Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Section 20 – In a case where a civil contempt is alleged by a party by referring to a “continuing wrong/breach/offence” and such allegation prima facie satisfies the court, the action for contempt is not liable to be nipped in the bud merely on the ground of it being presented beyond the period of one year as in section 20 of the Act. Applicability of the principle underlying Order VII Rule 6, CPC for granting exemption would only be just and proper having regard to the object and purpose for which the jurisdiction to punish for contempt is exercised by the courts if, of course, the court is satisfied that benefit of such an exemption ought to be extended in a given case. At the same time, it must be remembered that the court cannot grant exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship – e. For a “continuing wrong/breach/offence” to be accepted as a ground for seeking exemption in an action for contempt, the party petitioning the court not only has to comprehend what the phrase actually means but would also be required to show, from his pleadings, the ground resting whereon he seeks exemption from limitation. Should the party fail to satisfy the court, the petition is liable to outright rejection. Also, the court has to be vigilant. Stale claims of contempt, camouflaged as a “continuing wrong/breach/offence” ought not to be entertained, having regard to the legislative intent for introducing section 20 in the Act which has been noticed above. Contempt being a personal action directed against a particular person alleged to be in contempt, much of the efficacy of the proceedings would be lost by passage of time. Even if a contempt is committed and within the stipulated period of one year from such commission no action is brought before the court on the specious ground that the contempt has been continuing, no party should be encouraged to wait indefinitely to choose his own time to approach the court. If the bogey of “continuing wrong/breach/offence” is mechanically accepted whenever it is advanced as a ground for claiming exemption, an applicant may knock the doors of the Court any time suiting his convenience. If an action for contempt is brought belatedly, say any time after the initial period of limitation and years after the date of first breach, it is the prestige of the court that would seem to become a casualty during the period the breach continues. Once the dignity of the court is lowered in the eyes of the public by non-compliance of its order, it would be farcical to suddenly initiate proceedings after long lapse of time. Not only would the delay militate against the legislative intent of inserting section 20 in the Act (a provision not found in the predecessor statutes of the Act) rendering the section a dead letter, the damage caused to the majesty of the court could be rendered irreparable. It is, therefore, the essence of justice that in a case of proved civil contempt, the contemnor is suitably dealt with, including imposition of punishment, and direction as well is issued to bridge the breach. (Para 55-57)
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 129,215– Contempt of Courts Act, 1971– The power of the Supreme Court and a high court to punish for breach of its orders is expressly recognised by Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution, respectively. It is an inherent power, distinguishable from a power derived from a statute. (Para 29)- Despite such a power being conferred by the Constitution, what would constitute contempt – civil and criminal – and also, what would be the procedure for initiating action and how to punish for contempt is provided by the Act. (Para 33).
