N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7 SCC 123] : The object of fixing time limit for initiation of legal proceedings is not meant to destroy the rights of any party but to fix a life span for legal remedies in public interest and that the expression “sufficient cause” should be construed liberally.
Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. vs. Mst Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107] : In the matter of condonation of delay, as no one stands to gain in lodging an appeal late and when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. Therefore, a liberal approach should normally be adopted in condoning the delay.
G. Ramegowda Major etc. vs. Special Land Acquisition Bangalore [(1988) 2 SCC 142] : Where delay occurs due to fraud and unusual conduct of the Government pleaders, ordinarily delay ought to be condoned.
Ram Nath Sao & Ors. Vs. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195]: The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bonafide is imputable to a party. Therefore, acceptance of the explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception, but in doing so the Courts should not lose sight of the fact that with the expiry of time valuable rights get accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning the delay in a routine manner. The Courts as such have to strike a balance vis-a-vis the corresponding rights of the parties looking to the resultant effects of the order.
New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra [AIR 1976 SC 237] : Discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined or crystalized so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law.
Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari & Ors. [(1969) 1 SCR 1006] : Unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned.
Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi & Ors. [(1979) 3 SCR 694]: A case of negligence of the counsel which misled a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy the default in delay was condoned.
O.P. Kathpaliaa v. Lakhmir Singh (dead) & Ors. [(1984) 4 SCC 66] : If the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned.
Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. [(1987) 2 SCC 107] : In the matter of condonation of delay, as no one stands to gain in lodging an appeal late and when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. Therefore, a liberal approach should normally be adopted in condoning the delay.
State of Harayan vs. Chandra Mani & Ors. [(1996) 3 SCC 132] : The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit.