual offender legislation enacted by the respective State legislatures, subject to any constitutional challenge against such legislation in the future. All other references or definitions of “habitual offenders” in the impugned prison manuals/rules are declared unconstitutional. In case, there is no habitual offender legislation in the State, the Union and the State governments are directed to make necessary changes in the manuals/rules in line with this judgment, within a period of three months; (iv) The “caste” column and any references to caste in undertrial and/or convicts’ prisoners’ registers inside the prisons shall be deleted.

Constitution of India – The interpretation of the Constitution is not static – Our interpretation of the Constitution must fill the silences in its text. The framers of the Constitution could not have anticipated every situation that might arise in the future.-The Constitution of India is an emancipatory document. It provides equal citizenship to all citizens of India. The Constitution is not just a legal document, but in India’s social structure, it is a quantum leap. In one stroke, it gave a dignified identity to all citizens of India. (Para 5-24)-Article 14 – The constitutional standards laid down by the Court under Article 14 can be summarized as follows. First, the Constitution permits classification if there is intelligible differentia and reasonable nexus with the object sought. Second, the classification test cannot be merely applied as a mathematical formula to reach a conclusion. A challenge under Article 14 has to take into account the substantive content of equality which mandates fair treatment of an individual. Third, in undertaking classification, a legislation or subordinate legislation cannot be manifestly arbitrary, i.e. courts must adjudicate whether the legislature or executive acted capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle, or did something which is excessive and disproportionate. In applying this constitutional standard, courts must identify the “real purpose” of the statute rather than the “ostensible purpose” presented by the State, as summarized in ADR. Fourth, a provision can be found manifestly arbitrary even if it does not make a classification. Fifth, different constitutional standards have to be applied when testing the validity of legislation as compared to subordinate legislation. (Para 25-34) – Article 15 -Anti-discrimination principles emerge under Article 15(1). First, discrimination can be either direct or indirect, or both. Second, facially neutral laws may have an adverse impact on certain social groups, that are marginalized. Third, stereotypes can further discrimination against a marginalized social group. Fourth, the State is under a positive obligation to prevent discrimination against a marginalized social group. Fifth, discriminatory laws based on PART VII 33 stereotypes and causing harm or disadvantage against a social group, directly or indirectly, are not permissible under the constitutional scheme. Sixth, courts are required to examine the claims of indirect discrimination and systemic discrimination; and seventh, the test to examine indirect discrimination and systemic discriminatio. (Para 35-48)- Article 17- Article 17 has several components. It abolishes the practice of “untouchability”. At the same time, it prohibits “its practice in any form”. Furthermore, “enforcement of any disability” arising out of “Untouchability”” is a criminal offense as per the “law”. The meaning of “law” is any legislation enacted to tackle any practice or disability arising out of “untouchability- It is a provision that can be implemented both against the State and non-state actors such as the citizensArticle 17 enunciates that everyone is born equal. There cannot be any stigma attached to the existence, touch or presence of any person. By way of Article 17, our Constitution strengthens the equality of status of every citizen. (Para 49-54)

Constitution of India – Article 23 –The scope of Article 23 can be invoked to challenge practices where no wages are paid, non-payment of minimum wages takes place, social security measures for workers are not adopted, rehabilitation for bonded labour does not happen, and in similar unfair practices. The State shall be held accountable even in cases where the violation of fundamental rights such as Article 23 is done by private entities or individuals. Article 23 can also be applied to situations inside prisons, if the prisoners are subjected to degrading labour or other similar oppressive practices. (Para 68-85)- Article 23 was incorporated into the Constitution to protect the members of oppressed castes from exploitative practices, where their labour is taken advantage of, and without any adequate return- Assigning labour based on caste background strips individuals of their liberty to engage in meaningful work, and denies them the opportunity to rise above the constraints imposed by their social identity. (Para 195)

Constitution of India – Article 21- Rights of prisoners – Even the incarcerated have inherent dignity. They are to be treated in a humanely and without cruelty. Police officers and prison officials cannot take any disproportionate measures against prisoners. The prison system must be considerate of the physical and mental health of prisoners. For instance, if a prisoner suffers from a disability, adequate steps have to be taken to ensure their dignity and to offer support. (Para 67) -Article 23 can also be applied to situations inside prisons, if the prisoners are subjected to degrading labour or other similar oppressive practices. (Para 85) -The right to life enshrined in Article 21 “cannot be restricted to mere animal existence” and “means something much more than just physical survival”. It includes the right to live with dignity. In fact, dignity forms a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The “references” to dignity are “found in the guarantee against arbitrariness (Article 14), the lamps of freedom (Article 19) and in the right to life and personal liberty (Article 21).” Thus, dignity is the “core” which “unites the fundamental rights because the fundamental rights seek to achieve for each individual the dignity of existence”. In that sense, human dignity is a constitutional value and a constitutional goal.(Para 56-57) Article 21 envisages the growth of individual personality. Caste prejudices and discrimination hinder the growth of one’s personality. Therefore, Article 21 provides for the right to overcome caste barriers as a part of the right to life of individuals from marginalized communities. The protection provided by Article 21 can be seen as a constitutional guarantee that individuals from marginalized communities should have the freedom to break free from these traditional social restrictions. It extends beyond mere survival to ensure that they can flourish in an environment of equality, respect, and dignity, without being subjected to caste-based discrimination which stifles their personal growth (Para 187)

Constitution of India – Article 15- Article 15(1), caste cannot be a ground to discriminate against members of marginalized castes. Any use of caste as a basis for classification must withstand judicial scrutiny to ensure it does not perpetuate discrimination against the oppressed castes. While caste-based classifications are permissible under certain constitutional provisions, they are strictly regulated to ensure they serve the purpose of promoting equality and social justice

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989- PoA Act is a significant legislative measure designed to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, ensuring their dignity and safety against discrimination and violence – Discrimination against the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Denotified Tribes has continued in a systemic manner. Remedying systemic discrimination requires concrete multi-faceted efforts by all institutions. In discharge of their role, courts have to ensure that while there should be proper implementation of the protective legislation such as the PoA Act, there should not be unfair targeting of members from marginalized castes under various colonial-era or modern laws. (Para 131-144)

Quotable quotes -Our interpretation of the Constitution must fill the silences in its text. (Para 9) The Constitution is not just a legal document, but in India’s social structure, it is a quantum leap. In one stroke, it gave a dignified identity to all citizens of India. (Para 14) The Constitution mandates the replacement of fundamental wrongs with fundamental rights. The Constitution is the embodiment of the aspirations of the millions of caste-oppressed communities, which hoped for a better future in independent India. (Para 15) The fight against caste-based discrimination is not a battle that can be won overnight; it requires sustained effort, dedication, and the willingness to confront and challenge societal norms that perpetuate inequality. (Para 23) As a society that divided people into a hierarchy, we must remain conscious of the forms and kinds of discrimination against marginalized groups. Discriminatory laws enacted before the Constitution of India came into force need to be scrutinized and done away with. (Para 36) Article 17 enunciates that everyone is born equal. There cannot be any stigma attached to the existence, touch or presence of any person. (Para 54) A nation must prioritize human dignity—ensuring that every person, regardless of their background or identity, is able to live with respect, equality, and freedom. (Para 57) The right to live with dignity extends even to the incarcerated. Not providing dignity to prisoners is a relic of the colonizers and pre-colonial mechanisms, where oppressive systems were designed to dehumanize and degrade those under the control of the State.( Para 58) The rules of caste continued in medieval history. The law of caste manifested in several ways– with each manifestation causing a form of violence against the oppressed communities. (Para 94) The exercise of the power to arrest or detain may become reflective of a colonial mindset, if not exercised with caution. (Para 143) Discrimination against the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Denotified Tribes has continued in a systemic manner. Remedying systemic discrimination requires concrete multi-faceted efforts by all institutions. (Para 144) Segregating prisoners on the basis of caste would reinforce caste differences or animosity that ought to be prevented at the first place. Segregation would not lead to rehabilitation. (Para 166) The notion that an occupation is considered as “degrading or menial” is an aspect of the caste system and untouchability. (Para 179) Refusal to check caste practices or prejudices amounts to cementing of such practices. If such practices are based on the oppression of the marginalized castes, then such practices cannot be left untouched.( Para 180) The rule that a prisoner of a high caste be allowed to refuse the food cooked by other castes is a legal sanction by the State authorities to untouchability and the caste system.”(Para 181) Article 21 envisages the growth of individual personality. Caste prejudices and discrimination hinder the growth of one’s personality. Therefore, Article 21 provides for the right to overcome caste barriers as a part of the right to life of individuals from marginalized communities. (Para 187) Assigning labour based on caste background strips individuals of their liberty to engage in meaningful work, and denies them the opportunity to rise above the constraints imposed by their social identity. (Para 195) After all, the “bounds of caste are made of steel”– “Sometimes invisible but almost always inextricable””.But not so strong that they cannot be broken with the power of the Constitution. (Para 229)

Income Tax Act,1961; Section 149,151-Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act 2020-a.After 1 April 2021, the Income Tax Act has to be read along with the substituted provisions; b. TOLA will continue to apply to the Income Tax Act after 1 April 2021 if any action or proceeding specified under the substituted provisions of the Income Tax Act falls for completion between 20 March 2020 and 31 March 2021; c. Section 3(1) of TOLA overrides Section 149 of the Income Tax Act only to the extent of relaxing the time limit for issuance of a reassessment notice under Section 148; d. TOLA will extend the time limit for the grant of sanction by the authority specified under Section 151. The test to determine whether TOLA will apply to Section 151 of the new regime is this: if the time limit of three years from the end of an assessment year falls between 20 March 2020 and 31 March 2021, then the specified authority under Section 151(i) has extended time till 30 June 2021 to grant approval; e. In the case of Section 151 of the old regime, the test is: if the time limit of four years from the end of an assessment year falls between 20 March 2020 and 31 March 2021, then the specified authority under Section 151(2) has extended time till 31 March 2021 to grant approval; f. The directions in Ashish Agarwal (supra) will extend to all the ninety thousand reassessment notices issued under the old regime during the period 1 April 2021 and 30 June 2021; g. The time during which the show cause notices were deemed to be stayed is from the date of issuance of the deemed notice between 1 April 2021 and 30 June 2021 till the supply of relevant information and material by the assessing officers to the assesses in terms of the directions issued by this Court in Ashish Agarwal (supra), and the period of two weeks allowed to the assesses to respond to the show cause notices; and h. The assessing officers were required to issue the reassessment notice under Section 148 of the new regime within the time limit surviving under the Income Tax Act read with TOLA. All notices issued beyond the surviving period are time barred and liable to be set aside. (Para 114)

Constitution of India-Article 265– No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. A taxing statute must be valid and conform to other provisions of the Constitution -Distinction between “levy” and “collection.”- The expression “levy” has a wider connotation. It includes both the imposition of a tax as well as assessment. The quantum of tax levied by a taxing statute, the conditions subject to which it is levied, and how it is sought to be recovered are all matters within the competence of the legislature. In a taxing statute, the charging provisions are generally accompanied by a set of provisions for computing or assessing the levy. The character of assessment provisions bears a relationship to the nature of the charge -The expression “assessment” comprehends the entire procedure for ascertaining and imposing liability upon taxpayers. The process of assessment involves computation of the income of the assessees, determination of tax payable by them, and the procedure for collecting or recovering tax. An assessing officer is concerned with the assessment and collection of revenue. An assessing officer must administer the provisions of the Income Tax Act in the interests of the public revenue and to prevent evasion or escapement of tax legitimately due to the State. (Para 23-24) –Article 142 –Article 142 empowers this Court to pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. The discretionary jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Article 142 is of the widest amplitude. The Constitution has left it to the judicial discretion of this Court to decide the scope and limits of its jurisdiction to render substantial justice in matters coming before it. The expression “any cause or matter” mentioned under Article 142 includes every kind of proceeding pending before this Court. Article 142 allows this Court to give precedence-The exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142 is meant to supplement the existing legal framework to do complete justice between the parties. In a given circumstance, this Court can supplement a legal framework to craft a just outcome when strict adherence to a source of law and exclusive rulebased theories create inequitable results. – The directions issued by this Court under Article 142 cannot be considered as a ratio because they are issued based on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the cause or matter before this Court- a judgment has two components: (a) declaration of law; and (b) directions- What is binding on all courts under Article 141 is the declaration of law, and not the directions issued under Article 142. (Para 82-87)

Administrative Law – If a statute expressly confers a power or imposes a duty on a particular authority, then such power or duty must be exercised or performed by that authority itself. Further, when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner, then that authority has to exercise its power following the prescribed manner. Any exercise of power by statutory authorities inconsistent with the statutory prescription is invalid. (Para 30) -A statutory authority may lack jurisdiction if it does not fulfil the preliminary conditions laid down under the statute, which are necessary to the exercise of its jurisdiction. There cannot be any waiver of a statutory requirement or provision that goes to the root of the jurisdiction of assessment. An order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity. Any consequential order passed or action taken will also be invalid and without jurisdiction. (Para 32)

Interpretation of Statutes- Principle of harmonious construction . The legislature is presumed to enact a consistent and harmonious body of laws in deference to the rule of law. In case of any apparent conflict within a provision or between two provisions of the same statute, the courts must read the provisions harmoniously- The principle of harmonious construction requires courts to bring about a reconciliation between seemingly conflicting provisions to give effect to both. An interpretation which reduces one of the provisions to a “dead letter” is not a harmonious construction. The principle of harmonious construction also applies to reconcile two seemingly conflicting provisions of different statutes.(Para 39) – Non-obstante clause- A legislature often appends a non obstante clause to a provision to give it an overriding effect over provisions contained in the same statute or a separate statute. The purpose of incorporating a non obstante clause in a provision is to prohibit the operation and effect of all contrary provisions -A non-obstante clause must be given effect to the extent Parliament intended and not beyond. In construing a provision containing a non obstante clause, courts must determine the purpose and object for which the provision was enacted. The courts are also required to find out the extent to which the legislature intended to give one provision overriding effect over another provision. In case of a clear inconsistency between two enactments, a provision containing a non obstante clause can be given an overriding effect over a provision contained in another statute (Para 40-41) – Implied Repeal –When two laws are inconsistent or repugnant, the later legislation is interpreted as having impliedly repealed the earlier legislation. The principle underlying implied repeal is that there is no need for the later enactment to state in express words that the earlier enactment has been repealed if the legislative intent to supersede the earlier law is manifested through the provisions of the later enactment -The following principles applicable to the implied repeal of legislation: a. A subsequent legislation may not be too readily presumed to effectuate a repeal of existing statutory laws in the absence of express or at least unambiguous indication to that effect; b. Courts must lean against implying a repeal unless the two provisions are so plainly repugnant to each other that they cannot stand together and it is not possible on any reasonable hypothesis to give effect to both at the same time; c. It is necessary to closely scrutinise and consider the true meaning and effect of both the earlier and the later statute; and d. If the objects of the two statutory provisions are different and the language of each statute is restricted to its objects or subject, then they are generally intended to rule in parallel lines without meeting and there would be no real conflict-The principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests is that if the subjectmatter of a later legislation is identical to that of an earlier legislation so that they both cannot stand together, then the earlier legislation is impliedly repealed by the later legislation. The courts have to determine whether the legislature intended the two sets of provisions to be applied simultaneously. The presumption against implied repeal is based on the theory that the legislature knows the existing laws and does not intend to create any confusion by retaining two conflicting provisions or statutes. The test to be applied for the construction of implied repeal is whether the new or subsequent law is inconsistent with or repugnant to the old law. The inconsistency or repugnancy should clearly and manifestly reveal an intention to repeal the existing laws. The inconsistency or repugnancy must be such that the two statutes cannot be reconciled on reasonable construction or hypothesis. To determine whether a later statute repeals by implication an earlier statute, it is necessary to examine the scope and object of the two enactments by comparison of their provisions.105 Implied repeal should be avoided, if possible, where both the statutes can stand together. (Para 42-43)

Legislation – Amendment by substitution – The process of substitution of a statutory provision generally involves two steps: first, the existing rule is deleted; and second, the new rule is brought into existence in its place. The deletion effectively repeals the existing provision. Thus, an amendment by substitution results in the repeal of an earlier provision and its replacement by a new provision. The repealed provision will cease to operate from the date of repeal and the substituted provision will commence operation from the date of its substitution. After the substitution, the legislation must be read and construed as if the altered words have been written into the legislation “with pen and ink and the old words scored out.” Therefore, after amendment by substitution any reference to a legislation must be construed as the legislation as amended by substitution. (Para 57) –Legal fiction– A legal fiction is a supposition of law that a thing or event exists even though, in reality, it does not exist. The word “deemed” is used to treat a thing or event as something, which otherwise it may not have been, with all the attendant consequences. The effect of a legal fiction is that “a position which otherwise would not obtain is deemed to obtain under the circumstances.”- A legal fiction is created for a definite purpose and it should be limited to the purpose for which it is enacted or applied. It is a well-established principle of interpretation that the courts must give full effect to a legal fiction by having due regard to the purpose for which the legal fiction is created. The consequences that follow the creation of the legal fiction “have got to be worked out to their logical extent.”158 The court has to assume all the facts and consequences that are incidental or inevitable corollaries to giving effect to the fiction (Para 98-99)

Words and expressions –The expression “any” has been interpreted by this Court to mean “all” or “every”. The context in which the word “any” appears has to be construed after taking into consideration the scheme and the purpose of the enactment. (Para 61)

Code of Criminal Procedure ,1973- Section 154– When there is a delay in forwarding the FIR to the jurisdictional magistrate and the accused raises a specific contention regarding the same, they must demonstrate how this delay has prejudiced their case. Mere delay by itself is not sufficient to discard and disbelieve the case of the prosecution. If the investigation starts in right earnest and there is sufficient material on record to show that the accused were named and pinpointed, the prosecution case can be accepted when evidence implicates the accused. The requirement to dispatch and serve a copy of the FIR to the jurisdictional magistrate is an external check against ante dating or ante timing of the FIR to ensure that there is no manipulation or interpolation in the FIR. If the court finds the witnesses to be truthful and credible, the lack of a cogent explanation for the delay may not be regarded as detrimental. (Para 30)

Code of Criminal Procedure ,1973- Section 161– Statements under Section 161 CrPC are per se not evidence in the court. (Para 31)

Summary: Murder conviction of some of the accused upheld – Murder conviction of some other accused restored.

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017,2016- Section 17(5)- Constitutional validity of clauses (c) and (d) of Section 17(5) upheld- The expression “plant or machinery” used in Section 17(5)(d) cannot be given the same meaning as the expression “plant and machinery” defined by the explanation to Section 17- The question whether a mall, warehouse or any building other than a hotel or a cinema theatre can be classified as a plant within the meaning of the expression “plant or machinery” used in Section 17(5)(d) is a factual question which has to be determined keeping in mind the business of the registered person and the role that building plays in the said business. If the construction of a building was essential for carrying out the activity of supplying services, such as renting or giving on lease or other transactions in respect of the building or a part thereof, which are covered by clauses (2) and (5) of Schedule II of the CGST Act, the building could be held to be a plant. Then, it is taken out of the exception carved out by clause (d) of Section 17(5) to sub-section (1) of Section 16. Functionality test will have to be applied to decide whether a building is a plant. Therefore, by using the functionality test, in each case, on facts, in the light of what we have held earlier, it will have to be decided whether the construction of an immovable property is a “plant” for the purposes of clause (d) of Section 17(5)- (Para 65)-Section 16(4)– The words “thirtieth day of November” were substituted with effect from 1st October 2022 for the words “due date of furnishing of the return under Section 39 for the month of September”. We fail to understand how sub-section (4) of Section 16 becomes discriminatory when the legislature says that a registered person shall not be entitled to take ITC in respect of any invoice or debit note for the supply of goods or services or both after the thirtieth day of November following the end of the financial year to which such invoice or debit note pertains or furnishing of the relevant annual return, whichever is earlier. It is not shown how the provision is arbitrary and discriminatory. The fact that the provisions could have been drafted in a better manner or more articulately is not sufficient to attract arbitrariness. (Para 63)- Section 16(3) -A registered person will not be entitled to ITC on the tax component of the cost of capital goods and plant and machinery if he claims depreciation on the said tax component under the Income Tax Act. The object is that a registered person does not take advantage of both depreciation and ITC. (Para 28)

Legislation – Constitutional Validity– While dealing with a taxing statute, it can always be said that, ideally, a particular provision ought not to have been incorporated or ought to have been incorporated with a modification. Even if this can be said, per se, the particular provision does not become unconstitutional. The Court cannot impose its views on the legislature. (Para 62) – Laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion, etc. (Para 57) The fact that the provisions could have been drafted in a better manner or more articulately is not sufficient to attract arbitrariness. (Para 63)

Constitution of India.- Article 14 –Reasonable classification test- To satisfy the test, there must be an intelligible differentia forming the basis of the classification, and the differentia should have a rational nexus with the object of legislation. (Para 58)

Interpretation of Statutes – Rules Regarding Interpretation of Taxing Statutes summarized: a. A taxing statute must be read as it is with no additions and no subtractions on the grounds of legislative intendment or otherwise; b. If the language of a taxing provision is plain, the consequence of giving effect to it may lead to some absurd result is not a factor to be considered when interpreting the provisions. It is for the legislature to step in and remove the absurdity; c. While dealing with a taxing provision, the principle of strict interpretation should be applied; d. If two interpretations of a statutory provision are possible, the Court ordinarily would interpret th provision in favour of a taxpayer and against the revenue; e. In interpreting a taxing statute, equitable considerations are entirely out of place; f. A taxing provision cannot be interpreted on any presumption or assumption; g. A taxing statute has to be interpreted in the light of what is clearly expressed. The Court cannot imply anything which is not expressed. Moreover, the Court cannot import provisions in the statute to supply any deficiency; h. There is nothing unjust in the taxpayer escaping if the letter of the law fails to catch him on account of the legislature’s failure to express itself clearly; i. If literal interpretation is manifestly unjust, which produces a result not intended by the legislature, only in such a case can the Court modify the language; j. Equity and taxation are strangers. But if construction results in equity rather than injustice, such construction should be preferred; k. It is not a function of the Court in the fiscal arena to compel the Parliament to go further and do more; l. When a word used in a taxing statute is to be construed and has not been specifically defined, it should not be interpreted in accordance with its definition in another statute that does not deal with a cognate subject. It should be understood in its commercial sense. Unless defined in the statute itself, the words and expressions in a taxing statute have to be construed in the sense in which the persons dealing with them understand, that is, as per the trade understanding, commercial and technical practice and usage. (Para 25) -Non-obstante clause- A device used by the legislature that is usually employed to give an overriding effect to certain provisions over some contrary provisions that may be found in the same or some other enactments. Such a clause is used to indicate that the said provision should prevail despite anything to the contrary in the provisions mentioned in the non-obstante clause. (Para 30)

Constitution of India-Article 226- Scope of judicial intervention in Government contracts -Government bodies/ instrumentalities are expected to act in absolutely fair, reasonable and transparent manner, particularly in the award of contracts for Mega projects. Any element of arbitrariness or discrimination may lead to hampering of the entire project which would not be in the public interest-Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal in the matter of award of contracts and it merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made; and that the Government and its instrumentalities must have a freedom of entering into the contracts. However, it is equally well settled that the decision of the government/ its instrumentalities must be free from arbitrariness and must not be affected by any bias or actuated by malafides. Government bodies being public authorities are expected to uphold fairness, equality and public interest even while dealing with contractual matters. Right to equality under Article 14 abhors arbitrariness. Public authorities have to ensure that no bias, favouritism or arbitrariness are shown during the bidding process and that the entire bidding process is carried out in absolutely transparent manner. (Para 21-29)

Live Streaming – Livestreaming has provided fresh sunlight. The answer to sunlight is to provide more sunlight. All stake holders in the judicial system, including judges, lawyers and parties in person, have to be conscious of the fact that the reach of judicial proceedings extends beyond those who are physically present. The reach of judicial hearings extends to audiences well beyond the physical precincts of the court- This places an added responsibility on judges and lawyers as well as litigants who appear in person to conduct the proceedings conscious of the wide and immediate impact of casual observations on the community at large. (Para 14)

Judiciary – Judges need to be conscious of the fact that each individual bears a certain degree of accumulated predispositions, based on their experiences of life. Some may be early experiences. Others are gained later. Every Judge should be aware of those predispositions. The heart and soul of judging lies in the need to be impartial and fair. Intrinsic to that process is the need for every Judge to be aware of their own predispositions. Awareness of these predispositions is the first step in excluding them in the decision making process. It is on the basis of that awareness that a judge can be faithful to the fundamental obligation to render objective and fair justice. Every stake holder in the administration of justice has to understand that the only values which must guide decision making are those which are enshrined in the Constitution of India- Casual observations often reflect individual bias, particularly, when they are likely to be perceived as being directed against a particular gender or community. Courts, therefore, have to be careful not to make comments in the course of judicial proceedings which may be construed as being misogynistic or, for that matter, prejudicial to any segment of our society. (Para 15)

Income Tax Act, 1961 -Sections 139 and 143- In this case, the appellant-assessee filed a return of income on 19th November 1989 for the assessment year 1989-90. On 31st October 1990, the appellant filed a revised return. As per intimation issued under Section 143(1)(a) of the IT Act on 27th August 1991, the appellant paid the necessary tax amount. On 29th October 1991, the appellant filed another revised return. The assessing officer did not take cognizance of the said revised return- Dismissing appeal, SC held: The assessing officer had no jurisdiction to consider the claim made by the assessee in the revised return filed after the time prescribed by Section 139(5) for filing a revised return had already expired.

Public Representative– Matter of removal of an elected public representative should not be treated so lightly, especially when it concerns women belonging to rural areas. It must be acknowledged that these women who succeed in occupying such public offices, do so only after significant struggle. [In this case, the Collector passed an order disqualifying the appellant from continuing as Sarpanch- SC held: Punishment awarded to the appellant, namely, her removal from the office of Sarpanch, is highly disproportionate- Collector’s order set aside]

Public Employment –Introducing new requirements into the selection process after the entire selection process was completed amounted to changing the rules of the game after the game was played. (Para 28) [In this case, despite the preparation of the Final Select List which signals the conclusion of the appointment process, the State Government seeks to scrap the entire process and undertake a fresh appointment process under the New Rules- SC observed: This amounts to effectively changing the rules of the game after the game was played which is impermissible and deprives the candidates of their legitimate right of consideration under the previous Rules.]

U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954 A“voidable” document continues to be in force until it is set aside and such a document can only be set aside by a competent civil court- Consolidation authorities do not have the jurisdiction and power to cancel a document, which is required to be set aside or cancelled and the document will continue to be valid till it is cancelled by a Competent Court i.e. a Civil Court- If the document is void, it would be open for the Consolidation Authorities to disregard such a document & in such a case, they would get the exclusive jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. But if the document is voidable, the Civil Court is vested with the jurisdiction to declare the same to be voidable. In the case of voidable documents, not only would the Consolidation Authorities have no power to cancel such documents, but even the proceedings pending before any competent Civil Court would not abate. [In this case, the allegation was that the fraudulent misrepresentation was by petitioner’s mother, who executed the sale deed by impersonation: It would make the sale deed voidable, but not void -Therefore sale deed will be binding on the Consolidation Authorities unless it is set aside by a competent Civil Court and there would be no bar on jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try a suit for cancellation of such a sale deed.]

Summary: Trial Judge did not impose death penalty holding that it does not fit in the category of ‘rarest of rare cases’ – High Court imposed death penalty in appeal – Partly allowing appeal, SC observed: Unless the finding recorded by the Trial Judge was found to be perverse or impossible, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the same. In any case, the role played by appellant- is similar with all the other accused and the case of appellant could not have been segregated to impose death penalty upon him- The sentence of death imposed by the High Court set aside.

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 – Section 482 -For quashing of criminal charges it must be shown that there is no sufficient evidence to prove a prima facie case against the accused person/s. [In this case, there are statements by witnesses indicating abuse and torture of deceased by her in-laws and other factual circumstances- Therefore prima facie case is made against the accused persons- The High Court erred in quashing the order of trial court framing charges]

Indian Penal Code,1860 –Section 306 [Section 108 of BNS,2023]-The basic ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 306 of the IPC are suicidal death and abetment thereof -The ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 306 of the IPC (abetment of suicide) would stand fulfilled if the suicide is committed by the deceased due to direct and alarming encouragement/incitement by the accused leaving no option but to commit suicide. Further, as the extreme action of committing suicide is also on account of great disturbance to the psychological imbalance of the deceased such incitement can be divided First, where the deceased is having sentimental ties or physical relations with the accused and the second category would be where the deceased is having relations with the accused in his or her official capacity. In the case of former category sometimes a normal quarrel or the hot exchange of words may result into immediate psychological imbalance, consequently creating a situation of depression, loss of charm in life and if the person is unable to control sentiments of expectations, it may give temptations to the person to commit suicide, e.g., when there is relation of husband and wife, mother and son, brother and sister, sister and sister and other relations of such type, where sentimental tie is by blood or due to physical relations. In the case of second category the tie is on account of official relations, where the expectations would be to discharge the obligations as provided for such duty in law and to receive the considerations as provided in law. In normal circumstances, relationships by sentimental tie cannot be equated with the official relationship. The reason being different nature of conduct to maintain that relationship. The former category leaves more expectations, whereas in the latter category, by and large, the expectations and obligations are prescribed by law, rules, policies and regulations. (Para 14- 21)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973- Section 482 – Abetment of suicide cases -The test that the Court should adopt in this type of cases is to make an endeavour to ascertain on the basis of the materials on record whether there is anything to indicate even prima facie that the accused intended the consequences of the act, i.e., suicide. Over a period of time, the trend of the courts is that such intention can be read into or gathered only after a fullfledged trial. The problem is that the courts just look into the factum of suicide and nothing more. We believe that such understanding on the part of the courts is wrong. It all depends on the nature of the offence & accusation. For example, whether the accused had the common intention under Section 34 of the IPC could be gathered only after a full-fledged trial on the basis of the depositions of the witnesses as regards the genesis of the occurrence, the manner of assault, the weapon used, the role played by the accused etc. However, in cases of abetment of suicide by and large the facts make things clear more particularly from the nature of the allegations itself. The Courts should know how to apply the correct principles of law governing abetment of suicide to the facts on record. It is the inability on the part of the courts to understand and apply the correct principles of law to the cases of abetment of suicide, which leads to unnecessary prosecutions. We do understand and appreciate the feelings and sentiments of the family members of the deceased and we cannot find any fault on their part if they decide to lodge a First Information Report with the police. However, it is ultimately for the police and the courts of law to look into the matter and see that the persons against whom allegations have been levelled are not unnecessarily harassed or they are not put to trial just for the sake of prosecuting them. (Para 22)

Summary: Allowing appeal filed by accused in an abetment to suicide case, the Supreme Court observed: putting the appellants to trial on the charge that they abetted the commission of suicide by the deceased will be nothing but abuse of process of law. In our opinion, no case worth the name against the appellants is made out.

Transfer of Property Act,1882- Section 54– A minor can be a transferee though not a transferor of immovable property- Though an agreement to sell is a contract of sale, a sale cannot be said to be a contract. Sale, going by the definition, is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. (Para 30)

Adverse Possession -Tenants or lessees could not claim adverse possession against their landlord/lessor, as the nature of their possession is permissive in nature- Once the plaintiff proves his title over suit property it is for the defendant resisting the same claiming adverse possession that he perfected title through adverse possession –Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 –The starting point of limitation would not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff but would commence only from the date the defendant’s becomes adverse. (Para 40-41)

Transfer of Property Act,1882- Section 52,41- Once it has been held that the transactions are illegal due to the doctrine of lis pendens, the defence that they are bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration and thus, entitled to protection under Section 41 is liable to be rejected. (Para 14) – the doctrine of lis pendens applies to an alienation during the pendency of the suit whether such alienees had or had no notice of the pending proceedings. (Para 11)

Doctrine Of Lis Pendens -In this case, suit was filed on 24.12.1992 and the next date before the Trial Court was fixed on 12.01.1993. The sale deed was executed by defendant no. 1 in favour of defendant no. 2 on 08.01.1993- Trial Court partly decreed the suit – In Second appeal, High Court held that this sale deed is hit by doctrine of lis pendens and that defendant no. 2/appellant is not a bona fide purchaser – Dismissing appeal, SC observed- Once the subsequent sale was during pendency of the suit hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, the High Court was fully justified in setting aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court and passing a decree for specific performance.

Electricity Act 2003-Section 108 – The state regulatory commissions are not ‘bound’ by the directions of the state government, or the Central Government -The state commission shall only be ‘guided’ by the directions issued by the state government and is not automatically bound by them – The provision, in no manner, seeks to control the exercise of quasi-judicial power by the state commissions based on directions issued by the state government – The State government while issuing a policy directive cannot impinge on the adjudicatory discretion which is vested in an authority under the Act. (Para 16-18)

Electricity Act 2003- Section 94(f) – State commission has the same powers as vested in a civil court under the CPC in respect of reviewing its decisions, directions and orders. Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC provides for review on limited grounds. An order cannot be made the subject of an appeal under the garb of a review. While reviewing an order, the court or tribunal must be satisfied that there was an error apparent in its previous order, which warrants the exercise of its power to review. (Para 19)

Indian Penal Code 1860 – Section 34 –For a person to be convicted under section 34, there must be an involvement of two or more persons with common intention to commit the crime. Mere presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence is not sufficient. (Para 17)

Punishment -The object of punishment is not only to deter the accused from committing any further crime, but also to reform and retribute; and the extent of reformation can be derived only by the conduct of the accused exhibited during his days of retribution. (Para 19)

Criminal Trial –The law on minor discrepancies which does not affect the basic case of the prosecution- Referred to C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu [2010] 10 S.C.R. 262:: 2010 INSC 553: Even if there are some omissions, contradictions and discrepancies, the entire evidence cannot be disregarded. After exercising care and caution and sifting through the evidence to separate truth from untruth, exaggeration and improvements, the court comes to a conclusion as to whether the residuary evidence is sufficient to convict the accused. Thus, an undue importance should not be attached to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution’s witness. As the mental abilities of a human being cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb all the details of the incident, minor discrepancies are bound to occur in the statements of witnesses. (Para 15)

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973- Section 482 –A petition to quash the FIR does not become infructuous on submission of a police report under Section 173 (2) of the CrPC- But when a police report has been submitted, particularly when there is no stay on the investigation, the Court must apply its mind to the materials submitted in support of the police report before taking a call whether the FIR and consequential proceedings should be quashed or not – At the stage of deciding whether a criminal proceeding or FIR, as the case may be, is to be quashed at the threshold or not, the allegations in the FIR or the police report or the complaint, including the materials collected during investigation or inquiry, as the case may be, are to be taken at their face value so as to determine whether a prima facie case for investigation or proceeding against the accused, as the case may be, is made out. The correctness of the allegations is not to be tested at this stage- FIR is not an encyclopedia of all imputations. Therefore, to test whether an FIR discloses commission of a cognizable offence what is to be looked at is not any omission in the accusations but the gravamen of the accusations contained therein to find out whether, prima facie, some cognizable offence has been committed or not. At this stage, the Court is not required to ascertain as to which specific offence has been committed. It is only after investigation, at the time of framing charge, when materials collected during investigation are before the Court, the Court has to draw an opinion as to for commission of which offence the accused should be tried. Prior to that, if satisfied, the Court may even discharge the accused. Thus, when the FIR alleges a dishonest conduct on the part of the accused which, if supported by materials, would disclose commission of a cognizable offence, investigation should not be thwarted by quashing the FIR. (Para 16-19)

