In Chandan Kumar Sahoo vs Putul Sahoo, the Calcutta High Court observed thus: It is well settled that the proceedings under Section 498A IPC and under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are quite different, standing on different footings. A proceeding under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is not a criminal Proceeding even if there are allegations of facts which constitute one or more offences in the Penal Code. A proceeding under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is not a criminal Proceeding even if there are allegations of facts which constitute one or more offences in the Penal Code. Whereas, proceeding under section 498A IPC is criminal in nature and the object is to try the perpetrators and punish the guilt while proceeding under Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is to provide civil remedies to the victims of domestic violence which is not available in the criminal law under section 498A IPC. Standard of proof required in two proceedings are entirely different. In civil cases preponderance of probabilities would be sufficient to discharge the onus while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and the proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. In a criminal trial the degree of proof is stricter than what is required in a civil proceeding. A proceeding under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is quasi-criminal in nature and not criminal proceeding so as to attract Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under such circumstances door can not be shut to the aggrieved person simply because of identical facts being pleaded in the previous proceeding under Section 498 A IPC which ended in acquittal.
The Kerala High Court in Sheeja vs KT Anilkumar , observed: The concept of cruelty as contemplated under Section 498A requires a higher degree of cruelty and not mere domestic violence. On the other hand, domestic violence as provided under Section 3 takes in any type of violence meted out by the respondent against the aggrieved person of much lesser degree and may constitute domestic violence. That being the wide amplitude of the definition, which is not essentially one for prosecuting a person for an offence, but for granting relief to the aggrieved person, the court could not have relied on the conclusion arrived at in Ext.D11(judgment of acquittal), to deny the rights of the petitioner herein in this proceedings.
Very recently, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has taken a similar view.