Can Courts permit compounding of non-compoundable offences-?
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 142 – Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 320, 482- Courts cannot grant permission to compound the noncompoundable offences, on the basis of any sort of compromise between the parties, as it would be contrary to what has been provided by legislation, except the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.PC and the Apex Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. [In this case, the court invoked Article 142 as the appellants and complainant side are close relatives and after settling their disputes, both sides have agreed to maintain peace and harmony in the society.]. – Referred to Ramgopal & Anr. v. State of M.P (2022) 14 SCC 531 (Para 6-7) –Suraj Singh Gujar vs State Of Madhya Pradesh 2024 INSC 661
Can mere registration of FIR be interpreted to mean that it constitutes the initiation of proceedings?
Code Of Criminal Procedure,1973; Section 154-176 –Mere registration of FIR cannot be interpreted to mean that it constitutes the initiation of proceedings. A registration of FIR necessitates an investigation by a competent officer as per the detailed process outlined in Sections 155 to 176. It is only after a Final Report (or as referred in the common parlance, a Challan or a Chargesheet) is submitted as per the compliance of Section 173(2) of CrPC 1973, cognizance for the offence(s) concerned is taken. However, undoubtedly, the Court is not bound by the said report. The cardinal principle that investigation and taking of cognizance operate in parallel channels, without an intermingling, and in different areas – Referred to H.N. Rishbud v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1954) 2 SCC 934 , Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra 1967 SCC OnLine SC 107 and State of Orissa v. Habibullah Khan 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1411. (Para 19) – Baccarose Perfumes And Beauty Products Pvt. Ltd. vs Central Bureau Of Investigation 2024 INSC 662
Can Section 311 CrPC be invoked to recall prosecution witnesses merely on the ground that the erstwhile lawyer engaged by the accused did not conduct proper cross-examination ?
Code Of Criminal Procedure,1973; Section 311 [BNSS,2023; Section 348] – Section 311 CrPC operates in two parts, the first part clothes the Court with a power to summon or examine any person in attendance or recall or re-examine any person already examined. The second part mandates that the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine such person, if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case. Thus, first part of section gives a discretionary power to the Court to summon any person as a witness or to recall or re-examine the person already examined. Such a course of action is only permissible if the Court is satisfied that the prayer to recall and reexamine the witness is not made to fill in the lacuna and that the nonsummoning of the witnesses would cause a serious prejudice to the accused – Referred to Rajaram Prasad Yadav vs State of Bihar (2013) 4 SCC 461. (Para 7) [In this case, other than a vague aspersion that the erstwhile lawyer engaged by the petitioners did not conduct proper cross-examination of the witnesses, no such specific ground was alluded on behalf of the accused petitioners which could be considered to be a valid ground for the trial Court to invoke the power under Section 311 CrPC]- Neha Begum vs State Of Assam
Can constitutional Courts fix a time-bound schedule for conduct of cases before the Trial and other Courts ?
Criminal Trial -As a matter of rule, the Constitutional Courts should not fix a time-bound schedule for conduct of cases before the Trial and other Courts and the said approach can be adopted only in very exceptional cases. Notwithstanding the pronouncement of law by the Constitution Bench of this Court, we have noticed that several High Courts while rejecting the bail applications, are fixing time-bound schedule for the conduct of trials. It cannot be that the bail is denied on the ground that the trial will be disposed of in a time-bound schedule – Referred to High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of U.P- Ram Bahadur Magar @ Sanki @ Rabin vs State Of West Bengal
Is mere presence of the accused as part of the unlawful assembly sufficient for conviction under Section 149 IPC [now Section 190 BNS] ?