Mens Rea – To commit an offence, unless the penal statute provides otherwise, mens rea is one of the essential ingredients. Existence of mens rea is a question of fact which may be inferred from the act in question as well as the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the accused. (Para 17)

Code of Civil Procedure 1908 – Order XXI Rule 99– “Any person” not a party to the suit or in other words a stranger to the suit can seek redelivery, after he has been dispossessed. The term “Stranger” would cover within its ambit, a pendent lite transferee, who has not been impleaded- The difference between the rights of a decree holder qua a third party to the suit and the right of a third party after being dispossessed- Referred to Sriram Housing Finance & Investment (India) Ltd. v. Omesh Mishra Memorial Charitable Trust, (2022) 15 SCC 176 – The pendent lite purchaser has every right to defend his right, title, interest and possession – Referred to Yogesh Goyanka v. Govind, (2024) 7 SCC 524 : [2024] 7 S.C.R. 668 : 2024 INSC 510

Code of Civil Procedure 1908 – Order XXI Rule 99– Once an application under Order 21 Rule 99 is filed, it is incumbent upon the Trial Court to consider all the rival claims including the right title and interest of the parties under Order 21 Rule 101 which bars a separate suit by mandating the execution court to decide the dispute-

Limitation Act 1963 – Limitation for execution of a decree passed in the suit for partition- The time begins to run from the date of final decree and not from the date on which it is engrossed on the stamp paper. (Para 17)

National Medical Commission (NMC) guidelines regarding admission of students with “specified disabilities” under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016– (i)Quantified disability per se will not disentitle a candidate with benchmark disability from being considered for admission to educational institutions. The candidate will be eligible, if the Disability Assessment Board opines that notwithstanding the quantified disability the candidate can pursue the course in question. The NMC regulations in the notification of 13.05.2019 read with the Appendix H-1 should, pending the re-formulation by NMC, be read in the light of the holdings in this judgment – The Disability Assessment Boards assessing the candidates should positively record whether the disability of the candidate will or will not come in the way of the candidate pursuing the course in question. The Disability Assessment Boards should state reasons in the event of the Disability Assessment Boards concluding that the candidate is not eligible for pursuing the course. (iii) The Disability Assessment Boards will, pending formulation of appropriate regulations by the NMC, pursuant to the communication of 25.01.2024 by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, keep in mind the salutary points mentioned in the said communication while forming their opinion. (iv) Pending creation of the appellate body, we further direct that such decisions of the Disability Assessment Boards which give a negative opinion for the candidate will be amenable to challenge in judicial review proceedings. The Court seized of the matter in the judicial review proceedings shall refer the case of the candidate to any premier medical institute having the facility, for an independent opinion and relief to the candidate will be granted or denied based on the opinion of the said medical institution to which the High Court had referred the matter. (Para 53)

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Section 2(y)– The reasonable accommodation as defined in Section 2(y) of the RPwD Act should not be understood narrowly to mean only the provision of assisting devices and other tangible substances which will aid persons with disabilities. If the mandate of the law is to ensure a full and effective participation of persons with disabilities in the society and if the whole idea was to exclude conditions that prevent their full and effective participation as equal members of society, a broad interpretation of the concept of reasonable accommodation which will further the objective of the RPwD Act and Article 41 of the Directive Principles of State Policy is mandated. (Para 40) -principle of reasonable accommodation captures the positive obligation of the State and private parties to provide additional support to persons with disabilities to facilitate their full and effective participation in society. (Para 41) – The approach of the Government, instrumentalities of States, regulatory bodies and for that matter even private sector should be, as to how best can one accommodate and grant the opportunity to the candidates with disability. The approach should not be as to how best to disqualify the candidates and make it difficult for them to pursue and realize their educational goals.  (Para 38)

Constitution of India- Article 14 – A Constitutional Court examining the plea of discrimination is mandated to consider whether real equality exists. This Court is not to be carried away by a projection of facial equality -Appearances can be deceptive. The Court of law is obliged to probe as to whether beneath the veneer of equality there is any invidious breach of Article 14.  (Para 25) nArticle 41 -The Constitutional goal of our nation that within the limits of its economic capacity and development, the State was to make effective provisions for securing the right to education including for the persons with disabilities. (Para 16)

NCLT Rules – Rule 50 –The provisions of Rule 50 of the NCLT Rules place both the free certified copy as well as the certified copy which is applied for on payment of fees on the same footing – Both the certified copy which is provided free of cost as well as the certified copy which is made on an application in that behalf are treated as certified copies for the purposes of Rule 50. (Para 13,22)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 235 –A judgment of conviction shall have two components; namely, (i) Judgment on the point of conviction; and (ii) Where the accused is convicted, a separate order of sentence to be passed according to law, after hearing the accused on the question of sentence- Once the judgment of conviction is delivered, the accused has a right to be heard on the quantum of the sentence- Various relevant factors, including mitigating circumstances, if any, are to be kept in mind by the Court while awarding an adequate and proportionate sentence- In this case, the accused was held guilty and convicted vide judgment pronounced on 30.04.2015- Before he could be heard on the quantum of the sentence, the accused moved an application to exempt him from personal appearance on the ground that he had met with an accident. In view of that application, the matter was adjourned on a few occasions to enable the accused to recover from the accident.In the meanwhile, the Presiding Officer of the Court,, who had convicted him, was transferred – A new Presiding Officer was posted in his place. The question raised in this appeal is whether the new Presiding Officer was obligated not only to hear the accused on the question of sentence but also on the point of conviction? SC Held: The process and procedure contemplated under Section 235(2) cannot annul the judgment of conviction recorded under sub-section (1) thereof. Both clauses operate in their respective fields, though sub-section (2) is contingent upon the outcome under sub-section (1) of Section 235. The occasion to comply with subsection (2) arises only when there is a judgment of conviction passed under Section 235(1) of the Cr.PC -Once the judgment was pronounced, the conviction of the appellant stood finalized within the meaning of Section 235(1) whereupon the Trial Court became functus officio for the purpose of sub-section (1) of Section 235 of the Cr.P.C. The only issue that survived thereafter was of the quantum of sentence for which, the procedure contemplated under sub-section (2) was to be complied with-The successor officer should therefore hear the appellant on the question of sentence and pass an appropriate order.

Motor Accident Compensation Claims –The amount of compensation claimed is not a bar for the Tribunal to award more than what is claimed, provided it is found to be just and reasonable. It is the duty of the Court to assess fair compensation. Rough calculation made by the claimant is not a bar or the upper limit. (Para 20)

Indian Penal Code 1860 – Section 302 – Death Sentence –Doctrine of “rarest of rare” requires that death sentence should not be imposed only by taking into consideration the grave nature of crime but only if there is no possibility of reformation by a criminal. (Para 32)

Criminal Trial – Non-examination of independent witnesses by itself would not give rise to adverse inference against the prosecution. It would only assume importance when the evidence of eyewitness raises a serious doubt about their presence at the time of actual occurrence (Para 14( – here are bound to be some discrepancies between the narration of different witnesses, when they speak on details, and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety. It is further observed that corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but variations by reason therefore should not render the evidence unbelievable. Trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence. (Para 21) -Conviction can be based on the testimony of a sole eyewitness- The court can act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. Unless corroboration is insisted upon by a statute, courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence that corroboration should be insisted upon. Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary, would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and depends upon the judicial discretion- Court would be considered with the quality and not the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or not proving a fact. (Para 12)

Summary: Appellant conviction for murdering his pregnant daughter upheld -But the sentence of death penalty imposed by the courts below converted to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment without remission.

Specific Relief Act, 1963 -Section 16(c) – A plaintiff seeking specific performance of a contract must aver and prove that they have performed or have always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by them. This requirement is a condition precedent and must be established by the plaintiff throughout the proceedings. The readiness and willingness of the plaintiff are to be determined from their conduct prior to and subsequent to the filing of the suit, as well as from the terms of the agreement and surrounding circumstances. The rationale behind this provision is to ensure that a party seeking equitable relief has acted equitably themselves. Specific performance is a discretionary relief, and the plaintiff must come to the court with clean hands, demonstrating sincerity and earnestness in fulfilling their contractual obligations. Any laxity, indifference, or failure to perform their part of the contract can be a ground to deny such relief. (Para 8) -The plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the essential terms of the agreement and to take necessary steps within the stipulated time demonstrates a lack of readiness and willingness, which is fatal to their claim for specific performance. (Para 13) – Section 20 (pre-2018 amendment) -The relief of specific performance under the Specific Relief Act, 1963, is discretionary in nature. Section 20 of the Act explicitly stated that the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so. The discretion must be exercised judiciously and based on sound principles, ensuring that granting specific performance is just and equitable in the circumstances of the case. (Para 19)

Agency– While it is legally permissible for an agent to bind a principal even if the agency relationship is not disclosed, this principle applies when the agent has valid and subsisting authority. (Para 16) – An agent’s authority must be explicit, and any limitations or revocations thereof must be given due consideration. (Para 17) –

Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002- Rule 9(4) – T he period to deposit the balance sale consideration, as provided under the Rules, is not sacrosanct and is extendable with the consent in writing of the parties and that Rule 9(4) will only come into play when there is default on part of the party i.e. the auction purchaser to deposit the amount and will not apply where there is no default or that the default, if any, lies upon the auctioneer. (Para 21)

Practice and Procedure -The validity of an order can only be adjudged on the basis of the reasoning contained in the order and the said reasoning cannot be supplemented in any manner much less by means of a counter affidavit or a supplementary affidavit when the parties have entered into a litigation- The parties are not permitted to raise new pleas not contained in the order impugned while assailing the correctness or the validity of such an order. (Para 12)

Constitution of India – Article 226- High Court could exercise its power of judicial review in Criminal matters and it could exercise the power either under Article 226 or under Section 482 CrPC to prevent the abuse of process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Nomenclature under which a petition is filed is not quite relevant. If the court finds that the petitioner could not invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226, it may treat the petition under Section 482, Cr. P.C. (Para 1)

Indian Penal Code 1860 – Section 376 -Quashing a rape case, Supreme Court observed: Firstly, it is to be noted that the subject FIR itself would reveal that there occurred a delay of more than 5 years for registering the FIR; secondly, the very case of the complainant, as revealed from the FIR, would go to show that they lived for a long period as man and wife and thirdly, the facts and circumstances obtained from the subject FIR and other materials on record would reveal absence of a prima facie case that the complainant had given her consent for sexual relationship with the appellant under misconception of fact – The subsequent refusal to marry the complainant would not be sufficient, in view of the facts and circumstances obtained in the case at hand, by any stretch of imagination to draw existence of a prima facie case that the complainant had given consent for the sexual relationship with the accused under misconception of fact, so as to accuse the appellant guilty of having committed rape within the meaning of Section 375, IPC. (Para 14-15)

Summary -Charge sheet alleged that the accused, with the object of cheating the Bank, granted the three facilities to a company – High Court allowed his discharge petition – Dismissing appeal, SC observed: perhaps the only material that creates suspicion is the speed with which the proposal of the Company was sanctioned. As far as the respondent is concerned, considering his position and the role ascribed to him in the grant of sanction to the loan proposal of the Company, mere suspicion against him is not enough to frame a charge against him- Only because the entire proposal was processed and cleared within a short span of time, no offence is made out against the respondent. Taking the material in the charge sheet as it is, complicity of the respondent is not made out.