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971– In the vast majority of cases seeking invocation of the provisions of the Act for an alleged civil contempt, institution of proceedings is through a petition or an application containing information made available by a party alleging that the facts disclosed by him do constitute contempt of court and, thus, provide the court the premise for initiating proceedings to commit for contempt. The role of such a party, who brings a petition for contempt and activates the court’s machinery, is merely that of an informer. Despite such a party figuring in the memo of parties as a petitioner, the matter relating to entertainment of his petition and the punishment to be imposed, in case of a proved contempt, relate to the exclusive jurisdiction and authority of the high courts to punish for contempt and is substantially a matter between the court and the alleged contemnor. Whether or not to take the assistance of the petitioning informer is a question which invariably must be left entirely to the discretion of the court seized of the proceedings. (Para 45)
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971– Insofar as an interim order is concerned, despite an element of contempt being involved, if a defence appearing to be valid in law and having substance is raised before the high court by a party in default which shakes the very foundation of the order alleged to have been violated and upon the high court reaching a satisfaction of such a defence being valid to the extent that the subject order ought not to have been passed, it would always be open to the said court, depending on the nature of order and the breach alleged, to first secure compliance of the order by allowing the contemnor to purge the contempt without prejudice to his rights and contentions and, after such compliance, to revisit the order as per law and the circumstances present before it and then pass appropriate orders. There could be exceptional situations where the consequences of complying with an interim order, apparently erroneous or without jurisdiction and which has attained finality, could bring about irretrievable consequences. In such a case, where the high court is satisfied that securing compliance of its order would cause more injustice than justice, notwithstanding the finality attached to such order, the high court’s authority ought to be conceded to pass such order as the justice of the case before it demand. (Para 47)
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971– State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Supreme Court & High Court Judges (2024) 3 SCC 1-Standard Operating Procedure for being followed by the high courts while summoning public officials, alleged to be in contempt, to be physically present in court- Deeply concerned with the lack of self-restraint shown in the exercise of contempt power in certain cases, the Bench directed framing of rules by all the high courts in terms of the SoP, as devised- This Court noted in such decision that mandating the physical presence of a contemnor, specifically in the case of public officials, comes at a cost to the public interest and efficiency of public administration, and thus ought not to be resorted to at the drop of a hat -Concomitantly, there lies a bounden duty on the contemnor to comply with the court’s order without any delay, in a case where legal recourse has not been taken to set aside/review/vacate the order which is alleged to have been breached. A public official against whom an allegation of contempt is levelled, upon being noticed either by issuance of a rule for contempt or by court notice, must work out his remedy in accordance with law if he wishes not to comply with the court’s direction. He must not wait for compliance to be secured only upon all the phased steps to be taken by the high courts in terms of paragraph 44 of State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), forming part of the SoP, are complete. A public official who is arrayed as a contemnor is as much bound by an unchallenged order of a high court as a private party is, and cannot consider himself not bound by the law by virtue of the office he holds. Being under a duty to comply with a final and binding order of a high court, the contemnor ought not to drag his feet in doing the same until the coercive measure of summoning the contemnor to be physically present is resorted to by the high court. (Para 38-39)
Code Of Civil Procedure,1908; Section 114 and Order XLVII – Review – The exercise of review jurisdiction is not an inherent power given to the court; the power to review has to be specifically conferred by law – The provisions contained in section 114 and Order XLVII of the CPC relating to review of an order or decree are mandatory in nature and any petition for review not satisfying the rigours therein cannot be entertained ex debito justitiae, by a court of law. (Para 12) – The general impression is that more the number of grounds, less the likelihood of existence of a case for review. To succeed in a motion for review, viewed through the prism of ‘error apparent on the face of the record’, it does neither require long-drawn arguments nor an elaborate process of reasoning as these may be required, in a given case, when exercising the power of merit review. An error apparent on the face of the record has to be self-evident. Where, conceivably, two opinions can be formed in a given set of facts and circumstances and one opinion of the two has been formed, there is no error apparent on the face of the record. (Para 25) An applicant seeking review on the basis of discovery of new evidence has to demonstrate: first, that there has been discovery of new evidence, of which he had no prior knowledge or that it could not be produced at the time the decree was passed or the order made despite due diligence; and secondly, that the new evidence is material to the order/decree being reviewed in the sense that if the evidence were produced in court when the decree was passed or the order made, the decision of the court would have been otherwise. Ultimately, it is for the court to decide whether a review sought for by an applicant, if granted, would prevent abuse of the process of law and/or miscarriage of justice. (Para 16)
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 226- The principles flowing from the CPC may safely be taken as a guide to decide writ proceedings but to the extent the same can be made applicable. (Para 13)
Legal Maxim – Secundum allegata et probate – The court will arrive at its decision on the basis of the claims and proof led by the parties. (Para 71)
Pleadings – When a point is not traceable in the pleas set out either in a plaint or a written statement, findings rendered on such point by the court would be unsustainable as that would amount to an altogether new case being made out for the party. (Para 71)