Section 149 IPC does not create a separate offence but only declares vicarious liability of all members of the unlawful assembly for acts done in common object – Section 149 IPC creates a constructive or vicarious liability of the members of the unlawful assembly for the unlawful acts committed pursuant to the common object by any other member of that assembly. By application of this principle, every member of an unlawful assembly is roped in to be held guilty of the offence committed by any member of that assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly. The factum of causing injury or not causing injury would not be relevant when an accused is roped in with the aid of Section 149 IPC. The question which is relevant and which is required to be answered by the court is whether the accused was a member of an unlawful assembly and not whether he actually took part in the crime or not -No overt act is required to be imputed to a particular person when the charge is under Section 149 IPC; the presence of the accused as part of the unlawful assembly is sufficient for conviction. (Para 30-32) Nitya Nand vs State Of U.P 2024 INSC 655
Can FIR be quashed after filing of chargesheet?
Code Of Criminal Procedure,1973; Section 482 -Whether quashing of the FIR can be refused for no other reason than that the investigating officer has filed the charge-sheet? High Court under Section 482, Cr. PC. retains the power to quash an FIR, even after charge-sheet under Section 173(2) thereof is filed, provided a satisfaction is reached, inter alia, that either the FIR and the charge-sheet read together, even accepted as true and correct without rebuttal, does not disclose commission of any offence or that continuation of proceedings arising out of such an FIR would in fact be an abuse of the process of law as well as of the Court given the peculiar circumstances of each particular case- Referred to Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo (2011) 6 SCC 479 , Anand Kumar Mohatta vs State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) Home Department (2019) 11 SCC 706 and Abhishek vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 2023 SCC OnLine SC 108. (Para 7-8) – Shaileshbhai Ranchhodbhai Patel vs State Of Gujarat CrA 1884/2013 – S 482 CrPC
Is an order dismissing an application seeking modification of charge ‘interlocutory order’? Is a revision petition maintainable?
Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 216,397– The order dismissing application seeking modification of charge would be an interlocutory order and in view of the express bar contained in sub-section (2) of Section 397 Cr.P.C., the Revision Application itself is not maintainable. (Para 8)- K Ravi vs State Of Tamil Nadu 2024 INSC 642
Does Section 216 CrPC give any right to the accused to file a fresh application seeking his discharge after the charge is framed?
Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 216,227- Section 216 is an enabling provision which enables the court to alter or add to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced, and if any alteration or addition to a charge is made, the court has to follow the procedure as contained therein. Section 216 does not give any right to the accused to file a fresh application seeking his discharge after the charge is framed by the court, more particularly when his application seeking discharge under Section 227 has already been dismissed. Unfortunately, such applications are being filed in the trial courts sometimes in ignorance of law and sometimes deliberately to delay the proceedings. Once such applications though untenable are filed, the trial courts have no alternative but to decide them, and then again such orders would be challenged before the higher courts, and the whole criminal trial would get derailed- Such practice is highly deplorable, and if followed, should be dealt with sternly by the courts. (Para 11)- K Ravi vs State Of Tamil Nadu 2024 INSC 642
What is the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397?
Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 397-The Court exercising Revisional Jurisdiction under Section 397 should be extremely circumspect in interfering with the order framing the charge, and could not have interfered with the order passed by the Trial Court dismissing the application for modification of the charge under Section 216 Cr.P.C., which order otherwise would fall in the category of an interlocutory order – scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 Cr.P.C. is extremely limited. Apart from the fact that subsection 2 of Section 397 prohibits the Court from exercising the powers of Revision, even the powers under sub-section 1 thereof should be exercised very sparingly and only where the decision under challenge is grossly erroneous, or there is non-compliance of the provisions of law, or the finding recorded by the trial court is based on no evidence, or material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely by framing the charge. (Para 10) – K Ravi vs State Of Tamil Nadu 2024 INSC 642
When can be a person convicted for attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC?
Indian Penal Code,1860; Section 307 – A conviction under Section 307 of the IPC may be justified only if the accused in question possessed intent coupled with some overt act in aid of its execution. Ascertaining the intention to kill or having the knowledge that death may be caused as a result of the overt act, is a question of fact and hinges on the unique circumstances that each case may present. (Para 17) Raju vs State of Uttarakhand 2024 INSC 633