Judgments -Judgments are not to be read as Euclid’s theorems; they are not to be construed as statutes, and; specific cases are authorities only for what they actually decide. (Para 4)

Bail – Parity – Grant of bail to co-accused would not ipso facto entitle the accused to the same – [the accused was incarcerated for 5 ½ months only – This cannot be taken as ‘incarceration for a significant period of time’ as sought to be projected by him]

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 28 – Banks are required to purchase Government securities to maintain the SLR. As per RBI’s guideline dated 16th October 2000, there are three categories of securities: HTM, AFS and HFT. As far as AFS and HFT are concerned, the interest accrued will have to be treated as income from the business of the Bank. Thus, after the deduction of broken period interest is allowed, the entire interest earned or accrued during the particular year is put to tax. Thus, what is taxed is the real income earned on the securities. By selling the securities, Banks will earn profits. Even that will be the income considered under Section 28 after deducting the purchase price. Therefore, in these two categories of securities, the benefit of deduction of interest for the broken period will be available to Banks – The securities of the HTM category are usually held for a long term till their maturity. Therefore, such securities usually are valued at cost price or face value. In many cases, Banks hold the same as investments. Whether the Bank has held HMT security as investment or stock­in­trade will depend on the facts of each case. HTM Securities can be said to be held as an investment (i) if the securities are actually held till maturity and are not transferred before and (ii) if they are purchased at their cost price or face value- When the securities were treated as stock­in­trade, the interest on the broken period cannot be considered as capital expenditure and will have to be treated as revenue expenditure, which can be allowed as a deduction . (Para 18-24)

Citizenship Act 1955 – Section 6A – Constitutional validity upheld -Section 6A falls within the bounds of the Constitution and does not contravene the foundational principles of fraternity, nor does it infringe upon Articles 6 and 7, Article 9, Article 14, Article 21, Article 29, Article 326, or Article 355 of the Constitution of India. Furthermore, Section 6A does not clash with the IEAA or established principles of international law – Section 6A does not suffer from manifest arbitrariness because: (a) there is application of mind behind the incorporation of the cut-off dates; (b) the process under Section 6A is not arbitrary; (c) Section 6A does not violate Part II; and (d) the term ‘ordinary residence’ is not vague enough to be void.-But there is inadequate enforcement of the same—leading to the possibility of widespread injustice. Further, the intention of Section 6A, i.e., to restrict illegal immigration post- 1971 has also not been given proper effect. Directions issued: (a) Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 falls within the bounds of the Constitution and is a valid piece of legislation; (b) As a necessary corollary thereto, (i) immigrants who entered the State of Assam prior to 1966 are deemed citizens; (ii) immigrants who entered between the cut off dates of 01.01.1966 and 25.03.1971 can seek citizenship subject to the eligibility conditions prescribed in Section 6A (3); and (iii) immigrants who entered the State of Assam on or after 25.03.1971 are not entitled to the protection conferred vide Section 6A and consequently, they are declared to be illegal immigrants. Accordingly, Section 6A has become redundant qua those immigrants who have entered the State of Assam on or after 25.03.1971; (c) The directions issued in Sarbananda Sonowal (supra) are required to be given effect to for the purpose of deporting the illegal immigrants falling in the category of direction (b) (iii) above; (d) The provisions of the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950 shall also be read into Section 6A and shall be effectively employed for the purpose of identification of illegal immigrants; (e) The statutory machinery and Tribunals tasked with the identification and detection of illegal immigrants or foreigners in Assam are inadequate and not proportionate to the requirement of giving time-bound effect to the legislative object of Section 6A read with the Immigrants (Expulsion from 185 Assam) Act, 1950, the Foreigners Act, 1946, the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 and the Passport Act, 1967; and (f) The implementation of immigration and citizenship legislations cannot be left to the mere wish and discretion of the authorities, necessitating constant monitoring by this Court.

Constitution of India – Article 14 –Manifest arbitrariness- Manifest arbitrariness must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary- While the test of manifest arbitrariness requires the presence of logicality, such reasoning does not have to be stated explicitly and can be discernable from the facts and circumstances.163 However, it should be noted that the converse may not hold. In other words, even if the reason or rationale behind the impugned provision is expressly stated, it does not automatically guarantee non-arbitrariness. Such reason also needs to align with constitutional morality and public interest, and must bear a nexus with the object of the statute. The aspect of irrationality, as found in the test for ‘manifest arbitrariness’, thus, does not solely imply the absence of reason but also requires alignment with constitutional morality. Hence, the legitimacy of the reason or logic behind the impugned legislation should be viewed from the lens of constitutional ideals- Irrationality does not merely denote the absence of reason but also requires that such reasoning be in harmony with constitutionalism- bright-line test. In law, the bright-line test is a clearly defined norm that does not leave a scope of interpretation – while testing the arbitrariness of bright-line tests, the Courts must be mindful of the inherent limitations in such norms and therefore a microscopic review should be avoided. Instead, as discussed above, the effort should be to determine if the bright-line norm crosses the prescribed limit of ‘manifest arbitrariness’ and is irrational and capricious enough to be struck down. If the norm is backed by a policy reason, the Court must refrain from excessively questioning the specific standard and should exercise judicial review cautiously. (Para 214-226)

Constitution of India – Fraternity – the term ‘fraternity’ embodies a sense of collective brotherhood amongst all Indians. It serves as a critical element for national unity and social cohesion. Fraternity assumes paramount significance in reinforcing the ideals of equality and liberty, both of which are integral facets of the Preambl- In the Indian context, the meaning of fraternity has thus entirely diverged from the French sense of the term and is intricately woven into the fabric of fostering social solidarity, uplifting marginalised groups, and achieving a more equitable society- Unlike some Western perspectives, where fraternity may be overshadowed by an emphasis on individual rights, in India, fraternity is distinctly perceived as a vital instrument for realising equality and harmonising the diverse segments of society. It serves as a conduit for transcending societal disparities and working towards collective well-being. Therefore, in the Indian constitutional context, fraternity assumes a dynamic and inclusive role, aligning with the broader goals of social justice, equality, and upliftment. (Para 96-106) – t the essence of fraternity, therefore, is fundamentally geared towards fostering interconnectedness among Indians and was envisaged to be a principle for uplifting marginalised sections of society (Para 115)

Constitution of India – Article 29(1). This article aims to protect and guarantee the right conferred upon every citizen of India to conserve their language, script or culture. When read in conjunction with Article 30, the overarching objective of Article 29 is to allow minority communities to establish educational institutions to preserve and fortify their cultural, linguistic, or scriptural heritage.-Article 29(1) effectively has two key aspects that need to be determined: first, whether there is a ‘section of citizens’ seeking to conserve their language, script or culture and second, that such language, script or culture in question is ‘distinct’. Article 29(1) begins with the term ‘any section of citizens’. Though the term ‘minority’ is used in the marginal heading, the scope of Article 29(1) is not restricted to minorities as understood in the technical sense. It instead extends to any section of citizens residing in the territory of India – , Article 29(1), while conferring the right to conserve, does not restrict itself only to the notion of a minority as understood in the technical sense but includes any group that may seek to conserve a distinct language, script or culture. Article 29 does not advocate for absolute governmental abstention in matters involving culture, language or script. In fact, to some extent, government intervention is unavoidable as regulation is essential for the maintenance of public order and for upholding constitutionalism. State actions and regulations with an insignificant or merely incidental effect on a community’s cultural rights might also not be caught in the crosshairs of Article 29(1). This is also seconded by various decisions of this Court, where some such regulatory interventions by the State were held to not constitute a curtailment of Article 29(1) rights.198 In addition, although not germane to the controversy at hand, we must add a word of caution that not all cultural practices of a section of citizens—for example, those blatantly running against the spirit and grain of our Constitution, like casteism and gender discrimination—would be protected by Article 29(1). violation of Article 29, therefore hinges on the ‘nature’ and ‘degree’ of State intervention and not merely on the simpliciter fact of intervention. In other words, the violation of Article 29 is necessarily a question of law which requires adjudication of the circumstances, intention and effect of the state intervention on the aggrieved section of citizens, as well as the society at large. .To sum up our discussion, the rights conferred by Article 29(1) require that the State not take any steps to erode a community’s culture, language or script; and concomitantly accords to such section of citizens the freedom and independence to preserve and conserve their culture, language and script, by themselves. At the same time, the right under Article 29(1) does not necessitate the Government to enact specific provisions for its enforcement and also does not altogether restrict the State from enacting regulations. (Para 280-295)

Citizenship Act 1955 – Section 6A and 9 –An individual falling under Sections 6A (2) and 6A (3) can only assert Indian citizenship. Such individuals are presumed to have relinquished their previous citizenship. If authorities have reasons to believe that the previous citizenship is still being exercised, they are empowered under Section 9 of the Citizenship Act and associated rules to take steps to revoke the Indian citizenship of the delinquent individuals. Consequently, it can be deduced that Section 6A does not contradict Section 9. (Para 153)

Constitution of India – Article 14 -The right to equality enshrined under Article 14 is not a mechanical idea of parity. Article 14 requires the legislature to treat equals equally, but it also allows for differential treatment if the characteristics of the classes differ.120 In fact, treating unequal entities alike and subjecting them to the same laws could potentially lead to greater injustice. Therefore, rather than enforcing a fixed procrustean notion of equality, Article 14 permits the legislature to classify individuals into different groups and apply distinct norms accordingly. (Para 168) -a classification is reasonable if it differentiates between similar and dissimilar elements, if such distinction is intelligible, and if the similarities and dissimilarities have nexus with the purpose of the statute (Para 177) –

Constitution of India – Article 32 -The test for striking down a law on the grounds of vagueness can be viewed through two perspectives, both of which are to be taken into account, and the standards for the same have to be satisfied to sustain a challenge on the grounds of a law or provision being void for vagueness. Thus, a statute or its provision can be struck down for vagueness if: i. The authority interpreting and applying the impugned law or provision is not sufficiently guided by such law or provision and is conferred unfettered discretion by virtue of the same; and ii. When confronted with the plain meaning, a person of ordinary intelligence, amongst the persons regulated by the impugned 135 law or provision, faces difficulty in understanding the sphere of their application (Para 263)

Criminal Trial – A conviction could be based solely on the basis of the evidence of a solitary witness, however, the testimony of such a witness is required to be found to be credible and trustworthy. It is also necessary to examine the testimony of such a witness critically – Circumstantial Evidence – the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The Court held that it is a primary principle that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ proved guilty before a court can convict the accused. It has been held that there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’. It has been held that the facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except the one where the accused is guilty. It has further been held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It has been held that there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probabilities, the act must have been done by the accused-The suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted solely on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Para 21-22)

Motor Accident Compensation Claim– A witness who is otherwise found trustworthy cannot be disbelieved, in a motor accident case, only on the ground that the police have not recorded his statement during investigation – In claim cases, arising out of motor accident, the court has to apply the principles of preponderance of probability and cannot apply the test of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Medical Negligence – Special Leave Petition seeking enhancement of compensation awarded on account of alleged medical negligence – Dismissing SLP, SC observed: The value of human life cannot be ssessed in monetary terms whatsoever is awarded is a matter of solace.

Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 – Section 431 –Royalty and tax are not one and same. Corporation’s power to charge royalty cannot be interfered with on the ground that the same is not available, either in the Act or in the Regulations concerned, as there is no question of the said ‘royalty’ being a tax. Section 431 of the Act, therefore, would not come into the picture where royalty, that too by way of and under an agreement/understanding is concerned. (Para 24)

Administrative Law -Quoting the wrong provision of law, when the power to do an act otherwise exists, would not invalidate or render illegal the act in question. (Para 29)

Constitution of India- Article 21 – The right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution258 is violated by the commission of child marriage. All children married as minors are denied their right to choice and autonomy, right to education, right to sexuality and the right to development of the child. Girls who are married as children are denied their right to health. (Para 171) – Issued guidelines for the effective and useful implementation of the PCMA. The orientation of these guidelines is to prioritise prevention before protection and protection before penalisation . Parliament may consider outlawing child betrothals which may be used to evade penalty under the PCMA. While a betrothed child may be protected as a child in need of care and protection under the JJ Act, the practice also requires targeted remedies for its elimination. (Para 215)

Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 -Section 16- Child Marriage Prohibition Officers – Given the significant obligations expected to be discharged by a dedicated CMPO, no officer with other responsibilities shall be appointed as the CMPO. States or UTs shall appoint exclusive CMPOs in each district in addition to any CMPOs already serving in a dual capacity, and they shall equip these officers with adequate resources for the effective discharge of their functions. If a State or UT concludes that instances of child marriage have decreased to the extent that appointing exclusive CMPOs is no longer necessary, it may file an application before this Court, seeking leave to appoint a CMPO who also holds other duties at the District level. (Para 78)

Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006-Section 2(a),9 –Despite the age of majority for a man to enter into a marriage being prescribed as twenty-one under Section 2(a) of the Act, his criminal liability for entering into a child marriage with a minor woman begins at eighteen- A woman, regardless of her age is not liable for entering into a child marriage. A man above the age of eighteen but under the age of twenty one is liable for marrying a girl who is under the age of eighteen. The legislative intent behind making a groom liable for entering child marriage is to recognise the relative control of the agency that a groom may have in relation to his marriage as opposed to a girl- No child as defined in Section 2(a) of the PCMA is liable under Section 9 for marrying an adult person. (Para 55-56) – Section 10 – The provision is expansive and would govern any accomplice to the commission of child marriage. This would include the priest who performs the marriage, any family member, relative or person at whose direction the marriage takes place or anyone who abets it. (Para 58) – Section 11 – The intention of the provision is to place an obligation on any person who has the charge of a child to ensure that the offence of child marriage is not committed. The provision not only penalises the active participation of the person having charge of a child but also penalises the omission on the part of such a person to prevent child marriage. The provision recognises that children lack the ability to form intelligent consent and may not necessarily know the full ambit of the activity which they are about to commit. Further, children may lack the ability and grit to defend themselves and refuse to participate in the marriage against the pleasure of their custodians or parent- Clause (2) of Section 11 raises a presumption. It stipulates that any person, who is in charge of a child who was married off, is presumed to have negligently failed to prevent the child marriage. The presumption is a rebuttable one and may be defended if the person proves that he could not have prevented the marriage or failed at preventing it, having tried to do so to the best of their ability. This principle is only applicable to an offence under Section 11. (Para 61-62) – PCMA seeks to prohibit child marriages, it does not stipulate on betrothals. Marriages fixed in the minority of a child also have the effect of violating their rights to free choice, autonomy, agency and childhood. It takes away from them their choice of partner and life paths before they mature and form the ability to assert their agency. International law such as CEDAW stipulates against betrothals of minors. Parliament may consider outlawing child betrothals which may be used to evade penalty under the PCMA. While a betrothed child may be protected as a child in need of care and protection under the JJ Act, the practice also requires targeted remedies for its elimination.- Section 12 – Section 12 provides that the marriage in these instances is non est in law and has no legal standing from its inception. The declaration of the provision is mandatory and removes the option from the hands of the party to consent to the marriage after its commission. Therefore, all marriages done by taking or enticing a child, compelling by force or deceit or selling are void. Section 12(c) further stipulates that where a child marriage occurs and after the marriage, the minor is sold or trafficked or used for immoral purposes is void. Therefore, even when the commission of marriage was not through force or deceit the marriage would be void from the inception based on the acts performed after the marriage takes place. (Para 64-65)

Practice and Procedure -a. An authority (either a judicial or quasi-judicial authority) must not be impleaded in an appeal against its order if the order was issued solely in exercise of its “adjudicatory function”; b. An authority must be impleaded as a respondent in the appeal against its order if it was issued in exercise of its regulatory role since the authority would have a vital interest in ensuring the protection of public interest; and c. An authority may be impleaded as a respondent in the appeal against its order where its presence is necessary for the effective adjudication of the appeal in view of its domain expertise- What are the tests to identify if a function is an adjudicatory one? One of the factors to determine if an order was issued in exercise of an adjudicatory function, is whether it was specific to an individual or of general application. The second is that it is not necessary that a legislative action must always be ‘subjective’ and an adjudicatory function ‘objective’. (Para 33,48)

Airport Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act 2008 – Section 31,13- AERA is performing a regulatory function while determining tariff under Section 13(1)(a) of the AERA Act -Appeals filed by AERA against orders of TDSAT under Section 31 of the AERA Act are maintainable. (para 58,67)

Code Of Civil Procedure 1908 -Order 1 Rule 10- A necessary party is defined as someone who is indispensable to the suit and without whom the suit cannot effectively proceed. A proper party, on the other hand, is a party who has an interest in the adjudication of the suit though they may not be a person in whose favour or against whom a decree ought to be made- A party would not become a necessary party merely because she has an interest in the correct solution of the question involved. She would be a necessary party only when she would be bound by the result of the action and has a direct or a legal interest in the proceeding. (Para 32)

Code Of Criminal Procedure 1973 – Section 319 –Is it mandatory to decide the application under section 319 CrPC before conducting cross-examination and only on the basis of examination-in-chief? The Constitution Bench judgment in Hardeep Singh vs. State of Punjab does not take away the discretion of the Trial Court to wait for the crossexamination to take place before deciding the application under section 319 CrPC. It merely provides that consideration of such an application should not be a mini trial. It is for the Trial Court to decide whether the application should be decided without waiting for the crossexamination to take place or to wait for it. The same would depend upon the satisfaction of the Trial Court on the basis of the material placed on record- The complicity of any person sought to be arrayed as an accused can be decided with or without conducting cross-examination of the complainant and other prosecution witnesses, and there is no mandate to decide the application under section 319 CrPC before crossexamination of other witnesses. (Para 13-17)

Criminal Trial –The role of the complainant in a trial does not permit it to act as a Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State. The complainant and its counsel have a limited role in a sessions trial in a State case. (Para 18)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Section 5A– It codifies the fundamental safeguard of audi altrem partem. Landowners have the opportunity to demonstrate that the 10 acquisition is against public purpose or marred by mala fides. In the event the landowner presents a cogent case, the appropriate government may exempt such land from acquisition. By enabling landowners to put forward their perspective and elucidate their remonstrances, Section 5A envisions a modus of deliberation and consultation, which must therefore be construed to be mandatory, akin to a right. – Objections under Section 5A of the 1894 Act most often proceed in four distinct stages: i. The filing stage: Landowners can file objections within thirty days of the notification issued under Section 4 of the 1894 Act; ii. The hearing stage: The Collector must provide an oral hearing to the objecting landowners, either in person or through a pleader/authorized representative; iii. The recommendation stage: The Collector—after hearing objections and upon further inquiry—makes a report to the appropriate government containing their recommendations; and iv. The decision stage: The appropriate government considers the Collector’s report and takes a final decision on the objections- The Collector has no power to “decide” the case and can only give “recommendations” to the Government. It is the Government which is the ultimate arbiter for determining whether the land is to be released or not. No other authority can dictate the outcome of Section 5A proceedings neither the Collector nor the landowner- While the Collector’s report can form the “basis” of such decision, the Government is free to independently evaluate and take a final decision, of course, based on relevant and lawful considerations. (Page 12-17)

Constitution of India-Article 14– Article 14 cannot be ordinarily employed as a ground to claim negative equality, i.e., it cannot be used for claiming illicit benefits simply because someone else has been allowed such an undue favour, especially when doing so would jeopardize the entire acquisition by undermining its contiguity – A mere plea regarding differential treatment is insufficient; the claimant must instead demonstrate that similarly placed classes had been treated dissimilarly, unjustifiably. 9 The burden lies on the Respondents to not only prove disparate treatment of equals, but that it amounts to hostile discrimination as well. (Para 29-30)

Doctrine of Merger – When the previous SLPs arising out of the same impugned judgment were dismissed after granting leave, arguably, the doctrine of merger would be attracted-The doctrine of merger is neither a doctrine of constitutional law nor of statutory recognition. Since it is a common law principle directed towards judicial propriety, the same should not be applied in a straitjacket manner, and the nature of facts and circumstances of that particular case should be considered.

Quotes – Private interest of a few, should give way to the public interest of the many (Para 25)

Land Acquisition Act of 1894 – Section 23(1) – In determining compensation for acquired land, the Court must consider the ‘market value’ of the land- smaller parcels of land conventionally command higher prices. Relying on sale exemplars also, especially when only single solitary such instances are presented, may thus not be appropriate. However, there is no bar in law against considering sale exemplars of smaller plots, provided they are subjected to adequate developmental charges. The rationale behind applying such cuts lies in the fact that smaller plots often command higher prices due to their developed nature, whereas a larger tract of land which is acquired for development may require significant allocation for creating roads, parks, essential services, etc.  Accordingly, these sale exemplars can be relied upon only after applying appropriate cuts- When valuing a large block of land, appropriate deduction must be made for setting aside areas for roads, open spaces and dividing the land into smaller plots suitable for the construction of buildings – where there are multiple sale deeds available for consideration, the Court shall rely on the highest valued exemplars unless the prices fall within a narrow range, in which case calculating an average of the values therein may be more congruous- The degree of application of cuts is essentially a question of fact dependent on the unique circumstances of each case, the particulars to be reckoned with in determining the extent of such deduction often include a myriad of factors, such as the relative difference in the size of the land in the sale exemplar vis a vis the acquired land, proximity to a road, nearness to developed areas, etc- Additionally, several decisions have also taken into account the nature of the lands because of the stark difference that may exist between the valuation of an agricultural or undeveloped land and the sale price of a small developed plot in a private layout. (Para 18-31)

Constitution of India – Article 32 – A challenge to the constitutional validity of a statutory provision cannot be adjudicated upon in the absence of a lis and contest between the parties. (Para  6)

Summary:  SC recalled its decision in Union of India and Another v Ganpati Dealcom Private Ltd [2022] 12 S.C.R. 320:: 2022 INSC 853 which had declared Section 3(2) of the unamended provisions of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act 1988 as unconstitutional.

Indian Penal Code 1860 – Section 498-A – Essential ingredients: (a) The victim was a married lady (may also be a widow); (b) That she has been subjected to cruelty by her husband or relative(s) of her husband; (c) That such cruelty consisted of either (i) harassment with a view to coerce meeting a demand for dowry, or (ii) a wilful contact by the husband or his relative of such a nature as is likely to lead the lady to commit suicide or to cause grave injury to her life, limb or health; (d) That such injury as aforesaid may be physical or mental. [In this case, SC acquitted a person by observing thus:There is no scintilla of evidence against the appellant herein to hold that he has committed the offence under Section 498-A, IPC, even with the aid of Section 34, IPC- Exaggerated versions of the incident are reflected in a large number of complaints and the tendency of over implication is also reflected in a large number of cases- The courts have to be careful to identify instances of over implication and to avert the suffering of ignominy and inexpiable consequences, by such persons.]

Code Of Criminal Procedure 1973 – Section 294– Where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed. That is to say that if the authors of such documents does not enter the witness box to prove their signatures, the said documents could still be read in evidence. Further, under the proviso the Court has the jurisdiction in its discretion to require such signature to be proved. In the present case, the documents filed by the investigating agency were all public documents duly signed by public servants in their respective capacities either as Investigating Officer or the doctor conducting the autopsy or other police officials preparing the memo of recoveries etc. (Para 15)

Code Of Civil Procedure 1908 – Order XX – Practice to pronounce the operative part with the outcome and to provide the reasons later in detailed final judgments- It would be prudent to leave it to the learned Judges to pick any one of the three options [(i) dictation of the judgment in open court, (ii) reserving the judgment and pronouncing it on a future day, or (iii) pronouncing the operative part and the outcome, i.e., “dismissed” or “allowed” or “disposed of”, while simultaneously expressing that reasons would follow in a detailed final judgment supporting such outcome]- It would be in the interest of justice if any learned Judge, who prefers the third option (supra), makes the reasons available in the public domain, preferably within 2 (two) days thereof but, in any case, not beyond 5 (five) days to eliminate any kind of suspicion in the mind of the party losing the legal battle. If the pressure of work is such that in the assessment of the learned Judge the reasons in support of the final judgment cannot be made available, without fail, in 5 (five) days, it would be a better option to reserve the judgment. Also, if the ultimate order would have the effect of changing the status of the parties or the subject matter of the lis, it would always be advisable to stick to the course envisaged in Order XX.

Quotable Quotes -Since, the fraternity of learned Judges of all the courts are interested to preserve the dignity of the respective judicial institutions with which they are associated, all learned Judges must be mindful of the impact of their actions on the society at large. Dealing with lakhs of litigation is no mean task, but at the same time we must realize that instances do emerge leaving absolutely no margin for error. It is our duty as Judges to stand tall and rise to the challenge. (Para 19)- If the Supreme Court and the high courts were thought of as brothers, we as Judges of the apex court in the country remain as the elder brother only to the extent of exercise of appellate jurisdiction.(Para 21) – The society expects every Judge of a high court, so to say, to be a model of rectitude, an epitome of unimpeachable integrity and unwavering principles, a champion of moral excellence, and an embodiment of professionalism, who can consistently deliver work of high-quality guaranteeing justice (Para 18) We feel pained to observe, once more, that neglect/omission/refusal to abide by binding precedents augurs ill for the health of the system. Not only does it tantamount to disservice to the institution of the judiciary but also affects the administration of justice. For a learned Judge to deviate from the laid down standards would be to betray the trust reposed in him by the nation (Para 6)

Industrial Disputes Act,1947 – Section 2(s) –The determinative factor for “workman” covered under section 2(s) of the I.D. Act, is the principal duties and functions performed by an employee in the establishment and not merely the designation of his post. Further, the onus of proving the nature of employment rests on the person claiming to be a “workman” within the definition of section 2(s) of the I.D. Act (Para 15) [Allowing appeal, SC observed: Applying the pre-amended provision of section 2(s), since the employee was terminated from service and was drawing salary of more than Rs.1,600/-, he does not come within the definition of “workman”. Therefore, we hold that the employee is not a “workman” as defined under section 2(s) and is not covered by the provisions of the I.D. Act. ]

Practice and Procedure – Each party should present truthful and accurate information to the court to facilitate fair adjudication. Such information should be provided in the form of writing. Relying on the oral instructions may lead to factual errors, misunderstanding / misrepresentations, etc., ultimately compromising the integrity of the judicial process. Misleading representations not only affect the parties involved, but also erode public trust in the judicial system as a whole. The Court should also pass orders only based on the written instructions, so as to enable it to fix the liability on the correct official(s), responsible for any such wrongful representations / instructions. Therefore, it is imperative that the official(s)/counsel(s) appearing before the Court to represent the Government authorities should equip with proper written instructions from the competent authority(ies). Needless to state that if any misrepresentation is made on the part of the parties, in particular, Government authorities, the court should not shy away from it, rather act sternly by mulcting with costs on the official(s) who make the same. (Para 22)

Summary: Appeal against the judgment of High Court (Division Bench) allowed the State’s appeals and set aside the orders of the learned Single Judge with respect to grant of interest on delayed payment of revised pension to the appellants- Appeal dismissed.

Summary: Armed Forces Tribunal allowed Appellant’s OA and quashed the order of Admonition passed against him – In appeal before SC, appellant sought compensation for the wrongful order – Allowing appeal, SC observed: Small excesses like overtaking the vehicle of one’s senior at a railway crossing may be an incident of indiscipline in defense services, but the balance and proportion that needs to be maintained between such an infraction and its punishment will always be at the core of good governance. If the balance is not maintained, the distinction between bad governance, impropriety, unfairness and inhuman treatment is not much. The Tribunal is right in holding that a small incident has unnecessarily grown beyond proportion. When the institutions that we build grow beyond proportion, officers act mechanically and many a times helplessly, ignore the simple and readily available remedies that are available in our normal lives. We would have thought that an incident like this would have ended if a senior officer had at the right time intervened and resolved the issue by taking into account the emotional aspect of the dispute- Respondents directed to pay an amount of Rs. 1 lakh to the appellant towards compensation for having suffered an unnecessary and a longdrawn litigation that was foisted on him.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 – Public Premises Act, 1971 – In so far as the dispute relating to this right of renewal is concerned, it depends on the terms of the agreement. The Public Premises Act neither bars nor overlaps with the scope and ambit of proceedings that were initiated under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 – Section 11(6) –The remit of the referral court to consider an application under Section 11(6) is clear and unambiguous. We need to just examine the existence of an arbitration agreement. (Para 14)

Code Of Criminal Procedure 1973- Section 432 of the CrPC [ Section 473(1) BNSS] -(I) The appropriate Government has the power to remit the whole or any part of the punishment of a convict. The remission can be granted either unconditionally or subject to certain conditions; (ii) The decision to grant or not to grant remission has to be well­informed, reasonable and fair to all concerned; (iii) A convict cannot seek remission as a matter of right. However, he has a right to claim that his case for the grant of remission ought to be considered in accordance with the law and/or applicable policy adopted by the appropriate Government; (iv) Conditions imposed while exercising the power under sub­section (1) of Section 432 or sub­section (1) of Section 473 of the BNSS must be reasonable. If the conditions imposed are arbitrary, the conditions will stand vitiated due to violation of Article 14. Such arbitrary conditions may violate the convict’s rights under Article 21 of the Constitution; (v) The effect of remitting the sentence, in part or full, results in the restoration of liberty of a convict. If the order granting remission is to be cancelled or revoked, it will naturally affect the liberty of the convict. The reason is that when action is taken under sub­section (3) of Section 432 of the CrPC or sub­section (3) of Section 473 of the BNSS, it results in the convict being taken to prison for undergoing the remaining part of the sentence Therefore, this drastic power cannot be exercised without following the principles of natural justice. A show cause notice must be served on the convict before taking action to withdraw/cancel remission. The show cause notice must contain the grounds on which action under subsection (3) of Section 432 of the CrPC or sub­section (3) of Section 473 of BNNS is sought to be taken. The concerned authority must give the convict an opportunity to file a reply and of being heard. After that, the authority must pass an order stating the reasons in brief- Registration of a cognizable offence against the convict, per se, is not a ground to cancel the remission order. The allegations of breach of condition cannot be taken at their face value, and whether a case for cancellation of remission is made out will have to be decided in the facts of each case. Every case of breach cannot invite cancellation of the order of remission. The appropriate Government will have to consider the nature of the breach alleged against the convict. A minor or a trifling breach cannot be a ground to cancel remission. There must be some material to substantiate the allegations of breach. Depending upon the seriousness and gravity thereof, action can be taken under sub­section (3) of Section 432 of the CrPC or sub­section (3) of Section 473 of the BNSS of cancellation of the order remitting sentence. (Para 17)

Code Of Criminal Procedure 1973- Section 432 of the CrPC [ Section 473(1) BNSS] – Condition requiring the convict to behave decently for a period of two years after release from jail- The words ‘decent’ or ‘decently’ are not defined in the CrPC or any other cognate legislation. The concept of decency of each human being is likely to be different. The idea of decency keeps on changing with time. As the term ‘decency’ is not defined in the CrPC or any other cognate legislation, every person or authority may interpret the same differently. Therefore, such a condition while granting remission becomes too subjective. Putting such a vague condition while exercising the power under sub­section (1) of Section 432 of the CrPC will give a tool in the hands of the executive to cancel the remission at its whims and fancies. Therefore, such a condition is arbitrary and will be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Such a condition cannot be imposed as it will defeat the very object of remitting the sentence in the exercise of powers under sub­section (1) of Section 432 of the CrPC. (Para 13)

Constitution of India – Article 226– The convict can always challenge the order of cancellation of remission by adopting a remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (Para 15)

Indian Penal Code 1860 – Section 420 – For bringing out the offence under the ambit of Section 420 IPC, the FIR must disclose the following ingredients: (a) That the appellant-bank had induced anyone since inception; (b) That the said inducement was fraudulent or dishonest; and (c) That mens rea existed at the time of such inducement – Section 409- Following ingredients will have to be made out: (a) That there has been any entrustment with the property, or with any dominion over property on a person in the capacity of a public servant or banker, etc.; (b) That the said person commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property. For bringing out the case under criminal breach of trust, it will have to be pointed out that a person, with whom entrustment of a property is made, has dishonestly misappropriated it, or converted it to his own use, or dishonestly used it, or disposed of that property- Bank is a juristic person and as such, a question of mens rea does not arise. (Para 20-23)

Summary: Criminal proceedings against HDFC Bank quashed.

Finance Act, 1994- Section 65(33a) – Service tax is not separately payable on the interchange fee, as service tax has been paid on the MDR. (Para 11)

Interpretation Of Statutes– While interpreting a tax provision, one must keep in mind that the legislature ennobles the ease of collection of tax and payment of tax. These principles, especially when there is no loss of revenue, can be taken into consideration for interpreting a provision in case of doubt or debate. (Para 6)

Indian Evidence Act 1872 – Section 106– There are two important consequences that play out when an offence is said to have taken place in the privacy of a house, where the accused is said to have been present. Firstly, the standard of proof expected to prove such a case based on circumstantial evidence is lesser than other cases of circumstantial evidence. Secondly, the accused would be under a duty to explain as to the circumstances that led to the death of the deceased. In that sense, there is a limited shifting of the onus of proof. If he remains quiet or offers a false explanation, then such a response would become an additional link in the chain of circumstances. [Referred to Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, [2006] Supp. (7) S.C.R. 156] (Para 24)

Criminal Trial – Circumstantial Evidence – Panchsheel of proof, for a case based on circumstantial evidence: insofar as the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, and the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. [Referred to Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 ]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 -Section 238A – Limitation Act 1963- Section 16 –The commencement of a fresh period of limitation from the time of acknowledgement of the debt is part of the statutory scheme. Section 238A of the Code extends the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under the Code. With the extension of Limitation Act to the provisions of the Code, the benefit of Section 18 of the Limitation Act dealing with the effect of acknowledgement of a debt in writing applies – Referred to Laxmi Pat Surana v. Union Bank of India- [In this case, SC held: the Adjudicating Authority as well as the NCLAT have examined the case in detail and have come to the conclusion that the entry made in the balance sheet coupled with the note of the auditor of the appellant clearly amounts to acknowledgement of the liability]

NCLT Rules – Rule 8 – IBC – Section 12 -CIRP Regulations – Rule 30A – Procedure for the withdrawal of an application filed by creditors under Sections 7, 9, or 10 of the IBC- Before the application under Sections 7, 9 or 10 is admitted by the NCLT: Such cases are squarely covered by Rule 8 of the NCLT Rules, which requires that the applicant approach the NCLT directly. The NCLT may then pass an order permitting the withdrawal of the application. At this stage, as the CIRP process has not been initiated, the proceedings are still in personam, as between the applicant creditor and the corporate debtor. Therefore, while approving the withdrawal at this stage, the NCLT may restrict its enquiry to only hear the applicant creditor and corporate debtor, and other potential creditors are not stakeholders at this stage- After an application under Sections 7, 9, or 10 is admitted, but before the CoC has been constituted: Although Section 12A continues to be silent on this aspect, after the decision in Swiss Ribbons (supra), Regulation 30A was amended to provide for this eventuality. An application for withdrawal in such cases may be made by the applicant through the IRP.46 The IRP will then place the application before the NCLT, which may pass an order either approving or rejecting the application. As noted above, once the application has been admitted, the proceedings are no longer the sole preserve of the applicant creditor and the corporate debtor. They are now in rem and at this stage, the NCLT must hear the concerned parties and consider all relevant factors before approving or rejecting the application for withdrawal. The NCLT being a quasi-judicial body, must not act as a mere post office, which stamps and approves every settlement agreement, without application of judicial mind – After an application under Section 7, 9 or 10 is admitted, the CoC has been constituted and the invitation for expression of interest has not been issued: Section 12A read with Regulation 30A provides exhaustively for this scenario. In such cases, the application for withdrawal is to be placed before the NCLT, through the IRP or the RP. The application is first placed before the CoC and after ascertaining approval with a ninety percent voting share, the RP shall submit the application to the NCLT- After an application under Section 7, 9 or 10 is admitted, the CoC has been formed and the invitation for expression of interest has been issued: The procedure is the same as that detailed in (iii) above, with the added requirement stemming from the proviso to Regulation 30A (1). in such cases, the applicant must state the reasons for withdrawal at this belated stage. (Para 63)

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 -Sections 7, 9 or 10 – Nature of the proceedings after admission of the application – a. Once the petition is admitted, the proceedings are no longer the preserve of the applicant creditor and the debtor. They now become in rem and all creditors of the corporate debtor become stakeholders in the process; and b. Once the petition is admitted, the management of the affairs of the corporate debtor is vested in the IRP and eventually, in the RP. Thus, the corporate debtor no longer exists in the form that it did, before the admission of the petition. Once CIRP is initiated, the interests of the erstwhile management of the corporate debtor must be distinguished from the interests of the corporate debtor. (Para 44)

NCLT Rules 2016 – Rule 11- NCLAT Rules 2016 – Rule 11- ‘Inherent powers’ may be exercised in cases where there is no express provision under the legal framework. However, such powers cannot be exercised in contravention of, conflict with or in ignorance of express provisions of law- When a procedure has been prescribed for a particular purpose exhaustively, no power shall be exercised otherwise than in the manner prescribed by the said provisions. In such cases, the court must be circumspect in invoking its ‘inherent powers’ to deviate from the prescribed procedure. If such deviation is made, the court must justify why this was necessary to “prevent the abuse of the process of the Court”. (Para 67-71)

Constitution of India- a. Entry 8 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is both an industry-based entry and a product-based entry. The words that follow the expression “that is to say” in the Entry are not exhaustive of its contents. It includes the regulation of everything from the raw materials to the consumption of ‘intoxicating liquor’; b. Parliament cannot occupy the field of the entire industry merely by issuing a declaration under Entry 52 of List I. The State Legislature’s competence under Entry 24 of List II is denuded only to the extent of the field covered by the law of Parliament under Entry 52 of List I; c. Parliament does not have the legislative competence to enact a law taking control of the industry of intoxicating liquor covered by Entry 8 of List II in exercise of the power under Article 246 read with Entry 52 of List I; meaning of the expression ‘intoxicating liquor’ not limited to its popular meaning, that is, alcoholic beverages that produce intoxication- Entry 8 of List II is based on public interest. It seeks to enhance the scope of the entry beyond potable alcohol. This is inferable from the use of the phrase ‘intoxicating’ and other accompanying words in the Entry. Alcohol is inherently a noxious substance that is prone to misuse affecting public health at large. Entry 8 covers alcohol that could be used noxiously to the detriment of public health. This includes alcohol such as rectified spirit, ENA and denatured spirit which are used as raw materials in the production of potable alcohol and other products. However, it does not include the final product (such as a hand sanitiser) that contains alcohol since such an interpretation will substantially diminish the scope of other legislative entries; h. The judgment in Synthetics (7J) (supra) is overruled in terms of this judgment; Item 26 of the First Schedule to the IDRA must be read as excluding the industry of “intoxicating liquor”, as interpreted in this judgment. (Para 141)

Constitution of India- Article 246- The federal balance lies not on the recognition that the Constitution grants Parliament predominant legislative power but on the identification of the scope of such predominance. The scope of the non-obstante clause in Article 246(1) and the subjugation clause in Article 246(3) must not be interpreted in isolation but along with the substantive provisions of the clauses. When there is a conflict between an entry in List I and entry in List II which is not ‘capable of reconciliation’77, the power of Parliament to legislate with respect to a field covered by List I must supersede the exercise of power by the State legislature to that extent- a. In case of a seeming conflict between the entries in the two lists, the entries must be read together without giving a narrow and restricted meaning to either of the entries in the Lists; and b. If the entries cannot be reconciled by giving a wide meaning, it must be determined if they can be reconciled by giving the entries a narrower meaning- The principle of federal supremacy in Article 246 can be resorted to only when there is an ‘irreconcilable direct conflict’ between the entries in List I and List II. (Para 43-46) – It is crucial to note the difference between ‘overlap’ and ‘conflict’. An overlap occurs when two or more things or fields partially intersect. However, a conflict occurs when two or more entries operate in the exactly same field. Courts while dealing with an overlap of legislative entries must endeavour to diminish the overlap and not enhance it by including it in the field of conflict. The federal supremacy accorded to Parliament ticks in at the stage of ‘conflict’. (para 50)

Constitution of India – Article 21 -Legal Aid-Free legal assistance for poor and indigent at the cost of the State is a fundamental right of a person under Article 21 even if the person does not seek legal assistance on his own- Right to counsel for a prisoner is a fundamental right traceable to Article 21 – Legal aid to poor should not be poor legal aid – Directions issued – For the success of the functioning of the legal aid mechanism, awareness is the key. A robust mechanism should be put in place and periodically updated to ensure that the various beneficial schemes promoted by the Legal Services Authorities reaches the nook and corner of the nation and particularly, to those whose grievances it has set out to address. Adequate literature including in the local languages in the States and appropriate promotional methods should be launched so that the consumers of justice to whom the schemes are intended can make best use of the same.

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Summary: Dismissing appeal filed against order of Armed Forces Tribunal, SC observed: There is neither any illegality nor arbitrariness in giving grade pay to Artificers III to I which is more than the grade pay of Artificer IV but less than the grade pay of Chief Artificers. The Speaking Order dated 20th April 2009 refers to the fact that under Regulation 247, the “Chief” rating is given only to Chief Artificer and not to Artificers of grades III to I. It also notes that Artificers of grades III to I cannot be directly promoted to the post of Master Chief Artificer.

Motor Accident Compensation Claim – MACT determined age based on the School Leaving Certificate – High Court, while partly allowing appeal, noted that the Aadhar Card of the deceased records date of birth to be 1st January 1969; thus, the age comes to 47 years. Hence, the multiplier applicable would be 13 – Allowing appeal by claimants, SC observed: In case of conflict of the dates of birth between the two documents, as in this case between the School Leaving Certificate and the Aadhar Card, which of the two is to be taken as authoritative- School Leaving Certificate has been accorded statutory recognition. Sub-section (2) of Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 – Unique Identification Authority of India has stated that an Aadhar Card, while can be used to establish identity, it is not per se proof of date of birth- MACT’s determination of age based on the School Leaving Certificate.

Transfer of Property Act 1882- Section 126 –The gift validly made can be suspended or revoked under certain contingencies but ordinarily it cannot be revoked, more particularly when no such right is reserved under the gift deed. – Section 126 of the Act is drafted in a peculiar way in the sense that it contains the exceptions to the substantive law first and then the substantive law. The substantive law as is carved out from the simple reading of the aforesaid provision is that a gift cannot be revoked except in the cases mentioned earlier. The said exceptions are three in number; the first part provides that the donor and donee may agree for the suspension or revocation of the gift deed on the happening of any specified event which does not depend on the will of the donor. Secondly, a gift which is revocable wholly or in part with the agreement of the parties, at the mere will of the donor is void wholly or in part as the case may be. Thirdly, a gift may be revoked if it were in the nature of a contract which could be rescinded- ordinarily a gift deed cannot be revoked except for the three contingencies mentioned above. The first is where the donor and the donee agree for its revocation on the happening of any specified event. In the gift deed, there is no such indication that the donor and donee have agreed for the revocation of the gift deed for any reason much less on the happening of any specified event. (Para 12-15)

Limitation Act 1961 -In a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation would be governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief. In fact, a suit for a declaration of title to immovable property would not be barred so long as the right to such a property continues and subsists. When such right continues to subsist, the relief for declaration would be a continuing right and there would be no limitation for such a suit. The principle is that the suit for a declaration for a right cannot be held to be barred so long as Right to Property subsists- Though the limitation for filing a suit for declaration of title is three years as per Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act but for recovery of possession based upon title, the limitation is 12 years from the date the possession of the defendant becomes adverse in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

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Indian Penal Code 1860 – Section 198-Mens rea is an essential ingredient of the offence. Only because the accused could not establish her caste claim before the Committee, one cannot conclude that the accused corruptly used the caste certificate. Moreover, corruptly using the certificate is not sufficient. The accused must have knowledge that the certificate is false. The allegation that the certificate is false to the knowledge of the accused must be proved by the prosecution. (Para 7) Section 415,420 – Fraudulent or dishonest acts are essential ingredients of cheating. (Para 9)

Code Of Criminal Procedure 1973 – Section 378,386- The Appellate Court has to examine whether the findings recorded in the acquittal judgment are plausible findings that could have been recorded based on the evidence on record. Only if the Appellate Court is satisfied that the guilt of the accused is duly proved was the only plausible finding which could have been recorded based on the evidence on record, the Appellate Court can overturn the order of acquittal. In this case, no such finding has been recorded by the Sessions Court. Only because it is possible to take another view is no ground to overturn an order of acquittal. (Para 5)

Constitution of India – Article 142 – Supreme Court can depart from the procedure as well as the substantive laws, as long as the decision is exercised based on considerations of fundamental, general and specific public policy. It has the discretion to dissolve the marriage on the ground of its irretrievable breakdown, and this discretionary power is to be exercised to do ‘complete justice’ to the parties, when it is satisfied that the facts established show that the marriage has completely failed and there is no possibility that the parties will cohabit together, and continuation of the formal legal relationship is unjustified. [In this case, SC dissolved marriages between parties]

Summary: The appellants (Assistant Public Prosecutor and Stamp Reporter) appeared for the West Bengal Judicial Service Examination notified vide advertisement dated 17.02.2007- The selection process was completed in the year 2008, and appointments were made at relevant time. They are seeking appointment as Judicial Officers on the grounds set forth by them – Dismissing appeal, SC observed: Given the fact that 17 years have passed since the date of advertisement and the candidates who have been appointed would have reached senior positions as well as would have gained substantial experience as judicial officers, hence by lapse of time it would not be in public interest to adjudicate the issue on merit.

Medical Negligence – Actionable negligence in context of medical profession involves three constituents (i) duty to exercise due care; (ii) breach of duty and (iii) consequential damage. However, a simple lack of care, an error of judgment or an accident is not sufficient proof of negligence on part of the medical professional so long as the doctor follows the acceptable practice of the medical profession in discharge of his duties. He cannot be held liable for negligence merely because a better alternative treatment or course of treatment was available or that more skilled doctors were there who could have administered better treatment- A medical professional may be held liable for negligence only when he is not possessed with the requisite qualification or skill or when he fails to exercise reasonable skill which he possesses in giving the treatment – Bolam’s test: a doctor is not negligent if he is acting in accordance with the acceptable norms of practice unless there is evidence of a medical body of skilled persons in the field opining that the accepted principles/procedure were not followed- Deterioration of the condition of the patient post-surgery is not necessarily indicative or suggestive of the fact that the surgery performed or the treatment given to the patient was not proper or inappropriate or that there was some negligence in administering the same. In case of surgery or such treatment it is not necessary that in every case the condition of the patient would improve and the surgery is successful to the satisfaction of the patient. It is very much possible that in some rare cases complications of such nature arise but that by itself does not establish any actionable negligence on part of the medical expert- simply for the reason that the patient has not responded favourably to the surgery or the treatment administered by a doctor or that the surgery has failed, the doctor cannot be held liable for medical negligence straightway by applying the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor unless it is established by evidence that the doctor failed to exercise the due skill possessed by him in discharging of his duties.

Bail – The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the accused’s presence during the investigation and trial. Any conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related to this objective- Court’s discretion in imposing conditions must be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the accused’s presence, and prevent the misuse of liberty to impede the investigation or obstruct justice.- In this case, High Court granted bail to accused subject to certain conditions, including the removal of a wall at their expense and also directed the State of Madhya Pradesh to hand over the possession of the disputed property to the complainant -Allowing appeal filed by the accused, SC observed: The action by the police to take possession of immovable property reflects total lawlessness – Under no circumstances, can the police be allowed to interfere with the possession of immovable property, as such action does not bear sanction by any provision of law- The conditions imposed clearly tantamount to deprivation of civil rights, rather than measures to ensure the accused’s presence during trial.